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ABSTRACT
TOWARDS ETHICAL MACHINE LEARNING:




The challenge of ensuring that tools for data science and machine learning enforce ethical
notions like privacy and fairness is one of the most important facing modern computer
scientists. While the last decade has seen a flurry of research in this area, there are still
significant challenges to using existing algorithms and definitions in practice. This thesis
considers the theoretical questions arising from practical considerations, with an emphasis
on machine learning applications. In particular, we make crucial definitions and obtain
new results towards answering the following questions:
• How can we learn optimally private classifiers subject to a hard accuracy constraint?
• How can we leverage heuristic optimization oracles for private learning while still
maintaining rigorous privacy guarantees?
• How can we extend the coarse fairness protections provided by statistical notions of
fairness to richer subgroup classes?
• How can we learn subject to an individual fairness notion whose metric is not pro-
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1.1. Towards Ethical Machine Learning
Buoyed by the rise of vast technology platforms that collect troves of our most sensitive
data, the digital transformations upending even the most entrenched legacy industries,
and breakthroughs in computing, in the last decade machine learning has become increas-
ingly ingrained in the services that power modern business and daily life. Unlike mere
automation, machine learning promises to do things not only more e ciently, but more
intelligently. Dozens of startups and Fortune 500s alike have promised to make more
accurate loans, tailored advertisements, recidivism decisions, and even beauty contest
judgements Levin (2016). In addition to achieving greater accuracy, at the outset machine
learning models also seemed to hold the promise to be more ethical. After all, by definition
they replace the inconsistent, possibly prejudicial decisions of humans with the certainty of
mathematics. As recently as 2019 conservative columnist Ryan Saavedra ignited a twitter
war with Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez over whether algorithms could be
racist, and the Trump administration has sought to pass housing legislation that protects
algorithm-driven decisions by landlords from any accusations of discrimination Dane
(2019).
Yet in almost every domain where machine learning has been used to make consequential
decisions about humans, there have been documented cases of algorithmic misbehavior.
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These instances of misbehavior are typically of two distinct types: trespasses against users
whose data was input to the algorithm, or adverse outcomes for individuals who are e↵ected
by decisions made by the system. In machine learning parlance, this is a distinction between
users in the training set, and those e↵ected by the model post deployment.
Violations of this first kind, for users in the training set, are a form of privacy violation –
as a result of the witting or unwitting inclusion of their data in the system, private user
data has been exposed. The use of sophisticated algorithms, and the explosion of new data
sources, has been shown in several highly publicized instances to enable re-identification of
data subjects, even when all the released data has been “anonymized”. The most prominent
instance of this was the re-identification attack on the Netflix dataset of Narayanan and
Shmatikov (2008), where anonymized Netflix data was combined with public IMDB data,
and used to re-identify the supposedly anonymous accounts in the Netflix dataset. As a
result, algorithm designers in the public and private sectors have a moral imperative, and
in many instances a legal one, to balance the utility of their products with guaranteeing
meaningful privacy protections for their users.
Violations of this second kind, perpetrated against the end users in the system, are typically
issues of fairness. Whether due to historical bias present in the training data, sample size
disparities for di↵erent sensitive groups, redlining, over even deliberate discrimination,
there exists a protected class of end users who have been significantly harmed relative
to other groups by the algorithm. A particularly impactful example, both for the high-
stakes domain it concerned, and the ensuing publicity and impact it generated, is the
2016 ProPublica article Machine Bias. In it they highlight how the algorithm developed
by for-profit company Northpointe for recidivism prediction in Broward County, Florida
was biased against blacks Angwin et al. (2016). In the last few years well-documented
cases and think pieces on algorithmic discrimination have appeared almost weekly in the
leading news outlets Rudin (2013); Miller (2015a,b), along with a concurrent explosion
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of interdisciplinary research in computer science, philosophy, law, and statistics aimed at
rectifying and codifying bias in algorithms.
Given the flagrant abuses of privacy and fairness discovered in algorithmic decision-making
over the past few years, it can be tempting to condemn algorithmic decision making as
a whole. Indeed, there may be situations in which it is inappropriate for an algorithm
to replace a human being, for a multitude of reasons. That being said, the perspective
of this researcher, is that in most cases it is far more wise to design a better algorithm,
than to forsake the endeavor. After all, human decision makers exhibit precisely the same
proclivities to privacy disclosure and discrimination as algorithms, only in the case of the
latter, it is precisely their algorithmic nature that makes it possible to codify and constrain
these behaviors. The work of designing more fair and private algorithms therefore is the
work of a techno-optimist; a journey across a multitude of di↵erent topics in statistics and
machine learning with the goal of making them more private, fair, and ultimately ethical.
What follows in this thesis is a small but early contribution to this growing field of research,
focusing on the notions of privacy and fairness, with a special emphasis on the theoretical
questions arising from their incorporation into the practice of machine learning.
1.2. Di↵erential Privacy
Many notions of privacy have been proposed in the computer science literature. The most
obvious measure is to remove unique personal identifiers from the dataset. This has been
shown to be woefully inadequate, since attributes that are not obvious unique identifiers can
be used to infer sensitive attributes, particularly when they are combined across multiple
datasets (a procedure known as “linking”). See Davis and Osoba (2016) for a thorough
discussion. A variant of this scheme, termed “syntactic anonymization" seeks to modify
the non-sensitive attributes of the dataset so that the dataset has many indistinguishable
rows - the reasoning being that if k rows are indistinguishable, privacy will be preserved
since each individual’s information is attributed to the group it is a member of rather than
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the individual itself. Syntactic anonymization schemes include k-anonymity, and variants
l-diversity, and t-closeness, all of which have been shown to su↵er major shortcomings
against attribute disclosure attacks. The intuition behind an attribute disclosure attack is that
notions like k-anonymity do not prevent an adversary learning which group of k-records
an individual belongs to, and if the distribution of sensitive attributes in that group is
di↵erent than the overall base rate, group membership can leak sensitive information.
Moreover, variants like t-closeness which try to equalization the group-wise distributions
of sensitive attributes necessarily destroy utility in many settings, and so this appears to
be a fundamental problem with the approach. For a more robust discussion we refer to
Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2008).
Di↵erential privacy, introduced in the seminal paper of Dwork et al. (2006a), marked a
major turning point in the science of private statistical disclosure. Di↵erential privacy
avoids the specific vulnerabilities discussed above, and provides rigorous privacy guaran-
tees even in the face of adversaries with arbitrary prior information. While we give a formal
definition in Section , we briefly motivate di↵erential privacy and build intuition about the
privacy protection it o↵ers to individuals. We then summarize a few basic areas of research
in di↵erential privacy and applications of di↵erential privacy outside of the privacy realm.
Di↵erential privacy is a property of an algorithm A (or sequence of algorithms) operating
on data, rather than a property of a specific output. Thus we wouldn’t determine whether a
specific data analysis result was private, but rather whether the computation that produced
the result itself was private, independent of the actual output. Indeed Wood et al. (2018)
remarks that “research has continually demonstrated that privacy measures that treat
privacy as a property of the output, such as k-anonymity and other traditional statistical
disclosure limitation techniques, will fail to protect privacy," and illustrates this point
with several examples. Informally, we say that a procedure is di↵erentially private, if
any potential adversary can not learn much more about an individual in the dataset’s
private data based on the output of the study, than they could have inferred based on
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the output of the study if the individual did not participate in the study at all. Note that
this is di↵erent than saying that the output of the study doesn’t cause them to learn more
about the individuals private data, than if the study hadn’t been published at all. In the
words of Wood et al. (2018), "Risks of this nature apply to everyone, regardless of whether
they shared personal data through the study or not," what di↵erential privacy mitigates
is the incentive of an individual to not participate or to lie in the study based on privacy
considerations.
Di↵erential privacy achieves this property by injecting random noise into typically deter-
ministic computations, that serve to mask the contributions of individual data points to
the outcome. Determining the precise scale of the added noise, the manner in which it is
injected, and the subsequent privacy-accuracy analysis is a research question that can be
applied to nearly any computation. This started as privatizing simple computations like
releasing aggregate statistics, histograms, and maximizers, to more complex statistical tasks
like linear regression, hypothesis testing, inference, and PCA, to state of the art objectives in
machine learning: clustering, empirical risk minimization, and deep learning. Due to both
the rigorous privacy guarantee di↵erential privacy provides, and as di↵erential privacy
gains increasing acceptance in the legal and commercial spheres, this makes the study of
di↵erential privacy an increasingly compelling lens to tackle interesting and important
research problems across statistics and computer science.
While in this thesis we use either the original definition of di↵erential privacy, called (",0)-
DP, or its relaxation (", )-di↵erential privacy, over the last few years various definitions
of di↵erential privacy have cropped up that seek to rectify problems with the original
definitions; in particular to give tighter privacy analysis of common DP mechanisms like
the Gaussian Mechanism, or tighter analysis of the composition of multiple mechanisms.
As early alternatives have cropped up, further definitions have been proposed to mitigate
the shortcomings of these definitions themselves. Nevertheless, the original notions of
di↵erential privacy remain the most prevalent in both research, and in industry deploy-
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ments . The formal notion of di↵erential privacy is a statement that the max divergence
between the output distribution of A run on a dataset d, and the output distribution on any
neighboring dataset d0 is bounded by ". New definitions also bound some distance measure
between these two output distributions, but do so in subtly di↵erent ways. These include
Concentrated DP (CDP) which imposes a sub-Gaussianity condition on the privacy loss
random variable Dwork and Rothblum (2016), Renyi DP based on the Renyi divergence that
is a relaxation of CDP and satisfies group privacy Mironov (2017), and the very recentf -DP
which formulates privacy in terms of hypothesis testing between Gaussian distributions
Dong et al. (2019). Joint di↵erential privacy Hsu et al. (2013a) is a relaxed notion of di↵er-
ential privacy tailored to allocation problems, which assumes that the outputs to the rest
of the users is private as a function of the input of a given user. This guarantees that by
participating in the allocation problem, even if the other users collude against you, they
can’t infer your private data from their allocations.
Di↵erential privacy is a strong stability property of an algorithm, and as a concept has found
application for uses other than preserving privacy. One fascinating line of work explores
the connection between di↵erential privacy and what is called adaptive data analysis. In
adaptive data analysis, an analyst asks repeated queries against the same dataset d, using
answers to previous queries to formulate the next query. Many common routines fall under
this framework, for example, stepwise regression or hyperparameter tuning of an ML
algorithm. The goal of the mechanism answering the queries is to provide answers that
are approximately accurate, and prevent the analyst from asking a query that “overfits“
the dataset. Alternatives to di↵erential privacy as a stability notion for adaptive data
analysis include KL-stability and compression bounds, with di↵erential privacy attaining
the optimal rates Dwork et al. (2015a). Work by this author not included in this thesis
extends these techniques to data gathered adaptively by bandit algorithms Neel and Roth
(2018), and uses a new simplified proof technique to obtain the best known bounds for
adaptively answering a sequence of low sensitivity queries . Joint di↵erential privacy has
also found use as a technique to incentive truthfulness in allocation problems, beginning
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with the work of Hsu et al. (2013a), and applied in work from this author Jung et al. (2019)
to the problem of private securities lending.
The privacy chapters included in this thesis focus on private machine learning – the task
of approximately finding a hypothesis that minimizes error on a given dataset (ERM),
subject to di↵erential privacy. There is a rich and substantial literature on private convex
ERM, weaving tight connections between standard mechanisms in di↵erential privacy
and standard tools for empirical risk minimization. The proposed methods for private
ERM include output and objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012;
Rubinstein et al., 2009; Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2008), covariance perturbation (Smith
et al., 2017), the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007; Bassily et al., 2014),
and stochastic gradient descent (Bassily et al., 2014; Williams and McSherry, 2010; Jain
et al., 2012; Duchi et al., 2013; Song et al., 2013).
Chapter 3 observes: while the literature above deals with problem of finding the optimally
accurate classifier subject to a fixed privacy budget ", the practitioner may have a hard
accuracy constraint ↵, and simply view privacy as a non-essential desiderata subject to
that accuracy constraint. How can we learn the optimally private classifier subject to a
fixed accuracy constraint? Chapter 4 starts from the observation that while computational
hardness results pervade any realistic machine learning setting, the successful use of
learning heuristics (SGD, convex relaxations, etc.) has allowed the field to flourish. When
learning under the constraint of di↵erential privacy, can we use these same heuristics in a
black-box way, without sacrificing rigorous privacy guarantees?
1.3. Fairness
As machine learning is being deployed in increasingly consequential domains (including
policing (Rudin, 2013), criminal sentencing (Barry-Jester et al., 2015), and lending (Koren,
2016)), the problem of ensuring that learned models are fair has become urgent.
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Prior to the recent focus on fairness in the machine learning literature, fairness has been a
long studied consideration in philosophy, law, and economics. The most prevalent notion,
one which has been codified in various landmark pieces of legislation (Civil Rights Act,
Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunities Act) is known as disparate impact. Barocas and
Selbst (2016) state:
Disparate impact refers to policies or practices that are facially neutral but have a dispropor-
tionately adverse impact on protected classes. Disparate impact is not concerned with the intent
or motive for a policy; where it applies, the doctrine first asks whether there is a disparate impact
on members of a protected class, then whether there is some business justification for that impact,
and finally, whether there were less discriminatory means of achieving the same result.
Even if we agree that disparate impact is a reasonable criterion for discrimination, there is
substantial flexibility on how to translate it into mathematics. In the past few years many
di↵erent formulations have been proposed: equality of opportunity Hardt et al. (2016),
demographic parity, predictive rate parity Hébert-Johnson et al. (2017), counterfactual
fairness Kusner et al. (2017), and individual fairness Dwork et al. (2012) to name a few.
Moreover, it has been shown that many of these definitions are themselves incompatible,
requiring a careful domain-specific chose of fairness metric for any given task Kleinberg
et al. (2016).
That being said, approaches to fairness in machine learning can coarsely be divided into
two kinds: statistical and individual notions of fairness. Statistical notions typically fix a
small number of protected demographic groups G (such as racial groups), and then ask for
(approximate) parity of some statistical measure across all of these groups.
Definition 1.3.1. Fix a collection of “protected groups” G = {G1, . . . ,Gk}. Given k distributions
Di (one for each group) over feature/label pairs (x,y) 2 X ⇥Y and a pair of functions on label
pairs s,g : Y ⇥Y ! {0,1}, a classifier A is "-statistically fair with respect to (s,g) and G if for each
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pair of groups i, j :
E(x,y)⇠Di [s(A(x), y)|g(A(x), y) = 1]  E(x,y)⇠Dj [s(A(x), y)|g(A(x), y) = 1] + "
One popular statistical measure asks for equality of false positive or negative rates across
all groups in G (this is also sometimes referred to as an equal opportunity constraint (Hardt
et al., 2016)). Another asks for equality of classification rates (also known as statistical
parity). These statistical notions of fairness are the kinds of fairness definitions most
common in the literature (see e.g. Kamiran and Calders (2012); Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer
(2013); Kleinberg et al. (2017); Hardt et al. (2016); Friedler et al. (2016); Zafar et al. (2017);
Chouldechova (2017)).
One main attraction of statistical definitions of fairness is that they can in principle be
obtained and checked without making any assumptions about the underlying population,
and hence lead to more immediately actionable algorithmic approaches. On the other hand,
individual notions of fairness ask for the algorithm to satisfy some guarantee which binds
at the individual, rather than group, level. This often has the semantics that “individuals
who are similar” should be treated “similarly”, or “less qualified individuals should not be
favored over more qualified individuals” (Joseph et al., 2016).
Interestingly, one of the earliest notions of fairness proposed in machine learning observes
that their definition is in fact a generalization of the notion of di↵erential privacy Dwork
et al. (2012):
Definition 1.3.2 (Dwork et al. (2012)). Fixing a distance metric d between individuals, and a




Individual notions of fairness have attractively strong semantics, but their main drawback
is that achieving them seemingly requires more assumptions to be made about the setting
under consideration.
The fairness chapters in this thesis focus on mitigating the practical drawbacks of these
two most common types of fairness definitions: designing statistical notions that give finer
grained guarantees, and solving the problem of choosing a metric d for individual notions
of fairness by learning d from data gathered from a panel of experts. In the next section we
elaborate more on the results obtained.
1.4. Results
Broadly speaking the first two chapters focus on removing existing practical obstacles to
di↵erentially private machine learning, and are in the spirit of other papers completed
during the Ph.D. but not included in the thesis [Joseph et al. (2019), Neel et al. (2019)].
Chapters 5, 6 focus on mitigating the shortcomings of popular notions of fairness in
supervised learning, and developing learning algorithms that are fair with respect to these
new fairness notions.
Chapter 3 starts with the observation that traditional approaches to di↵erential privacy
assume a fixed privacy requirement " for a computation, and attempt to maximize the
accuracy of the computation subject to the privacy constraint. As di↵erential privacy is
increasingly deployed in practical settings, it may often be that there is instead a fixed
accuracy requirement for a given computation and the data analyst would like to maximize
the privacy of the computation subject to the accuracy constraint. This raises the question
of how to find and run a maximally private empirical risk minimizer subject to a given
accuracy requirement.
• We propose a general “noise reduction” framework that can apply to a variety of
private empirical risk minimization (ERM) algorithms, using them to “search” the
space of privacy levels to find the empirically strongest one that meets the accuracy
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constraint, incurring only logarithmic overhead in the number of privacy levels
searched.
• The privacy analysis of our algorithm leads naturally to a new version of di↵erential
privacy where the privacy parameters are dependent on the data, which we term
ex-post privacy, and which is related to the recently introduced notion of privacy
odometers.
• We also give an ex-post privacy analysis of the classical AboveThreshold privacy tool,
modifying it to allow for queries chosen depending on the database.
• Finally, we apply our approach to two common objectives, regularized linear and
logistic regression, and empirically compare our noise reduction methods to (i) invert-
ing the theoretical utility guarantees of standard private ERM algorithms and (ii) a
stronger, empirical baseline based on binary search.
Chapter 4 develops theory for using heuristics to solve computationally hard problems in
di↵erential privacy. Heuristic approaches have enjoyed tremendous success in machine
learning, for which performance can be empirically evaluated. However, privacy guaran-
tees cannot be evaluated empirically, and must be proven — without making heuristic
assumptions.
• We show that learning problems over broad classes of functions — those that have
polynomially sized universal identification sets — can be solved privately and e -
ciently, assuming the existence of a non-private oracle for solving the same problem.
• Our first algorithm yields a privacy guarantee that is contingent on the correctness
of the oracle. We then give a reduction which applies to a class of heuristics which
we call certifiable, which allows us to convert oracle-dependent privacy guarantees to
worst-case privacy guarantee that hold even when the heuristic standing in for the
oracle might fail in adversarial ways.
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Finally, we consider classes of functions for which both they and their dual classes have
small universal identification sets. This includes most classes of simple boolean functions
studied in the PAC learning literature, including conjunctions, disjunctions, parities, and
discrete halfspaces.
• We show that there is an e cient algorithm for privately constructing synthetic data
for any such class, given a non-private learning oracle. ’This in particular gives the
first oracle-e cient algorithm for privately generating synthetic data for contingency
tables.
The most intriguing question left open by our work is whether or not every problem that can
be solved di↵erentially privately can be privately solved with an oracle-e cient algorithm.
While we do not resolve this, we give a barrier result that suggests that any generic oracle-
e cient reduction must fall outside of a natural class of algorithms (which includes the
algorithms given in this chapter).
Chapter 5 aims to solve the so-called gerrymandering problem with statistical fairness
notions. This is the situation in which a classifier appears to be fair on each individual
group, but badly violates the fairness constraint on one ormore structured subgroups defined
over the protected attributes (such as certain combinations of protected attribute values),
which we call rich subgroup fairness. We propose instead to demand statistical notions of
fairness across exponentially (or infinitely) many subgroups, defined by a structured class
of functions over the protected attributes. This interpolates between statistical definitions
of fairness, and recently proposed individual notions of fairness, but it raises several
computational challenges. It is no longer clear how to even check or audit a fixed classifier
to see if it satisfies such a strong definition of fairness. Our results address both the problem
of auditing with respect to rich subgroup fairness, and learning the optimally accurate rich
subgroup fair classifier. We show:
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• The computational problem of auditing subgroup fairness for both equality of false
positive rates and statistical parity is equivalent to the problem of weak agnostic
learning.
This means it is computationally hard in the worst case, even for simple structured sub-
classes. However, it also suggests that common heuristics for learning can be applied to
successfully solve the auditing problem in practice.
• We then derive two algorithms that provably converge to the best fair distribution
over classifiers in a given class, given access to oracles which can optimally solve the
agnostic learning problem.
The algorithms are based on a formulation of subgroup fairness as a two-player zero-
sum game between a Learner (the primal player) and an Auditor (the dual player). Both
algorithms compute an equilibrium of this game. We obtain our first algorithm by sim-
ulating play of the game by having Learner play an instance of the no-regret Follow the
Perturbed Leader algorithm, and having Auditor play best response. This algorithm provably
converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium (and thus to an approximately optimal
subgroup-fair distribution over classifiers) in a polynomial number of steps. We obtain
our second algorithm by simulating play of the game by having both players play Fictitious
Play, which enjoys only provably asymptotic convergence, but has the merit of simplicity
and faster per-step computation. We implement the Fictitious Play version using linear
regression as a heuristic oracle, and show that we can e↵ectively both audit and learn fair
classifiers on real datasets.
Chapter 6 solves the problem of implementing individual fairness without knowing the
distance metric, under the assumption that we have access to random pairs from the
data distribution scored by the distance metric. We make no assumption that these pairs
are consistent with any metric. By formulating the problem of learning the optimal fair
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classifier as computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum game,
using techniques similar to those developed in Chapter 5 we:
• Provide a provably convergent oracle-e cient algorithm for minimizing error subject
to the fairness constraints, and prove generalization theorems for both accuracy and
fairness.
Since the constrained pairs could be elicited either from a panel of judges, or from particular
individuals, our framework also provides a means for algorithmically enforcing subjective
notions of fairness.
• We report on preliminary findings of a behavioral study of subjective fairness using





We now develop key definitions and statements that are used throughout this thesis. We
first formally define di↵erential privacy, and some of its basic properties, which appear
in Chapters 3, 4. We then define the types of optimization oracles and notions of oracle-
e ciency and dependence that are used in Chapters 4, 5, 6.
2.1. Di↵erential Privacy
Let X denote a d-dimensional data domain (e.g. Rd or {0,1}d). We write n to denote the
size of a dataset S . We call two data sets S,S 0 2 X n neighbors (written as S ⇠ S 0) if S can be
derived from S 0 by replacing a single data point with some other element of X . We can now
define the notion of approximate or (", )-di↵erential privacy.
Definition 2.1.1 (Di↵erential Privacy Dwork et al. (2006b,c)). Fix ",    0. A randomized
algorithm A : X ⇤ ! O is (", )-di↵erentially private if for every pair of neighboring data sets
S ⇠ S 0 2 X ⇤, and for every event ⌦ ✓ O:
Pr[A(S) 2⌦]  exp(")Pr[A(S 0) 2⌦] +  .
We say A is "-di↵erentially private or satisfies "-pure di↵erential privacy if   = 0 above.
Di↵erentially private computations enjoy two nice properties:
Theorem 2.1.2 (Post Processing Dwork et al. (2006b,c)). Let A : X ⇤ ! O be any (", )-
di↵erentially private algorithm, and let f : O ! O0 be any function. Then the algorithm
f  A : X ⇤ ! O0 is also (", )-di↵erentially private.
Post-processing implies that, for example, every decision process based on the output of a
di↵erentially private algorithm is also di↵erentially private.
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Theorem 2.1.3 (Basic Composition Dwork et al. (2006b,c)). Let A1 : X ⇤ ! O, A2 : O ⇥X ⇤ !
O0 be such thatA1 is ("1, 1)-di↵erentially private, andA2(o, ·) is ("2, 2)-di↵erentially private for
every o 2 O. Then the algorithm A : X ⇤ ! O0 defined as A(x) =A2(A1(x),x) is ("1 + "2, 1 +  2)-
di↵erentially private.
The Laplace distribution plays a fundamental role in di↵erential privacy. The Laplace
Distribution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribution with probability density function
Lap(z|b) = 12b e
  |z|b . We write X ⇠ Lap(b) when X is a random variable drawn from a Laplace
distribution with scale b. Let f : X n! Rk be an arbitrary function. The `1 sensitivity of f
is defined to be  1(f ) = maxS⇠S 0 kf (S)  f (S 0)k1. The Laplace mechanism with parameter "





to each coordinate of f (S).
Theorem 2.1.4 ((Dwork et al., 2006b)). The Laplace mechanism is "-di↵erentially private.
2.2. Oracle-E cient Algorithms
In chapters 4, 5, and 6 will often refer to optimization oracles and oracle-e cient algorithms.
It will be useful for us to study oracles that solve weighted generalizations of the mini-
mization problem, in which each datapoint xi 2 S is paired with a real-valued weight wi .
In the literature on oracle-e ciency in machine learning, these are widely employed, and
are known as cost-sensitive classification oracles. Via a simple translation and re-weighting
argument, they are no more powerful than agnostic learning oracles Zadrozny et al. (2003),
but are more convenient to work with. We formally define weak agnostic learning (Chapter
5), weighted (private) optimization oracles (Chapter 4), and cost-sensitive classification
below (Chapters 5, 6). We will also define the notion of certifiability of an oracle (Chapter
4), which is an oracle that may not perfectly solve the optimization problem it is given, but
when it does fail outputs “FAIL”. Throughout the chapters we will use statistical queries Q
interchangeably with a hypothesis class H. Specifically we refer to queries in the context of
private data release, and hypothesis classes in the context of learning; in either case they
are simply functions from the data domain X to [0,1] or {0,1} depending on the context.
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Definition 2.2.1 (Weak Agnostic Learning (Kearns et al., 1994; Kalai et al., 2008)). Let Q be
a distribution over X ⇥ {0,1} and let ","0 2 (0,1/2) such that "   "0. We say that the hypothesis
classH is (","0)-weakly agnostically learnable under distribution Q if there exists an algorithm
L such that when given sample access to Q, L runs in time poly(1/"0 ,1/ ), and with probability
1   , outputs a hypothesis h 2H such that
min
f 2H
err(f ,Q)  1/2  " =) err(h,Q)  1/2  "0 .
where err(h,Q) = Pr(x,y)⇠Q[h(x) , y].
Formally, an instance of a cost-sensitive classification (CSC) problem for the classH is given




i=1 such that c
`
i corresponds to the cost for predicting label `
on point Xi . Given such an instance as input, a CSC oracle finds a hypothesis ĥ 2H that
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A crucial property of a CSC problem is that the solution is invariant to translations of the
costs.
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We now define certifiability, and the notion of an oracle-dependent algorithm.
Definition 2.2.3. A weighted optimization oracle for a class of statistical queries Q is a function
O⇤ : (X ⇥ R)⇤ ! Q takes as input a weighted dataset WD 2 (X ⇥ R)⇤ and outputs a query








Definition 2.2.4. A certifiable heuristic optimization oracle for a class of queries Q is a polyno-
mial time algorithm O : (X ⇥R)⇤ ! (Q[?) that takes as input a weighted datasetWD 2 (X ⇥R)⇤




⇤(xi) or else outputs ? (“Fail”). If it
outputs a statistical query q, we say the oracle has succeeded.
In contrast, a heuristic optimization oracle (that is not certifiable) has no guarantees of
correctness. Without loss of generality, such oracles never need to return “Fail” (since they
can always instead output a default statistical query in this case).
Definition 2.2.5. A (non-certifiable) heuristic optimization oracle for a class of queries Q is an
arbitrary polynomial time algorithm M : (X ⇥R)⇤ ! Q. Given a call to the oracle defined by a
weighted dataset WD 2 (X ⇥R)⇤ we say that the oracle has succeeded on this call up to error ↵ if








⇤(xi) +↵. If it succeeds up
to error 0, we just say that the heuristic oracle has succeeded. Note that there may not be any
e cient procedure to determine whether the oracle has succeeded up to error ↵.
We say an algorithm AO is (certifiable)-oracle dependent if throughout the course of its run
it makes a series of (possibly adaptive) calls to a (certifiable) heuristic optimization oracle
O. An oracle-dependent algorithm AO is oracle equivalent to an algorithm A if given access
to a perfect optimization oracle O⇤, AO⇤ induces the same distribution on outputs as A. We
now state an intuitive lemma (that could also be taken as a more formal definition of oracle
equivalence). See the Appendix for a proof.
Lemma 2.2.6. Let AO be a certifiable-oracle dependent algorithm that is oracle equivalent to A.
Then for any fixed input dataset S , there exists a coupling between A(S) and AO(S) such that
Pr[AO(S) = a|AO(S) ,?] = Pr[A(S) = a|AO(S) ,?].
We will also discuss di↵erentially private heuristic optimization oracles, in order to state
additional consequences of our construction in Section 4.4. Note that because di↵erential
privacy precludes exact computations, di↵erentially private heuristic oracles are necessarily
non-certifiable, and will never succeed up to error 0.
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Definition 2.2.7. A weighted (", )-di↵erentially private (↵, )-accurate learning oracle for a
class of statistical queries Q is an (", ) di↵erentially private algorithm O : (X ⇥R)⇤ ! C that









⇤(xi )  ↵
We say that an algorithm is oracle-e cient if given access to an oracle (in this chapter,
always a weighted optimization oracle for a class of statistical queries) it runs in polynomial
time in the length of its input, and makes a polynomial number of calls to the oracle. In
practice, we will be interested in the performance of oracle-e cient algorithms when they
are instantiated with heuristic oracles. Thus, we further require oracle-e cient algorithms
to halt in polynomial time even when the oracle fails. When we design algorithms for
optimization and synthetic data generation problems, their (↵, )-accuracy guarantees will
generally rely on all queries to the oracle succeeding (possibly up to error O(↵)).
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CHAPTER 3
Accuracy First: Selecting a Di↵erential Privacy in ERM
3.1. Introduction
While di↵erential privacy enjoys over a decade of study as a theoretical construct, practical
deployments, including by Google (Fanti et al., 2015) and Apple (Greenberg, 2016), are
a much more recent occurrence. As the large theoretical literature is put into practice,
we start to see disconnects between assumptions implicit in the theory and the practical
necessities of applications. In this chapter we focus our attention on one such assumption
in the domain of private empirical risk minimization (ERM): that the data analyst first
chooses a privacy requirement, and then attempts to obtain the best accuracy guarantee (or
empirical performance) that she can, given the chosen privacy constraint. Existing theory is
tailored to this view: the data analyst can pick her privacy parameter " via some exogenous
process, and either plug it into a “utility theorem” to upper bound her accuracy loss, or
simply deploy her algorithm and (privately) evaluate its performance.
While existing algorithms take a privacy-first perspective, in practice, product requirements
may impose hard accuracy constraints, and privacy (while desirable) may not be the over-
riding concern. In such situations, things are reversed: the data analyst first fixes an
accuracy requirement, and then would like to find the smallest privacy parameter consistent
with the accuracy constraint. Here, we find a gap between theory and practice. The only
theoretically sound method available is to take a “utility theorem” for an existing private
ERM algorithm and solve for the smallest value of " (the di↵erential privacy parameter)—
and other parameter values that need to be set—consistent with her accuracy requirement,
and then run the private ERM algorithm with the resulting ". But because utility theorems
tend to be worst-case bounds, this approach will generally be extremely conservative,
leading to a much larger value of " (and hence a much larger leakage of information) than
is necessary for the problem at hand. Alternately, the analyst could attempt an empirical
20
search for the smallest value of " consistent with her accuracy goals. However, because this
search is itself a data-dependent computation, it incurs the overhead of additional privacy
loss. Furthermore, it is not a priori clear how to undertake such a search with nontrivial
privacy guarantees for two reasons: first, the worst case could involve a very long search
which reveals a large amount of information, and second, the selected privacy parameter
is now itself a data-dependent quantity, and so it is not sensible to claim a “standard”
guarantee of di↵erential privacy for any finite value of " ex-ante.
In this chapter, we describe, analyze, and empirically evaluate a principled variant of this
second approach, which attempts to empirically find the smallest value of " consistent with
an accuracy requirement. We give a meta-method that can be applied to several interesting
classes of private learning algorithms and introduces very little privacy overhead as a result
of the privacy-parameter search. Conceptually, our meta-method initially computes a very
private hypothesis, and then gradually subtracts noise (making the computation less and
less private) until a su cient level of accuracy is achieved. One key technique that saves
significant factors in privacy loss over naive search is the use of correlated noise generated
by the method of (Koufogiannis et al., 2017), which formalizes the conceptual idea of
“subtracting” noise without incurring additional privacy overhead. In order to select the
most private of these queries that meets the accuracy requirement, we introduce a natural
modification of the now-classic AboveThreshold algorithm (Dwork and Roth, 2014a), which
iteratively checks a sequence of queries on a dataset and privately releases the index of
the first to approximately exceed some fixed threshold. Its privacy cost increases only
logarithmically with the number of queries. We provide an analysis of AboveThreshold that
holds even if the queries themselves are the result of di↵erentially private computations,
showing that if AboveThreshold terminates after t queries, one only pays the privacy costs
of AboveThreshold plus the privacy cost of revealing those first t private queries. When
combined with the above-mentioned correlated noise technique of (Koufogiannis et al.,
2017), this gives an algorithm whose privacy loss is equal to that of the final hypothesis
output – the previous ones coming “for free” – plus the privacy loss of AboveThreshold.
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Because the privacy guarantees achieved by this approach are not fixed a priori, but rather
are a function of the data, we introduce and apply a new, corresponding privacy notion,
which we term ex-post privacy, and which is closely related to the recently introduced
notion of “privacy odometers” (Rogers et al., 2016).
In Section 3.4, we empirically evaluate our noise reduction meta-method, which applies to
any ERM technique which can be described as a post-processing of the Laplace mechanism.
This includes both direct applications of the Laplace mechanism, like output perturbation
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011); and more sophisticated methods like covariance perturbation
(Smith et al., 2017), which perturbs the covariance matrix of the data and then performs an
optimization using the noisy data. Our experiments concentrate on `2 regularized least-
squares regression and `2 regularized logistic regression, and we apply our noise reduction
meta-method to both output perturbation and covariance perturbation. Our empirical
results show that the active, ex-post privacy approach massively outperforms inverting the
theory curve, and also improves on a baseline “"-doubling” approach.
3.2. Ex-post Di↵erential Privacy
3.2.1. Definition
It is possible to design computations that do not satisfy the di↵erential privacy definition,
but whose outputs are private to an extent that can be quantified after the computation
halts. For example, consider an experiment that repeatedly runs an "0-di↵erentially private
algorithm, until a stopping condition defined by the output of the algorithm itself is met.
This experiment does not satisfy "-di↵erential privacy any fixed value of ", since there is no
fixed maximum number of rounds for which the experiment will run (for a fixed number of
rounds, a simple composition theorem, 2.1.3, shows that the "-guarantees in a sequence of
computations “add up.”) However, if ex-post we see that the experiment has stopped after k
rounds, the data can in some sense be assured an “ex-post privacy loss” of only k"0. Rogers
et al. Rogers et al. (2016) initiated the study of privacy odometers, which formalize this idea.
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Conceptually, if a data scientist is constrained to obey a di↵erential privacy constraint of
" over all computations run on a particular data set, then she can make better use of her
data by accounting for the actual, ex post, privacy losses of her algorithms rather than their
worst-case upper bounds.
We apply a related idea here, for a di↵erent purpose. Our goal is to design algorithms that
always achieve a target accuracy but that may have variable privacy levels depending on
their input.
Definition 3.2.1. Given a randomized algorithm A : X ⇤ ! O, define the ex-post privacy loss1





Pr[A(D0) = o] .
We refer to exp(Loss(o)) as the ex-post privacy risk factor.
Definition 3.2.2 (Ex-Post Di↵erential Privacy). Let E : O! (R 0 [ {1}) be a function on the
outcome space of algorithm A : X ⇤ ! O. Given an outcome o = A(D), We say that A satisfies
E(o)-ex-post di↵erential privacy if for all o 2 O, Loss(o)  E(o).
Note that if E(o)  " for all o, A is "-di↵erentially private. Ex-post di↵erential privacy has
the same semantics as di↵erential privacy, once the output of the mechanism is known:
it bounds the log-likelihood ratio of the dataset being D vs. D0, which controls how an
adversary with an arbitrary prior on the two cases can update her posterior.
3.2.2. Gradual Private Release
Koufogiannis et al. Koufogiannis et al. (2017) study how to gradually release private data
using the Laplace mechanism with an increasing sequence of " values, with a privacy cost
scaling only with the privacy of the marginal distribution on the least private release, rather
than the sum of the privacy costs of independent releases. For intuition, the algorithm can
be pictured as a continuous random walk starting at some private data v with the property
1If A’s output is from a continuous distribution rather than discrete, we abuse notation and write Pr[A(D) =
o] to mean the probability density at output o.
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that the marginal distribution at each point in time is Laplace centered at v, with variance
increasing over time. Releasing the value of the random walk at a fixed point in time gives a
certain output distribution, for example, v̂, with a certain privacy guarantee ". To produce
v̂0 whose ex-ante distribution has higher variance (is more private), one can simply “fast
forward” the random walk from a starting point of v̂ to reach v̂0; to produce a less private
v̂0, one can “rewind.” The total privacy cost is max{","0} because, given the “least private”
point (say v̂), all “more private” points can be derived as post-processings given by taking a
random walk of a certain length starting at v̂. Note that were the Laplace random variables
used for each release independent, the composition theorem would require summing the "
values of all releases.
In our private algorithms, we will use this noise reduction mechanism as a building
block to generate a list of private hypotheses ✓1, . . . ,✓T with gradually increasing " values.
Importantly, releasing any prefix (✓1, . . . ,✓t) only incurs the privacy loss in ✓t . More
formally:
Algorithm 1 Noise Reduction Koufogiannis et al. (2017): NR(v, , {"t})
Input: private vector v, sensitivity parameter  , list "1 < "2 < · · · < "T
Set v̂T := v +Lap( /"T ) . drawn i.i.d. for each coordinate






: set v̂t := v̂t+1
Else: set v̂t := v̂t+1 +Lap( /"t) . drawn i.i.d. for each coordinate
Return v̂1, . . . , v̂T
Theorem 3.2.3 (Koufogiannis et al. (2017)). Let f have `1 sensitivity   and let v̂1, . . . , v̂T be
the output of Algorithm 1 on v = f (D),  , and the increasing list "1, . . . ,"T . Then for any t, the
algorithm which outputs the prefix (v̂1, . . . , v̂t) is "t-di↵erentially private.
3.2.3. AboveThreshold with Private Queries
Our high-level approach to our eventual ERM problem will be as follows: Generate a
sequence of hypotheses ✓1, . . . ,✓T , each with increasing accuracy and decreasing privacy;
then test their accuracy levels sequentially, outputting the first one whose accuracy is “good
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enough.” The classical AboveThreshold algorithm (Dwork and Roth, 2014a) takes in a
dataset and a sequence of queries and privately outputs the index of the first query to exceed
a given threshold (with some error due to noise). We would like to use AboveThreshold
to perform these accuracy checks, but there is an important obstacle: for us, the “queries”
themselves depend on the private data. 2 A standard composition analysis would involve
first privately publishing all the queries, then running AboveThreshold on these queries
(which are now public). Intuitively, though, it would be much better to generate and publish
the queries one at a time, until AboveThreshold halts, at which point one would not publish
any more queries. The problem with analyzing this approach is that, a-priori, we do not
know when AboveThreshold will terminate; to address this, we analyze its ex-post privacy.3
Algorithm 2 InteractiveAboveThreshold: IAT(D,",W , ,M)
Input: Dataset D, privacy loss ", threshold W , `1 sensitivity  , algorithm M





for each query t = 1, . . . ,T do
Query ft  M(D)t





  Ŵ : then Output (t, ft); Halt.
Output (T , ?).
Let us say that an algorithm M(D) = (f1, . . . , fT ) is ("1, . . . ,"T )-prefix-private if for each t, the
function that runs M(D) and outputs just the prefix (f1, . . . , ft) is "t-di↵erentially private.
Lemma 3.2.4. Let M : X ⇤ ! (X ⇤ ! O)T be a ("1, . . . ,"T )-prefix private algorithm that returns
T queries, and let each query output by M have `1 sensitivity at most  . Then Algorithm 2 run
on D, "A, W ,  , and M is E-ex-post di↵erentially private for E((t, ·)) = "A + "t for any t 2 [T ].
The proof, which is a variant on the proof of privacy for AboveThreshold Dwork and Roth
(2014a), appears in the Appendix, along with an accuracy theorem for IAT.
2In fact, there are many applications beyond our own in which the sequence of queries input to AboveThresh-
old might be the result of some private prior computation on the data, and where we would like to release
both the stopping index of AboveThreshold and the “query object.” (In our case, the query objects will be
parameterized by learned hypotheses ✓1, . . . ,✓T .)
3This result does not follow from a straightforward application of privacy odometers from Rogers et al.
(2016), because the privacy analysis of algorithms like the noise reduction technique is not compositional.
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Remark 3.2.5. Throughout we study "-di↵erential privacy, instead of the weaker (", ) (approxi-
mate) di↵erential privacy. Part of the reason is that an analogue of 3.2.4 does not seem to hold for
(", )-di↵erentially private queries without further assumptions, as the necessity to union-bound
over the   “failure probability” that the privacy loss is bounded for each query can erase the
ex-post gains. We leave obtaining similar results for approximate di↵erential privacy as an open
problem.
3.3. Noise-Reduction with Private ERM
In this section, we provide a general private ERM framework that allows us to approach the
best privacy guarantee achievable on the data given a target excess risk goal. Throughout
the section, we consider an input dataset D that consists of n row vectors X1,X2, . . . ,Xn 2 Rp
and a column y 2 Rn. We will assume that each kXik1  1 and |yi |  1. Let di = (Xi,yi ) 2 Rp+1
be the i-th data record. Let ` be a loss function such that for any hypothesis ✓ and any
data point (Xi,yi) the loss is `(✓, (Xi,yi)). Given an input dataset D and a regularization
parameter  , the goal is to minimize the following regularized empirical loss function over











Let ✓⇤ = argmin✓2C `(✓,D). Given a target accuracy parameter ↵, we wish to privately
compute a ✓p that satisfies L(✓p,D)  L(✓⇤,D) +↵, while achieving the best ex-post privacy
guarantee. For simplicity, we will sometimes write L(✓) for L(✓,D).
One simple baseline approach is a “doubling method”: Start with a small " value, run an "-
di↵erentially private algorithm to compute a hypothesis ✓ and use the Laplace mechanism
to estimate the excess risk of ✓; if the excess risk is lower than the target, output ✓; otherwise
double the value of " and repeat the same process. (See the appendix for details.) As a
result, we pay for privacy loss for every hypothesis we compute and every excess risk we
estimate.
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Our meta-method provides a more cost-e↵ective way to select the privacy level. The
algorithm takes a more refined set of privacy levels "1 < . . . < "T as input and generates a
sequence of hypotheses ✓1, . . . ,✓T such that the generation of each ✓t is "t-private. Then
it releases the hypotheses ✓t in order, halting when a hypothesis meets the accuracy goal.
Importantly, there are two key components that reduce the privacy loss in our method:
1. We use 1, the “noise reduction” method of Koufogiannis et al. (2017), for generating
the sequence of hypotheses: we first compute a very private and noisy ✓1, and then
obtain the subsequent hypotheses by gradually “de-noising” ✓1. As a result, any
prefix (✓1, . . . ,✓k) incurs a privacy loss of only "k (as opposed to ("1 + . . .+ "k) if the
hypotheses were independent).
2. When evaluating the excess risk of each hypothesis, we use 2, InteractiveAboveThresh-
old, to determine if its excess risk exceeds the target threshold. This incurs substan-
tially less privacy loss than independently evaluating the excess risk of each hypothesis
using the Laplace mechanism (and hence allows us to search a finer grid of values).
For the rest of this section, we will instantiate our method concretely for two ERM problems:
ridge regression and logistic regression. In particular, our noise-reduction method is based
on two private ERM algorithms: the recently introduced covariance perturbation technique
of Smith et al. (2017), and output perturbation Chaudhuri et al. (2011).
3.3.1. Covariance Perturbation for Ridge Regression
In ridge regression, we consider the squared loss function: `((Xi,yi),✓) = 12(yi   h✓,Xii)2,








where X denotes the (n ⇥ p) matrix with row vectors X1, . . . ,Xn and y = (y1, . . . , yn). Since




(see the appendix for a proof), we will focus on optimizing ✓ over the constrained set
C = {a 2 Rp | kak2 
p
1/ }, which will be useful for bounding the `1 sensitivity of the
empirical loss.
Before we formally introduce the covariance perturbation algorithm due to Smith et al.











In other words, ✓⇤ only depends on the private data through X|y and X|X. To compute
a private hypothesis, the covariance perturbation method simply adds Laplace noise to
each entry of X|y and X|X (the covariance matrix), and solves the optimization based on
the noisy matrix and vector. The formal description of the algorithm and its guarantee are
in 3.3.1. Our analysis slightly deviates from the one in Smith et al. (2017) because that
paper considers the “local privacy” setting, and also adds Gaussian noise whereas we use
Laplace. The proof is deferred to the appendix.










where B 2 Rp⇥p and b 2 Rp⇥1 are random Laplace matrices such that each entry of B and b is














In our algorithm CovNR, we will apply the noise reduction method, 1, to produce a
sequence of noisy versions of the private data (X|X,X|y): (Z1, z1), . . . , (ZT ,zT ), one for each
privacy level. Then for each (Zt,zt), we will compute the private hypothesis by solving the
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noisy version of the optimization problem in 3.1. The full description of our algorithm
CovNR is in 3, and satisfies the following guarantee:
Algorithm 3 Covariance Perturbation with Noise-Reduction: CovNR(D, {"1, . . . ,"T },↵, )
Input: private data set D = (X,y), accuracy parameter ↵, privacy levels "1 < "2 < . . . < "T ,
and failure probability  
Instantiate InteractiveAboveThreshold: A = IAT(D,"0, ↵/2, , ·) with "0 =
16 (log(2T / ))/↵ and   = (
p
1/ +1)2/(n)
Let C = {a 2 Rp | kak2 
p
1/ } and ✓⇤ = argmin✓2C L(✓)
Compute noisy data:
{Zt} =NR((X|X),2, {"1/2, . . . ,"T /2}), {zt} =NR((X|Y ),2, {"1/2, . . . ,"T /2})












Let f t(D) = L(✓⇤,D) L(✓t ,D); Query A with query f t to check accuracy
if A returns (t, f t) then Output (t,✓t) . Accurate hypothesis found.
Output: (?,✓⇤)
Theorem 3.3.2. The instantiation of CovNR(D, {"1, . . . ,"T },↵, ) outputs a hypothesis ✓p that
with probability 1   satisfies L(✓p) L(✓⇤)  ↵. Moreover, it is E-ex-post di↵erentially private,
where the privacy loss function E : (([T ][ {?})⇥Rp)! (R 0[ {1}) is defined as E((k, ·)) = "0+"k




n↵ is the privacy loss incurred by IAT.
3.3.2. Output Perturbation for Logistic Regression
Next, we show how to combine the output perturbation method with noise reduction for
the ridge regression problem.4 In this setting, the input data consists of n labeled examples
(X1, y1), . . . , (Xn,yn), such that for each i, Xi 2 Rp, kXik1  1, and yi 2 { 1,1}. The goal is to
train a linear classifier given by a weight vector ✓ for the examples from the two classes. We












4We study the ridge regression problem for concreteness. Our method works for any ERM problem with
strongly convex loss functions.
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The output perturbation method is straightforward: we simply add Laplace noise to perturb
each coordinate of the optimal solution ✓⇤. The following is the formal guarantee of output
perturbation. Our analysis deviates slightly from the one in Chaudhuri et al. (2011) since
we are adding Laplace noise (see the appendix).
Theorem 3.3.3. Fix any " > 0. Let r = 2
p
p
n " . For any input dataset D, consider the mechanism
that first computes ✓⇤ = argmin✓2Rp L(✓), then outputs ✓p = ✓
⇤ + b, where b is a random vector











Given the output perturbation method, we can simply apply the noise reduction methodNR
to generate a sequence of noisy hypotheses. We will again use InteractiveAboveThreshold
to check the excess risk of the hypotheses. The full algorithm OutputNR follows the same
structure in 3, and we defer the formal description to the appendix.
Theorem 3.3.4. The instantiation of OutputNR(D,"0, {"1, . . . ,"T },↵, ) is E-ex-post di↵eren-
tially private and outputs a hypothesis ✓p that with probability 1   satisfies L(✓p) L(✓⇤)  ↵,
where the privacy loss function E : (([T ][ {?})⇥Rp)! (R 0[ {1}) is defined as E((k, ·)) = "0+"k




n↵ is the privacy loss incurred by IAT.
Proof sketch of 3.3.4. The accuracy guarantees for both algorithms follow from an accuracy
guarantee of the IAT algorithm (a variant on the standard AboveThreshold bound) and the
fact that we output ✓⇤ if IAT identifies no accurate hypothesis. For the privacy guarantee,
first note that any prefix of the noisy hypotheses ✓1, . . . ,✓t satisfies "t-di↵erential privacy
because of our instantiation of the Laplace mechanism (see the appendix for the `1 sensitiv-
ity analysis) and noise-reduction method NR. Then the ex-post privacy guarantee directly
follows 3.2.4.
3.4. Experiments
To evaluate the methods described above, we conducted empirical evaluations in two
settings. We used ridge regression to predict (log) popularity of posts on Twitter in the
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dataset of at Laboratoire d’Informatique de Grenoble (2017), with p = 77 features and
subsampled to n =100,000 data points. Logistic regression was applied to classifying
network events as innocent or malicious in the KDD-99 Cup dataset KDD’99 (1999), with
38 features and subsampled to 100,000 points. Details of parameters and methods appear
in the appendix.
In each case, we tested the algorithm’s average ex-post privacy loss for a range of input
accuracy goals ↵, fixing a modest failure probability   = 0.1 (and we observed that excess
risks were concentrated well below ↵/2, suggesting a pessimistic analysis). The results
show a large improvement over the “theory” approach of simply inverting utility theorems
for private ERM algorithms. (In fact, the utility theorem for the popular private stochastic
gradient descent algorithm does not even give meaningful guarantees for the ranges of
parameters tested; one would need an order of magnitude more data points, and even then
the privacy losses are enormous, perhaps due to loose constants in the analysis.)
To gauge the more modest improvement over DoublingMethod, note that the variation in
the privacy risk factor e" can still be very large; for instance, in the ridge regression setting
of ↵ = 0.05, NoiseReduction has e" ⇡ 10.0 while Doubling has e" ⇡ 495; at ↵ = 0.075, the
privacy risk factors are 4.65 and 56.6 respectively.
In contrast to our original expectation, the privacy loss due to “testing” hypotheses (the
AboveThreshold technique) was significantly larger than that for “generating” them (Nois-
eReduction). One place the AboveThreshold analysis is loose is in using a theoretical
bound on the maximum norm of any hypothesis to compute the sensitivity of queries. The
actual norm of hypotheses tested was significantly lower which, if taken as guidance to the
practitioner in advance, would drastically improve the privacy guarantee of both adaptive
methods.
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(a) Linear (ridge) regression,
vs theory approach.
(b) Regularized logistic regression,
vs theory approach.
(c) Linear (ridge) regression,
vs naive approach.
(d) Regularized logistic regression,
vs naive approach.
Figure 1: Ex-post privacy loss. (1a) and (1c), left, represent ridge regression on the Twitter
dataset, where NoiseReduction and Doubling both use Covariance Perturbation. (1b) and
(1d), right, represent logistic regression on the KDD-99 Cup dataset, where both NoiseRe-
duction and Doubling use Output Perturbation. The top plots compare NoiseReduction to
the “theory approach”: running the algorithm once using the value of " that guarantees
the desired expected error via a utility theorem. The bottom compares to the Doubling
baseline. Note the top plots are generous to the theory approach: the theory curves promise
only expected error, whereas NoiseReduction promises a high probability guarantee.
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CHAPTER 4
How to Use Heuristics for Di↵erential Privacy
4.1. Introduction
Di↵erential privacy is compatible with a tremendous number of powerful data analysis
tasks, including essentially any statistical learning problem Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011);
Chaudhuri et al. (2011); Bassily et al. (2014) and the generation of synthetic data consistent
with exponentially large families of statistics Blum et al. (2013); Roth and Roughgarden
(2010); Hardt and Rothblum (2010); Gupta et al. (2012); Nikolov et al. (2013). Unfortunately,
it is also beset with a comprehensive set of computational hardness results. Of course, it
inherits all of the computational hardness results from the (non-private) agnostic learning
literature: for example, even the simplest learning tasks — like finding the best conjunction
or linear separator to approximately minimize classification error — are hard Feldman et al.
(2009a, 2012a); Diakonikolas et al. (2011a). In addition, tasks that are easy absent privacy
constraints can become hard when these constraints are added. For example, although
information theoretically, it is possible to privately construct synthetic data consistent
with all d-way marginals for d-dimensional data, privately constructing synthetic data
for even 2-way marginals is computationally hard Ullman and Vadhan (2010). These
hardness results extend even to providing numeric answers to more than quadratically
many statistical queries Ullman (2016).
How should we proceed in the face of pervasive computational hardness? We might take
inspiration from machine learning, which has not been slowed, despite the fact that its
most basic problems (e.g. learning linear separators) are already hard even to approximate.
Instead, the field has employed heuristics with tremendous success — including exact
optimization of convex surrogate loss functions (as in the case of SVMs), decision tree
heuristics, gradient based methods for di↵erentiable but non-convex problems (as in back-
propogation for training neural networks), and integer programming solvers (as in recent
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work on interpretable machine learning Ustun and Rudin (2016)). Other fields such as
operations research similarly have developed sophisticated heuristics including integer
program solvers and SAT solvers that are able to routinely solve problems that are hard in
the worst case.
The case of private data analysis is di↵erent, however. If we are only concerned with
performance (as is the case for most machine learning and combinatorial optimization
tasks), we have the freedom to try di↵erent heuristics, and evaluate our algorithms in
practice. Thus the design of heuristics that perform well in practice can be undertaken as
an empirical science. In contrast, di↵erential privacy is an inherently worst-case guarantee
that cannot be evaluated empirically (see Gilbert and McMillan (2018) for lower bounds for
black-box testing of privacy definitions).
In this paper, we build a theory for how to employ non-private heuristics (of which there are
many, benefitting from many years of intense optimization) to solve computationally hard
problems in di↵erential privacy. Our goal is to guide the design of practical algorithms
about which we can still prove theorems:
1. We will aim to prove accuracy theorems under the assumption that our heuristics solve
some non-private problem optimally. We are happy to make this assumption when
proving our accuracy theorems, because accuracy is something that can be empirically
evaluated on the datasets that we are interested in. An assumption like this is also
necessary, because we are designing algorithms for problems that are computationally
hard in the worst case. However:
2. We aim to prove that our algorithms are di↵erentially private in the worst case, even
under the assumption that our heuristics might fail in an adversarial manner.
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4.1.1. Overview of Our Results
Informally, we give a collection of results showing the existence of oracle-e cient algorithms
for privately solving learning and synthetic data generation problems defined by discrete
classes of functions Q that have a special (but common) combinatorial structure. One
might initially ask whether it is possible to give a direct reduction from a non-private
but e cient algorithm for solving a learning problem to an e cient private algorithm for
solving the same learning problem without requiring any special structure at all. However,
this is impossible, because there are classes of functions (namely those that have finite
VC-dimension but infinite Littlestone dimension) that are known to be learnable absent
the constraint of privacy, but are not privately learnable in an information-theoretic sense
Bun et al. (2015); Alon et al. (2018). The main question we leave open is whether being
information theoretically learnable under the constraint of di↵erential privacy is su cient for
oracle-e cient private learning. We give a barrier result suggesting that it might not be.
Before we summarize our results in more detail, we give some informal definitions.
Definitions
We begin by defining the kinds of oracles that we will work with, and end-goals that we
will aim for. We will assume the existence of oracles for (non-privately) solving learning
problems: for example, an oracle which can solve the empirical risk minimization problem
for discrete linear threshold functions. Because ultimately oracles will be implemented
using heuristics, we consider two types of oracles:
1. Certifiable heuristic oracles might fail, but when they succeed, they come with a
certificate of success. Many heuristics for solving integer programs are certifiable,
including cutting planes methods and branch and bound methods. SAT Solvers (and
any other heuristic for solving a decision problem in NP) are also certifiable.
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2. On the other had, some heuristics are non-certifiable. These heuristics might produce
incorrect answers, without any indication that they have failed. Support vector
machines and logistic regression are examples of non-certifiable heuristic oracles for
learning linear threshold functions.
We define an oracle-e cient non-robustly di↵erentially private algorithm to be an algorithm
that runs in polynomial time in all relevant parameters given access to an oracle for some
problem, and has an accuracy guarantee and a di↵erential privacy guarantee which may
both be contingent on the guarantees of the oracle — i.e. if the oracle is replaced with
a heuristic, the algorithm may no longer be di↵erentially private. Although in certain
situations (e.g when we have very high confidence that our heuristics actually do succeed
on all instances we will ever encounter) it might be acceptable to have a privacy guarantee
that is contingent on having an infallible oracle, we would much prefer a privacy guarantee
that held in the worst case. We say that an oracle-e cient algorithm is robustly di↵erentially
private if its privacy guarantee is not contingent on the behavior of the oracle, and holds
in the worst case, even if an adversary is in control of the heuristic that stands in for our
oracle.
Learning and Optimization
Our first result is a reduction from e cient non-private learning to e cient private learning
over any class of functions Q that has a small universal identification set Goldman et al.
(1993). A universal identification set of size m is a set of m examples such that the labelling
of these examples by a function q 2 Q is enough to uniquely identify q. Equivalently, a
universal identification set can be viewed as a separator set Syrgkanis et al. (2016): for any
pair of functions q , q0 2 Q, there must be some example x in the universal identification set
such that q(x) , q(x0). We will use these terms interchangeably throughout the paper. We
show that if Q has a universal identification set of size m, then given an oracle which solves
the empirical risk minimization problem (non-privately) over Q, there is an "-di↵erentially
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private algorithm with additional running time scaling linearly with m and error scaling
linearly with m2/" that solves the private empirical risk minimization problem over Q.
The error can be improved to O(m1.5
p
log1/ /"), while satisfying (", )-di↵erential privacy.
Many well studied discrete concept classes Q from the PAC learning literature have small
universal identification sets. For example, in d dimensions, boolean conjunctions, disjunc-
tions, parities, and halfspaces defined over the hypercube have universal identification
sets of size d. This means that for these classes, our oracle-e cient algorithm has error
that is larger than the generic optimal (and computationally ine cient) learner from Ka-
siviswanathan et al. (2011) by a factor of O(
p
d). Other classes of functions also have small
universal identification sets — for example, decision lists have universal identification sets
of size d2.
The reduction described above has the disadvantage that not only its accuracy guarantees —
but also its proof of privacy — depend on the oracle correctly solving the empirical risk
minimization problem it is given; it is non-robustly di↵erentially private. This shortcoming
motivates our main technical result: a generic reduction that takes as input any oracle-
e cient non-robustly di↵erentially private algorithm (i.e. an algorithmwhose privacy proof
might depend on the proper functioning of the oracle) and produces an oracle-e cient
robustly di↵erentially private algorithm, whenever the oracle is implemented with a certifiable
heuristic. As discussed above, this class of heuristics includes the integer programming
algorithms used in most commercial solvers. In combination with our first result, we
obtain robustly di↵erentially private oracle-e cient learning algorithms for conjunctions,
disjunctions, discrete halfspaces, and any other class of functions with a small universal
identification set.
Synthetic Data Generation
We then proceed to the task of constructing synthetic data consistent with a class of queries
Q. Following Hsu et al. (2013b); Gaboardi et al. (2014), we view the task of synthetic data
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generation as the process of computing an equilibrium of a particular zero sum game played
between a data player and a query player. In order to compute this equilibrium, we need to
be able to instantiate two objects in an oracle-e cient manner:
1. a private learning algorithm for Q (this corresponds to solving the best response
problem for the “query player”), and
2. a no-regret learning algorithm for a dual class of functions Qdual that results from
swapping the role of the data element and the query function (this allows the “data
player” to obtain a diminishing regret bound in simulated play of the game).
The no-regret learning algorithm need not be di↵erentially private. From our earlier
results, we are able to construct an oracle-e cient robustly di↵erentially private learning
algorithm for Q whenever it has a small universal identification set. On the other hand,
Syrgkanis et al. Syrgkanis et al. (2016) show how to obtain an oracle-e cient no regret
learning algorithm for a class of functions under the same condition. Hence, we obtain an
oracle-e cient robustly di↵erentially private synthetic data generation algorithm for any
class of functions Q for which both Q and Qdual have small universal identification sets.
Fortunately, this is the case for many interesting classes of functions, including boolean
disjunctions, conjunctions, discrete halfspaces, and parity functions. The result is that
we obtain oracle-e cient algorithms for generating private synthetic data for all of these
classes. We note that the oracle used by the data player need not be certifiable.
A Barrier Result
Finally, we exhibit a barrier to giving oracle-e cient private learning algorithms for all
classes of functions Q known to be privately learnable. We identify a class of private
learning algorithms called perturbed empirical risk minimizers (pERMs) which output the
query that exactly minimizes some perturbation of their empirical risk on the dataset.
This class of algorithms includes the ones we give in this paper, as well as many other
di↵erentially private learning algorithms, including the exponential mechanism and report-
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noisy-min. We show that any private pERM can be e ciently used as a no-regret learning
algorithm with regret guarantees that depend on the scale of the perturbations it uses.
This allows us to reduce to a lower bound on the running time of oracle-e cient online
learning algorithms due to Hazan and Koren Hazan and Koren (2016). The result is that
there exist finite classes of queries Q such that any oracle-e cient di↵erentially private
pERM algorithm must introduce perturbations that are polynomially large in the size of
|Q|, whereas any such class is information-theoretically privately learnable with error that
scales only with log |Q|.
The barrier implies that if oracle-e cient di↵erentially private learning algorithms are as
powerful as ine cient di↵erentially private learning algorithms, then these general oracle
e cient private algorithms must not be perturbed empirical risk minimizers. We conjecture
that the set of problems solvable by oracle-e cient di↵erentially private learners is strictly
smaller than the set of problems solvable information theoretically under the constraint of
di↵erential privacy, but leave this as our main open question.
4.1.2. Additional Related Work
Conceptually, the most closely related piece of work is the “DualQuery” algorithm of
Gaboardi et al. (2014), which in the terminology of our paper is a robustly private oracle-
e cient algorithm for generating synthetic data for k-way marginals for constant k. The
main idea in Gaboardi et al. (2014) is to formulate the private optimization problem
that needs to be solved so that the only computationally hard task is one that does not
depend on private data. There are other algorithms that can straightforwardly be put into
this framework, like the projection algorithm from Nikolov et al. (2013). This approach
immediately makes the privacy guarantees independent of the correctness of the oracle,
but significantly limits the algorithm design space. In particular, the DualQuery algorithm
(and the oracle-e cient version of the projection algorithm from Nikolov et al. (2013)) has
running time that is proportional to |Q|, and so can only handle polynomially sized classes
of queries (which is why k needs to be held constant). The main contribution of our paper
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is to be able to handle private optimization problems in which the hard computational step
is not independent of the private data. This is significantly more challenging, and is what
allows us to give oracle-e cient robustly private algorithms for constructing synthetic data
for exponentially large families Q. It is also what lets give oracle-e cient private learning
algorithms over exponentially large Q for the first time.
A recent line of work starting with the “PATE” algorithm Papernot et al. (2016) together
with more recent theoretical analyses of similar algorithms by Dwork and Feldman, and
Bassily, Thakkar, and Thakurta Dwork and Feldman (2018); Bassily et al. (2018) can be
viewed as giving oracle-e cient algorithms for an easier learning task, in which the goal is
to produce a finite number of private predictions rather than privately output the model that
makes the predictions. These can be turned into oracle e cient algorithms for outputting a
private model under the assumption that the mechanism has access to an additional source
of unlabeled data drawn from the same distribution as the private data, but that does not
need privacy protections. In this setting, there is no need to take advantage of any special
structure of the hypothesis class Q, because the information theoretic lower bounds on
private learning proven in Bun et al. (2015); Alon et al. (2018) do not apply. In contrast,
our results apply without the need for an auxiliary source of non-private data.
Privately producing contingency tables, and synthetic data that encode them — i.e. the
answers to statistical queries defined by conjunctions of features — has been a key challenge
problem in di↵erential privacy at least since Barak et al. (2007). Since then, a number of
algorithms and hardness results have been given Ullman and Vadhan (2010); Gupta et al.
(2013); Kasiviswanathan et al. (2010); Thaler et al. (2012); Hardt et al. (2012); Feldman
and Kothari (2014); Chandrasekaran et al. (2014). This paper gives the first oracle-e cient
algorithm for generating synthetic data consistent with a full contingency table, and the
first oracle-e cient algorithm for answering arbitrary conjunctions to near optimal error.
Technically, our work is inspired by Syrgkanis et al. Syrgkanis et al. (2016) who show how a
small separator set (equivalently a small universal identification set) can be used to derive
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oracle-e cient no-regret algorithms in the contextual bandit setting. The small separator
property has found other uses in online learning, including in the oracle-e cient con-
struction of nearly revenue optimal auctions Dudík et al. (2017). Hazan and Koren Hazan
and Koren (2016) show lower bounds for oracle-e cient no-regret learning algorithms in
the experts setting, which forms the basis of our barrier result. More generally, there is a
rich literature studying oracle-e cient algorithms in machine learning Beygelzimer et al.
(2005); Balcan et al. (2008); Beygelzimer et al. (2016) and optimization Ben-Tal et al. (2015)
as a means of dealing with worst-case hardness, and more recently, for machine learning
subject to fairness constraints Agarwal et al. (2018); Kearns et al. (2018); Alabi et al. (2018).
We also make crucial use of a property of di↵erentially private algorithms, first shown by
Cummings et al. (2016): That when di↵erentially private algorithms are run on databases of
size n with privacy parameter " ⇡ 1/
p
n, then they have similar output distributions when
run on datasets that are sampled from the same distribution, rather than just on neighboring
datasets. In Cummings et al. (2016), this was used as a tool to show the existence of robustly
generalizing algorithms (also known as distributionally private algorithms in Blum et al.
(2013)). We prove a new variant of this fact that holds when the datasets are not sampled
i.i.d. and use it for the first time in an analysis to prove di↵erential privacy. The technique
might be of independent interest.
4.2. Preliminaries
4.2.1. Statistical Queries and Separator Sets
We study learning (optimization) and synthetic data generation problems for statistical
queries defined over a data universe X . A statistical query over X is a function q : X ! {0,1}.
A statistical query can represent, e.g. any binary classification model or the binary loss
function that it induces. Given a dataset S 2 X n, the value of a statistical query q on S




q(Si). In this chapter, we will generally think about query
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classes Q that represent standard hypothesis classes from learning theory – like conjunctions,
disjunctions, halfspaces, etc.
In this chapter, we will make crucial use of universal identification sets for classes of statistical
queries. Universal identification sets are equivalent to separator sets, defined (in a slightly
more general form) in Syrgkanis et al. (2016).
Definition 4.2.1 (Goldman et al. (1993); Syrgkanis et al. (2016)). A set U ✓ X is a universal
identification set or separator set for a class of statistical queries Q if for every pair of distinct
queries q,q0 2 Q, there is an x 2U such that:
q(x) , q(x0)
If |U | =m, then we say that Q has a separator set of size m.
Many classes of statistical queries defined over the boolean hypercube have separator sets of
size proportional to their VC-dimension. For example, boolean conjunctions, disjunctions,
halfspaces defined over the hypercube, and parity functions in d dimensions all have
separator sets of size d. When we solve learning problems over these classes, we will be
interested in the set of queries that define the 0/1 loss function over these classes: but as we
observe in Appendix A.2.1, if a hypothesis class has a separator set of size m, then so does
the class of queries representing the empirical loss for functions in that hypothesis class.
4.2.2. Learning and Synthetic Data Generation
We study private learning as empirical risk minimization (the connection between in-
sample risk and out-of-sample risk is standard, and follows from e.g. VC-dimension
bounds Kearns and Vazirani (1994a) or directly from di↵erential privacy (see e.g. Bassily
et al. (2014); Dwork et al. (2015b))). Such problems can be cast as finding a function q in
a class Q that minimizes q(S), subject to di↵erential privacy (observe that the empirical
risk of a hypothesis is a statistical query — see Appendix A.2.1). We will therefore study
minimization problems over classes of statistical queries generally:
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Definition 4.2.2. We say that a randomized algorithm M : X n! Q is an (↵, )-minimizer for




Synthetic data generation, on the other hand, is the problem of constructing a new dataset Ŝ
that approximately agrees with the original dataset with respect to a fixed set of statistical
queries:
Definition 4.2.3. We say that a randomized algorithm M : X n ! X ⇤ is an (↵, )-accurate
synthetic data generation algorithm for Q if for every dataset S 2 X n, with probability 1   , it
outputs M(S) = Ŝ such that for all q 2 Q:
|q(S)  q(Ŝ)|  ↵
4.2.3. Robust Di↵erential Privacy
For the definitions of oracle-e ciency, certifiable oracle-e ciency, and oracle-dependency
used through the paper, see subsection 2.2. With these definitions in hand, we are able
to define the notion of robust di↵erential privacy in the context of oracle-dependent
algorithms. If our algorithms are merely oracle equivalent to di↵erentially private algorithms,
then their privacy guarantees depend on the correctness of the oracle. However, we would
prefer that the privacy guarantee of the algorithm not depend on the success of the oracle.
We call such algorithms robustly di↵erentially private.
Definition 4.2.4. An oracle-e cient algorithm M is (", )-robustly di↵erentially private if it
satisfies (", )-di↵erential privacy even under worst-case performance of a heuristic optimization
oracle. In other words, it is di↵erentially private for every heuristic oracle O that it might be
instantiated with.
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We write that an oracle e cient algorithm is non-robustly di↵erentially private to mean
that it is oracle equivalent to a di↵erentially private algorithm. Naturally any robustly
di↵erentially private algorithm is non-robustly di↵erentially private.
4.3. Oracle E cient Optimization
In this section, we show how weighted optimization oracles can be used to give di↵er-
entially private oracle-e cient optimization algorithms for many classes of queries with
performance that is worse only by a
p
d factor compared to that of the (computationally
ine cient) exponential mechanism. The first algorithm we give is not robustly di↵erentially
private — that is, its di↵erential privacy guarantee relies on having access to a perfect oracle.
We then show how to make that algorithm (or any other algorithm that is oracle equivalent
to a di↵erentially private algorithm) robustly di↵erentially private when instantiated with
a certifiable heuristic optimization oracle.
4.3.1. A (Non-Robustly) Private Oracle E cient Algorithm
In this section, we give an oracle-e cient (non-robustly) di↵erentially private optimization
algorithm that works for any class of statistical queries that has a small separator set.
Intuitively, it is attempting to implement the “Report-Noisy-Min” algorithm (see e.g. Dwork
and Roth (2014b)), which outputs the query q that minimizes a (perturbed) estimate
q̂(S) ⌘ q(S) +Zq where Zq ⇠ Lap(1/") for each q 2 Q. Because Report-Noisy-Min samples
an independent perturbation for each query q 2 Q, it is ine cient: its run time is linear
in |Q|. Our algorithm – “Report Separator-Perturbed Min” (RSPM) – instead augments
the dataset S in a way that implicitly induces perturbations of the query values q(S). The
perturbations are no longer independent across queries, and so to prove privacy, we need
to use the structure of a separator set.
The algorithm is straightforward: it simply augments the dataset with one copy of each
element of the separator set, each with a weight drawn independently from the Laplace
distribution. All original elements in the dataset are assigned weight 1. The algorithm then
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simply passes this weighted dataset to the weighted optimization oracle, and outputs the
resulting query. The number of random variables that need to be sampled is therefore now
equal to the size of the separator set, instead of the size ofQ. The algorithm is closely related
to a no-regret learning algorithm given in Syrgkanis et al. (2016) — the only di↵erence
is in the magnitude of the noise added, and in the analysis, since we need a substantially
stronger form of stability.
Report Separator-Perturbed Min (RSPM)
Given: A separator set U = {e1, . . . , em} for a class of statistical queries Q, a weighted
optimization oracle O⇤ for Q, and a privacy parameter ".
Input: A dataset S 2 X n of size n.
Output: A statistical query q 2 Q.
Sample ⌘i ⇠ Lap(2m/") for i 2 {1, . . . ,m}
Construct a weighted dataset WD of size n+m as follows:
WD(S,⌘) = {(xi ,1) : xi 2 S}[ {(ei ,⌘i ) : ei 2U }
Output q = O⇤(WD(S,⌘)).
It is thus immediate that the Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is oracle-e cient
whenever the size of the separator set m is polynomial: it simply augments the dataset with
a single copy of each ofm separator elements, makesm draws from the Laplace distribution,
and then makes a single call to the oracle:
Theorem 4.3.1. The Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is oracle-e cient.
The accuracy analysis for the Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is also straightfor-
ward, and follows by bounding the weighted sum of the additional entries added to the
original data set.





Proof. Let q0 be the query returned by RSPM, and let q⇤ be the true minimizer q⇤ =
argminq2Q q⇤(S). Then we show that with probability 1   , q0(S)  q⇤(S) +↵. By the CDF of
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the Laplace distribution and a union bound over the m random variables ⌘i , we have that
with probability 1   :




Since for every query q, q(ei) 2 [0,1], this means that with probability 1    , q0(WD)  
q0(S)  m · 2m log(m/ )"n . Similarly q⇤(WD)  q⇤(S) + 2m ·
m log(m/ )
"n . Combining these bounds
gives:
q0(S)  q0(WD) + 2m2 log(m/ )
"n
 q⇤(WD) + 2m2 log(m/ )
"n
 q⇤(S) + 4m
2 log(m/ )
"n
as desired, where the second inequality follows because by definition, q0 is the true mini-
mizer on the weighted dataset WD.
Remark 4.3.3. We can bound the expected error of RSPM using Theorem 4.3.2 as well. If










4m2   logm   log(1/ )
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 1, and so E [E]  4m2"n (1 + logm).
The privacy analysis is more delicate, and relies on the correctness of the oracle.
Theorem 4.3.4. If O⇤ is a weighted optimization oracle for Q, then the Report Separator-
Perturbed Min algorithm is "-di↵erentially private.
Proof. We begin by introducing some notation. Given a weighted dataset WD(S,⌘), and
a query q 2 Q, let q(S,⌘) = q(S) +Pei2U q(ei)⌘i be the value when q is evaluated on the
weighted dataset given the realization of the noise ⌘. To allow us to distinguish queries
that are output by the algorithm on di↵erent datasets and di↵erent realizations of the
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perturbations, write Q(S,⌘) = O⇤(WD(S,⌘)). Fix any q 2 Q, and define:
E(q,S) = {⌘ : Q(S,⌘) = q}
to be the event defined on the perturbations ⌘ that the mechanism outputs query q. Given
a fixed q 2 Q we define a mapping fq(⌘) : Rm! Rm on noise vectors as follows:
1. If q(ei ) = 1, fq(⌘)i = ⌘i   2
2. If q(ei ) = 0, fq(⌘)i = ⌘i +2
Equivalently, fq(⌘)i = ⌘i +2(1  2q(ei )).
We now make a couple of observations about the function fq.
Lemma 4.3.5. Fix any q̂ 2 Q and any pair of neighboring datasets S,S 0. Let ⌘ 2 E(q̂,S) be such
that q̂ is the unique minimizer q̂ 2 infq2Q q(S,⌘). Then fq̂(⌘) 2 E(q̂,S 0). In particular, this implies
that for any such ⌘:
(⌘ 2 E(q̂,S))  (fq̂(⌘) 2 E(q̂,S 0))
Proof. For this argument, it will be convenient to work with un-normalized versions of our
queries, so that q(S) =
P
xi2S q(xi) — i.e. we do not divide by the dataset size n. Note that
this change of normalization does not change the identity of the minimizer. Under this
normalization, the queries q are now 1-sensitive, rather than 1/n sensitive.
Recall that Q(S,⌘) = q̂. Suppose for point of contradiction that Q(S 0 , fq̂(⌘)) = q̃ , q̂. This in
particular implies that q̃(S 0 , fq̂(⌘))  q̂(S 0 , fq̂(⌘)).
We first observe that q̂(S 0 ,⌘)  q̃(S 0 ,⌘) < 2. This follows because:
q̃(S 0 ,⌘)   q̃(S,⌘)  1 > q̂(S,⌘)  1   q̂(S 0 ,⌘)  2 (4.1)
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Here the first inequality follows because the un-normalized queries q are 1-sensitive,
the second follows because q̂ 2 argminq2Q q(S,⌘) is the unique minimizer, and the last
inequality follows from the fact that S and S 0 are neighbors.
Next, we write:




(q̃(ei )  q̂(ei ))(fq̂(⌘i )  ⌘i )
Consider each term in the final sum: (q̃(ei )  q̂(ei ))(fq̂(⌘i )  ⌘i ). Observe that by construction,
each of these terms is non-negative: Clearly if q̃(ei) = q̂(ei), then the term is 0. Further, if
q̃(ei ) , q̂(ei ), then by construction, (q̃(ei )  q̂(ei ))(fq̂(⌘i ) ⌘i ) = 2. Finally, by the definition of a
separator set, we know that there is at least one index i such that q̃(ei ) , q̂(ei ). Thus, we can
conclude:
q̃(S 0 , fq̂(⌘))  q̂(S 0 , fq̂(⌘))   q̃(S 0 ,⌘)  q̂(S 0 ,⌘) + 2 > 0
where the final inequality follows from applying inequality (4.1). But rearranging, this
means that q̂(S 0 , fq̂(⌘)) < q̃(S 0 , fq̂(⌘)), which contradicts the assumption that Q(S 0 , fq̂(⌘)) =
q̃.
Let p denote the probability density function of the joint distribution of the Laplace random
variables ⌘, and by abuse of notation also of each individual ⌘i .
Lemma 4.3.6. For any r 2 Rm,q 2 Q:
p(⌘ = r)  e"p(⌘ = fq(r))
Proof. For any index i and z 2 R, we have p(⌘i = z) = "4me |z|"/(2m). In particular, if |x   y|  2,







p(⌘i = fq(r)i )







Lemma 4.3.7. Fix any class of queries Q that has a finite separator set U = {e1, . . . , em}. For every
dataset S there is a subset B ✓ Rm such that:
1. Pr[⌘ 2 B] = 0 and
2. On the restricted domain Rm \B, there is a unique minimizer q0 2 argminq2Q q(S,⌘)
Proof. Let:























be the set of ⌘ values that do not result in unique minimizers q0.
Because Q is a finite set1, by a union bound it su ces to show that for any two distinct



























This follows from the continuity of the Laplace distribution. Let i be any index such that
q1(ei ) , q2(ei ) (recall that by the definition of a separator set, such an index is guaranteed to
exist). For any fixed realization of {⌘j }j,i , there is a single value of ⌘i that equalizes q1(S,⌘)
and q2(S,⌘). But any single value is realized with probability 0.
1Any class of queries Q with a separator set of size m can be no larger than 2m.
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We now have enough to complete the proof. We have for any query q̂:























































= e"Pr[⌘ 2 E(q̂,S 0)]
= e"Pr[RSPM(S 0) = q̂]
In Appendix A.2.2, we give a somewhat more complicated analysis to show that by using
Gaussian perturbations rather than Laplace perturbations, it is possible to improve the
accuracy of the RSPM algorithm by a factor of
p
m, at the cost of satisfying (", )-di↵erential
privacy:
Theorem 4.3.8. The Gaussian RSPM algorithm is (", )-di↵erentially private, and is an oracle-
e cient (↵, )-minimizer for any class of functions Q that has a universal identifications sequence


















See Appendix A.2.2 for the algorithm and its analysis.
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It is instructive to compare the accuracy that we can obtain with oracle-e cient algorithms
to the accuracy that can be obtained via the (ine cient, and generally optimal) exponential
mechanism based generic learner from Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011). The existence of a
universal identification set for Q of sizem implies |Q|  2m (and for many interesting classes
of queries, including conjunctions, disjunctions, parities, and discrete halfspaces over the
hypercube, this is an equality — see Appendix A.2.1). Thus, the exponential-mechanism







Comparing this bound to ours, we see that we can obtain oracle-e ciency at a cost of
roughly a factor of
p
m in our error bound. Whether or not this cost is necessary is an
interesting open question.
We can conclude that for a wide range of hypothesis classes Q including boolean conjunc-
tions, disjunctions, decision lists, discrete halfspaces, and several families of circuits of
logarithmic depth (see Appendix A.2.1) there is an oracle-e cient di↵erentially private
learning algorithm that obtains accuracy guarantees within small polynomial factors of the
optimal guarantees of the (ine cient) exponential mechanism.
4.3.2. A Robustly Di↵erentially Private Oracle-E cient Algorithm
The RSPM algorithm is not robustly di↵erentially private, because its privacy proof depends
on the oracle succeeding. This is an undesirable property for RSPM and other algorithms
like it, because we do not expect to have access to actual oracles for hard problems even if
we expect that there are certain families of problems for which we can reliably solve typical
instances2. In this section, we show how to remedy this: we give a black box reduction,
starting from a (non-robustly) di↵erentially private algorithmAO that is implemented using
2There may be situations in which it is acceptable to use non robustly di↵erentially private oracle-e cient
algorithms — for example, if the optimization oracle is so reliable that it has never been observed to fail on the
domain of interest. But robust di↵erential privacy provides a worst-case guarantee which is preferable.
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a certifiable heuristic3 oracleO, and producing a robustly di↵erentially private algorithm ÃO
for solving the same problem. ÃO will be (", )-di↵erentially private for a parameter   that
we may choose, and will have a factor of roughly Õ(1/ ) running time overhead on top of
AO . So if AO is oracle e cient, so is ÃO whenever the chosen value of     1/poly(n). If the
oracle never fails, then we can prove utility guarantees for it when AO has such guarantees,
since it just runs AO (using a smaller privacy parameter) on a random sub-sample of the
original dataset. But the privacy guarantees hold even in the worst case of the behavior of
the oracle. We call this reduction the Private Robust Subsampling Meta Algorithm or PRSMA.
Private Robust Subsampling Meta Algorithm (PRSMA)
Given: Privacy parameters ",    0 and an oracle-e cient di↵erentially private algorithm
A"O : X n!M, implemented with a certifiable heuristic oracle O.
Input: A dataset S 2 X n of size n.
Output: An output m 2M or ? (“Fail”).
1: Randomly partition S into K = 1" (1 + log(
2
  )) equally sized datasets {Si}
K
i=1. (If n is not
divisible by K , first discard n mod K elements at random.)
2: for i = 1 . . .K do
3: Set oi = PASS
4: for t = 1 . . . log(K/ )  do
5: Compute A"0O(Si ) = ait , where "0 =
1p
8 nK log(2K/ )
6: If ait =?, set oi =?
7: Compute T = #{oi ,?}. Let T̃ = T + z, where z ⇠ Lap(1" ).
8: Test if T̃ > 1" (1 + log(
1
  )), if no output ? and halt. Else:
9: Sample a uniformly at random from {ait : oi ,?}.
10: Output a.
Intuition and Proof Outline
Before we describe the analysis of PRSMA, a couple of remarks are helpful in order to set
the stage.
1. At first blush, one might be tempted to assert that if an oracle-e cient non-robustly
di↵erentially private algorithm is implemented using a certifiable heuristic oracle,
then it will sample from a di↵erentially private distribution conditioned on the event
3We recall that heuristics for solving integer programs (such as cutting planes methods, branch and bound,
and branch and cut methods, as implemented in commercial solvers) and SAT solvers are certifiable.
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that the heuristic oracle doesn’t fail. But a moment’s thought reveals that this isn’t so:
the possibility of failures both on the original dataset S and on the (exponentially
many) neighboring datasets S 0 can substantially change the probabilities of arbitrary
events ⌦, and how these probabilities di↵er between neighboring datasets.
2. Next, one might think of the following simple candidate solution: Run the algorithm
AO(S) roughly Õ(1/ ) many times in order to check that the failure probability of
the heuristic algorithm on S is⌧  , and then output a sample of AO(S) only if this
is so. But this doesn’t work either: the failure probability itself will change if we
replace S with a neighboring dataset S 0, and so this won’t be di↵erentially private.
In fact, there is no reason to think that the failure probability of AO will be a low
sensitivity function of S , so there is no way to privately estimate the failure probability
to non-trivial error.
It is possible to use the subsample-and-aggregate procedure of Nissim et al. (2007) to ran-
domly partition the dataset into K pieces Si , and privately estimate on how many of these
pieces AO(Si) fails with probability⌧  . The algorithm can then then fail if this private
count is not su ciently large. In fact, this is the first thing that PRSMA does, in lines 1-10,
setting oi = PASS for those pieces Si such that it seems that the probability of failure is⌧  ,
and setting oi =? for the others.
But the next step of the algorithm is to randomly select one of the partition elements Si
amongst the set that passed the earlier test: i.e. amongst the set such that oi , ?— and
return one of the outputs a that had been produced by runningAO(Si ). It is not immediately
clear why this should be private, because which partition elements passed the test {i : oi ,?}
is not itself di↵erentially private. Showing that this results in a di↵erentially private output
is the di cult part of the analysis.
To get an idea of the problem that we need to overcome, consider the following situation
which our analysis must rule out: Fix a partition of the dataset S1, . . . ,SK , and imagine that
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each partition element passes: we have oi , ? for all i. Now suppose that there is some
event ⌦ such that Pr[AO(S1) 2⌦]   1/2, but Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦] is close to 0 for all i , 1. Since
K ⇡ 1/", and the final output is drawn from a uniformly random partition element, this
means that PRSMA outputs an element of ⌦ with probability ⌦("). Suppose that on a
neighboring dataset S 0, S1 no longer passes the test and has o1 = ?. Since it is no longer
a candidate to be selected at the last step, we now have that on S 0, PRSMA outputs an
element of ⌦ with probability close to 0. This is a violation of (", )-di↵erential privacy for
any non-trivial value of   (i.e.   O(")).
The problem is that (fixing a partition of S into S1, . . . ,SK ) moving to a neighboring dataset
S 0 can potentially arbitrarily change the probability that any single element Si survives to
step 11 of the algorithm, which can in principle change the probability of arbitrary events
⌦ by an additive ±O(") term, rather than a multiplicative 1±O(") factor.
Since we are guaranteed that (with high probability) if we make it to step 11 without
failing, then at least ⌦(1/") elements Si have survived with oi , ?, it would be su cient
for di↵erential privacy if for every event ⌦, the probabilities Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦] were within a
constant factor of each other, for all i. Then a change of whether a single partition element
Si survives with oi ,? or not would only add or remove an " fraction of the total probability
mass on event ⌦. While this seems like a “di↵erential-privacy” like property, but it is not
clear that the fact that AO⇤ is di↵erentially private can help us here, because the partition
elements Si ,Sj are not neighboring datasets — in fact, they are disjoint. But as we show,
it does in fact guarantee this property if we set the privacy parameter "0 to be su ciently
small — to roughly O(1/
p
n/K) in step 5.
With this intuition setting the stage, the roadmap of the proof is as follows. For notational
simplicity, we write A(·) to denote AO⇤(·), the oracle-e cient algorithm when implemented
with a perfect oracle.
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1. We observe that "-di↵erential privacy implies that the log-probability of any event ⌦
when A(·) is run on Si changes by less than an additive factor of " when an element of
Si is changed. We use a method of bounded di↵erences argument to show that this
implies that the log-probability density function concentrates around its expectation,
where the randomness is over the subsampling of Si from S . A similar result is proven
in Cummings et al. (2016) to show that di↵erentially private algorithms achieve what
they call “perfect generalization." We need to prove a generalization of their result
because in our case, the elements of Si are not selected independently of one another.
This guides our choice of "0 in step 5 of the algorithm. (Lemma 4.3.10)
2. We show that with high probability, for every Si such that oi ,? after step 10 of the
algorithm, AO(Si) fails with probability at most O( ). By Lemma 2.2.6, this implies
that it is  -close in total variation distance to A(Si ).
3. We observe that fixing a partition, on a neighboring dataset, only one of the partition
elements Si changes — and hence changes its probability of having oi , ?. Since
with high probability, conditioned on PRSMA not failing, ⌦(1/") partition elements
survive with oi ,?, parts 1 and 2 imply that changing a single partition element Si
only changes the probability of realizing any outcome event by a multiplicative factor
of ⇡ 1+ ".
The Main Theorem
Theorem 4.3.9. PRSMA is (", ) di↵erentially private when given as input:
1. An oracle-e cient non-robustly di↵erentially private algorithm AO implemented with a
certifiable heuristic oracle O, and
2. Privacy parameters ("⇤, ⇤) where "⇤ = "62 
1
2 and  




Proof. We analyze PRSMA with privacy parameters " and  , optimizing the constants at
the end. Fix an input dataset S with |S | = n, and an adjacent dataset S 0 ⇠ S , such that
without loss of generality S,S 0 di↵er in the element x1 , x01. We denote the PRSMA routine
with input AO and dataset S by A
prsm
O (S ). We first observe that:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) =?]  e
"Pr[AprsmO (S
0) =?]
This is immediate since the indicator for a failure is a post-processing of the Laplace
mechanism. Since x1 can a↵ect at most one oracle failure, T is 1-sensitive, and so publishing





satisfies "-di↵erential privacy since it is an invocation of the Laplace
Mechanism defined in Section 2.1. (This can also be viewed as an instantiation of the
“sub-sample and aggregate procedure of Nissim et al. (2007)).
We now proceed to the meat of the argument. To establish (", ) di↵erential privacy we
must reason about the probability of arbitrary events ⌦ ⇢M, rather than just individual
outputs a. We want to show:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦]  e
"Pr[AprsmO (S
0) 2⌦] +  
We first fix some notation and define a number of events that we will need to reason about.
Let:
• P Ssplit be the uniform distribution over equal sized partitions of S that the datasets Si
are drawn from in line 1; i.e. P (S) ⇠ P Ssplit , where P (S) is the partition of S into {Si}.
• A denote AO⇤ , our oracle-e cient algorithm when instantiated with a perfect oracle
O⇤. i.e. A(S) is the "-di↵erentially private distribution that we ideally want to sample
from.







{oi} : |{oi : oi , ?}| > 1"
o
. We will use o to denote a particular set {oi}. Let Iopass be
the set {i : oi ,?}. Given o 2 F , let |o| denote |Iopass |.
• E be the event that for all i = 1 . . .K : Pr[AO(Si ) =?]    ) oi =?.
• i⇤ denote the index i of the randomly chosen ait in step 11 of PRSMA.
• Q be the event that the draw P (S) ⇠ P Ssplit is such that the probabilities ofA outputting
a 2 ⌦ when run on any two Si ,Sj 2 P (S) are within a multiplicative factor of 2.
Lemma 4.3.10 formally defines Q and shows Pr[Q]   1   . Let SQ denote the set of
P (S) on which event Q holds.
We now bound the probabilities of several of these events. By the CDF of the Laplace
distribution, we have Pr[Z] = Pr
h




" log(1/ ) =  , and by a union bound:
Pr[E]   1 K · (1   )(log(K/ )/ )   1 K · e  ·log(K/ )/  = 1   .
Let L be the event Zc\E. By the above calculation and another union bound, Pr[L]   1 2 .
Our proof now proceeds via a sequence of lemmas. All missing proofs appear in Appendix
A.2.3. We first show that Q occurs with high probability.
Lemma 4.3.10. Let P (S) ⇠ P Ssplit . Let A : X l !M be an ("0 ,0) di↵erentially private algorithm,
where: "0 = 1p
8 nK log(2K/ )
. Fix ⌦ ⇢M , and let q⌦(Si) = logPr[A(Si) 2 ⌦]. Define Q to be the
event
Q = {P (S) : max
i,j21...K
|q⌦(Si )  q⌦(Sj )|  2}.
Then over the random draw of P (S) ⇠ P Ssplit , Pr[Q]   1   .
The proof relies on the fact that q⌦(·) is "-Lipschitz. This result is similar to Theorem 5.4
in Cummings et al. (2016), although in our case sampling without replacement induces
dependence among the elements in Si , and thus we can’t appeal to standard concentration
inequalities for independent random variables. Instead we prove that elements sampled
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without replacement from a fixed set satisfy a type of negative dependence called stochastic
covering, and are n/K-homogenous (supported on a set of size n/K), which are used to prove
exponential concentration of Lipschitz functions in PEMANTLE and PERES (2014). We
defer the details to the Appendix.
To establish the theorem we want to show that given an adjacent database S 0 di↵ering only
in the first element from S , that
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦]
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
 e"⇤ +  
⇤
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
(4.2)
Our analysis will proceed by expanding the numerator by first conditioning on L, and
then on particular realizations of the partition P (S), and on a fixed realization of o = {oi}.
We can also restrict our attention to only summing over P (S) 2 SQ, by showing that the
terms corresponding to P (S) 2 ScQ contribute at most an additive factor of 2  to the final
probability. We will also only sum over o 2 F since conditioned on Zc, which is implied by
L, these are the only o such that Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|o] , 0.
Lemma 4.3.11.
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦]




Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] + 4 
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
The rest of the proof will consist of upper bounding the individual terms
Pr[AprsmO (S )2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S 0)2⌦]
. Lemma 4.3.12 is a tool used to prove Lemma 4.3.13, which
upper bounds the numerator, and Lemma 4.3.14 lower bounds the denominator. The
conclusion of the argument consists of manipulations to upper bound the ratio of these two
bounds.
We first analyze the Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L] term, for P (S) 2 SQ,o 2 F . Conditioned on
Zc, if o 2 F , then PRSMA passes the test in step 10 and outputs a randomly chosen ait : i 2
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Iopass. Fixing a sampled value i⇤ 2 Iopass, ai⇤t is distributed identically to a ⇠AO(Si⇤)|AO(Si⇤) ,
?, since after conditioning on Si⇤ each ai⇤t is drawn iid and the event oi ,? does not depend
on the sampled values ait . In other words, Pr[A
prsm
O (S ) 2 ⌦|i⇤ = i,P(S),o] = Pr[AO(Si⇤) 2
⌦|AO(Si⇤) ,?], and so:





Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,?] (4.3)
Substituting in 4.3 we have:
X
P (S)2SQ,o2F







Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,?]Pr[o,P(S)|L] (4.4)
We now use the fact that P (S) 2 SQ, to show that none of the terms Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,
?] in the right hand side of Equation 4.3 individually represent a substantial fraction of the
total probability mass. Conditioning on L ensures that if oi , ? then Pr[AO(Si ) =?]   ,
which means AO(Si ) is  -close in total variation distance to A(Si ). By Lemma 4.3.10, with
high probability anyA(Si ) is approximately equally likely to output an element in⌦, which
allows us to bound the e↵ect that changing a single data point (and hence a single Si ) can
have on the probability of outputting an element in ⌦.
Lemma 4.3.12. Fix any o, any P (S) 2 SQ, and index j 2 Iopass, i.e. oj ,?. Then:







Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,?] +
 e2
(1   )
Without loss of generality (up to renaming of partition elements), assume that the element
on which S and S 0 di↵er falls into S1. Now we break the summation over O into two
pieces, depending on whether o1 =? or o1 ,?. We will use Lemma 4.3.12 to bound terms
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Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] 
(1 +
e2


















We now condition on a fixed partition P(S 0) in the denominator as well. Given a fixed
partition P(S) of S , define the adjacent partition P (S 0) ⇠ P (S) as the partition of an adjacent
database S 0 such that for all i , 1, Si = S 0i , and S1,S
0
1 di↵er only in x1 , x
0
1, where x1
is the di↵ering element between S,S 0. Let S 0Q be the set of P (S 0) adjacent to P (S) 2 SQ,
i.e. S 0Q = {P (S 0) : 9 P (S) 2 SQ,P (S 0) ⇠ P (S)}. We now lower bound the denominator in
















Pr[AO(S 0i ) 2⌦|AO(S 0i ) ,?])Pr[o|P(S 0)])Pr[P(S 0)]
Thus by Lemmas 4.3.13 and 4.3.14,
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]

































Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
(4.6)
For all P (S),P (S 0),Pr[P (S)] = Pr[P (S 0)], and we can bound the ratio of the summations over
SQ,S
0


























Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
(4.7)
Now since for all i , 1,Si = S 0i , if we could control the ratio Pr[o|P (S)]/ Pr[o|P (S 0)] we
would be done. But this ratio could potentially be unbounded, as Pr[o1|P(S)] could be
nonzero, and the substitution of x01 for x1 could force failure on the first partition S
0
1, and
so Pr[o1|P(S 0)] = 0.
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Given o let o 1 denote {o2, . . . oK }. The remainder of the argument circumvents this obstacle
by decomposing the outer summation over o 2 F into a summation over the indicators of
all but the first failure event (o 1), and integrating out the probability of the first failure
event (o1) from the joint probability Pr[o|P(S)]. This trick will be applied in the numerator
and denominator, with a slight di↵erence corresponding to an upper and a lower bound
respectively. See the end of Section C of the Appendix for details. Following the chain of
inequalities, we finally obtain:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
 (1 + e
2






Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
,
which substituting into Lemma 4.3.11 gives:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦]  (1 +
e2






0) 2⌦] + 4  + " e
2
1   
For ",   1/2, (1 + e2
(1  )2( 1"  1)
) 11 "  e8e
2"+"+"2 , which establishes that PRSMA is (8e2" + " +
"2,4  + " e
2
1   ) di↵erentially private. Setting " = "
⇤,  =  ⇤ completes the proof.
We now turn to PRSMA’s accuracy guarantees. Note that when PRSMA starts with an
algorithm AO⇤ instantiated with a perfect oracle O⇤, it with high probability outputs the
result of running AO⇤ on a subsampled dataset Si of size n/K ⇡ "n, with privacy parameter
"0 = 1p
8 nK log(2K/ )
. In general, therefore, the accuracy guarantees of PRSMA depend on how
robust the guarantees of A are to subsampling, which is typical of “Subsample and Aggre-
gate" approaches, and also to its specific privacy-accuracy tradeo↵. Learning algorithms are
robust to sub-sampling however: below we derive an accuracy theorem for PRSMA when
instantiated with our oracle-e cient RSPM algorithm.
Theorem 4.3.15. Let Q a class of statistical queries with a separator set of size m. Let AO⇤
denote the RSPM algorithm with access to O⇤, a perfect weighted optimization oracle for Q. Then
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PRSMA instantiated with AO⇤ , run on a dataset S of size n, with input parameters " and   is an




































where the Õ hides logarithmic factors in 1" , log(
1
  ).
Proof. With probability at least 1   , PRSMA outputs the result of RSPM run on an n/K
fraction of the dataset, with privacy parameter "0 = 1p
8 nK log(2K/ )
. We will condition on this
event for the remainder of the proof, which occurs except with probability  .
Let q⇤ denote the true minimizer on S . Let SK denote the random subsample, and let qK
denote the true minimizer on SK . By Theorem 4.3.2, we know that for any ⌘ > 0, with
probability 1  ⌘, the error on SK is bounded as follows:
q̂(SK )  qK (SK ) 
2m2 log(m/⌘)
"0 nK
We next bound maxq2Q q(SK )  q(S), the maximum di↵erence between the value that any
query takes on SK compared to the value that it takes on S . By a Cherno↵ bound for
subsampled random variables (see e.g. Theorem 1.2 of Bardenet and Maillard (2013)), for
any q 2 Q, t > 0,







By a union bound over Q, this means that with probability 1  ⌘,
max
q2Q










We now have all the ingredients to complete the bound:
q̂(S)  q⇤(S) = [q̂(S)  q̂(SK )] + [q̂(SK )  q⇤(SK )] + [q⇤(SK )  q⇤(S)]
 2max
q2Q
|q(SK )  q(S)|+ q̂(SK )  q⇤(SK )
= 2max
q2Q
|q(SK )  q(S)|+ q̂(SK )  qK (SK ) + qK (SK )  q⇤(SK )
 2max
q2Q
|q(SK )  q(S)|+ q̂(SK )  qK (SK ).












with probability at least 1 ⌘. Substituting ⌘ =    , "0 = 1p
8 nK log(2K/ )
, K =O(1" (1+log(2/ )))
gives the desired result.
We remark that we can convert this (↵, )-accuracy bound into a bound on the expected
error using the same technique we used to compute the expected error of RSPM. The








4.4. OracleQuery: Oracle-E cient Private Synthetic Data Generation
We now apply the oracle-e cient optimization methods we have developed to the problem
of generating private synthetic data. In particular, given a private dataset S and a query class
Q, we would like to compute a synthetic dataset Ŝ subject to di↵erential privacy such that
the error maxq2Q |q(Ŝ)  q(S)| is bounded by some target parameter ↵. We provide a general
algorithmic framework called OracleQuery for designing oracle-e cient algorithms. The
crucial property of the query class we rely on to obtain oracle e ciency is dual separability,
which requires both the query class and its dual class have separator sets (Definition 4.2.1).
Informally, the dual of a query class Q is the query class Qdual that results from swapping
the role of the functions q 2 Q and the data elements x 2 X . More formally:
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Definition 4.4.1 (Dual class and dual separability). Fix a class of queries Q. For every element
x in X , let hx : Q! {0,1} be defined such that hx(q) = q(x). The dual class Qdual of Q is the set
of all such functions defined by elements in X :
Qdual = {hx | x 2 X }.
We say that the class Q is (m1,m2)-dually separable if there exists a separator set of size m1 for Q,
and there exists a separator set of size m2 for Qdual.
As we will show (see Appendix A.2.1), many widely studied query classes, including
discrete halfspaces, conjunctions, disjunctions, and parities are dually separable, often
with m1 =m2 = d (in fact, many of these classes are self-dual, meaning Q = Qdual). For any
q 2 Q, define its negation ¬q to be ¬q(x) = 1   q(x). Let ¬Q = {¬q | q 2 Q} be the negation
of Q. It will simplify several aspects of our exposition to deal with classes that are closed
under negation. For any class Q, define Q = Q[¬Q to be the closure of Q under negation.
Note that whenever we have a weighted minimization oracle for Q, we have one for ¬Q as
well — simply by negating the weights. Further, if U is a separator set for Q, it is also a
separator set for ¬Q. This implies that we also have oracle e cient learners for Q, since we
can separately learn over Q and ¬Q, and then privately take the minimum value query that
results from the two procedures (using e.g. report-noisy-min Dwork and Roth (2014b)).
Before we give our algorithm and analysis, we state several consequences of our main
theorem (that follow from instantiating it with di↵erent oracle-e cient learners).
Theorem 4.4.2. Let Q be an (m1,m2)-dually separable query class. Then given access to a
weighted minimization oracle O over the class Qdual and a di↵erentially private weighted min-
imization algorithm O"0, 0 for the class Q (with appropriately chosen privacy parameters "0
and  0), the algorithm OracleQuery is oracle-e cient, (", )-di↵erentially private, and (↵, )-
accurate with ↵ depending on the instantiation of O"0, 0 . If O"0, 0 is robustly di↵erentially private,
then so is OracleQuery.
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In this case, OracleQuery is oracle equivalent to a di↵erentially private algorithm, but is
not robustly di↵erentially private.























as long as   >  . In this case, OracleQuery is robustly di↵erentially private.




















In this case, OracleQuery is robustly di↵erentially private.
where the Õ hides logarithmic factors in 1  ,
1
  ,m1,m2,n and log(|X |).
A couple of remarks are in order.
Remark 4.4.3. The first two bounds quoted in Theorem 4.4.2 result from plugging in con-
structions of oracle-e cient di↵erentially private learners that we gave in Section 4.3. These
constructions start with a non-private optimization oracle. The third bound quoted in Theorem
4.4.2 assumes the existence of a di↵erentially private oracle with error bounds comparable to
the (ine cient) exponential mechanism based learner of Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011). We don’t
know if such oracles can be constructed from non-private (exact) optimization oracles. But this
bound is analgous to the bounds given in the non-private oracle-e cient learning literature. This
literature gives constructions assuming the existence of perfect learning oracles, but in practice,
these oracles are instantiated with heuristics like regression or support vector machines, which
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exactly optimize some convex surrogate loss function. This is often reasonable, because although
these heuristics don’t have strong worst-case guarantees, they often perform very well in practice.
The same exercise makes sense for private problems: we can use a di↵erentially private convex
minimization algorithm to optimize a surrogate loss function (e.g. Chaudhuri et al. (2011);
Bassily et al. (2014)), and hope that it does a good job minimizing classification error in practice.
It no longer makes sense to assume that the heuristic exactly solves the learning problem (since
this is impossible subject to di↵erential privacy) — instead, the analogous assumption is that it
does as well as the best ine cient private learner.
Remark 4.4.4. It is useful to compare the bounds we obtain to the best bounds that can be
obtained with ine cient algorithms. To be concrete, consider the class of boolean conjunctions
defined over the boolean hypercube X = {0,1}d (see Appendix A.2.1), which are dually-separable
with m1 =m2 = d. The best (ine cient) bounds for constructing synthetic data useful for con-
junctions Hardt and Rothblum (2010); Gupta et al. (2012) obtain error: ↵ =O
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respectively. Therefore the costs in terms of error that we pay, in exchange for oracle e ciency are
d5/8, d("n)1/6 , and d
3/8 respectively.
We now give a brief overview of our construction before diving into the technical details.
Proof overview: We present our solution in three main steps.
1. We first revisit the formulation by Hsu et al. (2013b) that views the synthetic data
generation problem as a zero-sum game between a Data player and a Query player.
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We leverage the fact that at any approximate equilibrium, the data player’s mixed
strategy (over X ) represents a good synthetic dataset S 0 with respect to Q.
2. Using the seminal result of Freund and Schapire (1996a), we will compute the equilib-
rium for the zero-sum game by simulating no-regret dynamics between the two players:
in rounds, the Data player plays according to an oracle-e cient online learning algo-
rithm due to Syrgkanis et al. (2016), and the Query player best responds to the Data
player by using a di↵erentially private oracle e cient optimization algorithm. At the
end of the dynamics, the average play of the Data player is an approximate minimax
strategy for the game, and hence a good synthetic dataset.
3. We instantiate the private best response procedure of the Query player using di↵erent
oracle-e cient methods, which we have derived in this paper, each of which gives
di↵erent accuracy guarantees. Finally, we apply our result to several query classes of
interest.
4.4.1. The Query Release Game
The query release game defined in Hsu et al. (2013b) involves a Data player and Query
player. The data player has action set equal to the data universe X (or equivalently the dual
class Qdual), while the query player has action set equal to the query class Q. Given a pair
of actions x 2 X and q 2 Q, the payo↵ is defined to be:
A(x,q) = q(S)  q(x),
where S is the input private dataset. In the zero-sum game, the Data player will try
minimize the payo↵ and the Query player will try to maximize the payo↵. To play the game,
each player chooses a mixed strategy, which is defined by a probability distribution over
their action set. Let  (X ) and  (Q) denote the sets of mixed strategies of the Data player
and Query player respectively. To simplify notation, we will write A(Ŝ , ·) = Ex⇠Ŝ [A(x, ·)]
and A(·,W ) = Eq⇠W [A(·, q)] for any Ŝ 2  (X ) and W 2  (Q). By von Neumann’s minimax
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If both players are playing strategies that can guarantee a payo↵ value close to V , then we
say that the pair of strategies form an approximate equilibrium.
Definition 4.4.5 (Approximate Equilibrium). For any ↵ > 0, a pair of strategies Ŝ 2  (X ) and
W 2  (Q) form an ↵-approximate minimax equilibrium if
max
q2Q
A(Ŝ , q)  V +↵ and min
x2X
A(W,x)   V  ↵.
Hsu et al. Hsu et al. (2013b) show that the query release game has value V = 0 and that
at any approximate equilibrium, the mixed strategy of the Data player provides accurate
answers for all queries in Q.
Lemma 4.4.6 (Accuracy at equilibrium Hsu et al. (2013b)). Let (Ŝ ,W ) be an ↵-approximate
equilibrium of the query release game. Then for any q 2 Q, |q(S)  q(Ŝ)|  ↵.
Therefore, the dataset represented by the distribution Ŝ (or that could be obtained by
sampling from Ŝ) is exactly the synthetic dataset we would like to compute, and hence the
problem of privately computing synthetic data is reduced to the problem of di↵erentially
private equilibrium computation in the query release game.
4.4.2. Solving the Game with No-Regret Dynamics
To privately compute an approximate equilibrium of the game, we will simulate the
following no-regret dynamics between the Data Player and the Query Player in rounds:
In each round t, the Data player plays a distribution St according to a no-regret learning
algorithm, and the Query player plays an approximate best-response to St . The following
classical theorem of Freund and Schapire Freund and Schapire (1996a) (instantiated in our
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setting) shows that the average play of both players in this dynamic forms an approximate
equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4.7 (Freund and Schapire (1996a)). Let S1,S2, . . . ,ST 2  (X ) be a sequence of
distributions played by the Data Player, and let q1, q2, . . . , qT 2 Q be the Query player’s sequence





















A(St,qt)   QT .
Let S be uniform mixture of the distributions {S1, . . . ,ST } andW be the uniform distribution over
{q1, . . . , qT }. Then (S,W ) is a ( D + Q)-approximate minimax equilibrium of the game.
Now we will detail the no-regret algorithm for the Data player and the best-response
method for the Query player, and provide the regret bounds  D and  Q.
No-Regret Algorithm for the Data Player. We start with the observation that the regret


























Therefore, it su ces to minimize regret with respect to the sequence of loss functions
{¬qt(·)}, while ignoring the private dataset S . We crucially rely on the fact that each qt
is computed by the Query player subject to di↵erential privacy, and so the Data player’s
learning algorithm need not be di↵erentially private: di↵erential privacy for the overall
procedure will follow from the post-processing guarantee of di↵erential privacy. In particu-
lar, we will run an oracle-e cient algorithm Context-FTPL due to Syrgkanis et al. (2016),
which is a variant of the “Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader” of Kalai and Vempala (2005) al-
gorithm that performs perturbations using a separator set. We state its regret guarantee
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below. Because Context-FTPL need not be di↵erentially private, it can be instantiated with
an arbitrary heuristic oracle, that need not be either di↵erentially private or certifiable.
Context-FTPL (Qdual,µ) Algorithm Syrgkanis et al. (2016)
Given: parameter µ, hypothesis class Qdual (or equivalently X ), separator set U ⇢ Q for
Qdual, weighted optimization oracle O for Qdual
Input: A sequence of queries {q1, . . . , qT } selected by the Query player.
1: for t = 1 . . .T do
2: Data player plays the distribution St such that each draw x generated as follows:
3: Draw a sequence (s,⌘s), for s 2U , where ⌘s ⇠ Lap(µ)




s2S ⌘shx(s) . Use non-private oracle O
Theorem 4.4.8 (Follows from Syrgkanis et al. (2016)). Suppose that U is a separator set for
Qdual of cardinality m2. Then the Data player running Context-FTPL (X ,µ) with appropriately





T log |X |)
Note that the algorithm Context-FTPL only provides sample access to each distribution St ,
but each draw from St can be computed using a single call to the oracle O.
Approximate Best Response by the Query Player. At each round t, after the Data player









Unlike the problem faced by the Data player, this optimization problem directly depends on
the private data S , so the best response needs to be computed privately. Since we only have
sample access to the distribution St , the Query player will first draw N random examples
from the distribution St , and we will the empirical distribution Ŝ t over the sample as a
proxy for St . Recall that Q = QS¬Q, so we will first approximately and di↵erentially








































with weights wi,w0j taking values in {1, 1}. We will rely on a private weighted optimization




2 for the two problems in Equation (4.9)
respectively. Finally, the Query player privately selects one of the queries using report noisy
max—i.e. it first perturb the values of A(Ŝ t , qt1) and A(Ŝ
t , qt2) with Laplace noise, and then
select the query with higher noisy value. By bounding the errors from the sampling of Ŝ t ,
the private optimization oracle O"0, 0 , and report noisy max, we can derive the following
regret guarantee for the Query player.
Private Best-Response (PBR)
Given: privacy parameters ("0, 0), accuracy parameters (↵0, 0), a private weighted opti-
mization algorithm O"0, 0 .
Input: A private dataset S and the Data player’s sequence of distributions {S1, . . . ,ST }.
1: for t = 1 . . .T do
2: Query player plays a query qt as follows:
3: Draw N samples x01, . . .x
0
N ⇠i.i.d. St with N =
2log(2|Q|/ 0)
↵20
4: Form the weighted dataset WD1 = {(xi , 1n )}xi2S [ {xj ,
 1
N }j=1...N
5: Form the weighted dataset WD2 = {(xi ,  1n )}xi2S [ {xj ,
1
N }j=1...N






7: Perturb payo↵s: Ã1 = A(Ŝ t , qt1) + Lap(1/("0n)) and Ã2 = A(Ŝ
t , qt2) + Lap(1/("0n))
8: If Ã1 > Ã2 then qt = qt1 else q
t = qt2
Lemma 4.4.9. Suppose that the oracle O"0, 0 succeeds in solving all problems it is presented with
up to error at most ↵0 except with probability  0. Then with probability at least 1  3 0T , the
Query player has regret:








Proof. There are three potential sources of error at each round t. The first is the error
introduced by solving our optimization problem over the proxy distribution Ŝ t instead of
St . By applying a Cherno↵ bound and a union bound over all queries in Q, we have with
probability 1   0 that,











Next is the error introduced by the oracle. By our assumption on the oracle O"0, 0 , we have































Finally, the Laplace noise used to privately select the best query amongst qt1 and q
t
2 intro-
duces additional error. But by the accuracy guarantee of report noisy max Dwork and Roth
(2014b) (which follows from the CDF of the Laplace distribution and a union bound over












Combining Equations (4.11) to (4.13) and applying a union bound, we have the following
















Finally, taking a union bound over all T steps recovers the stated regret bound.
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4.4.3. The Full Algorithm: OracleQuery
Our main algorithm OracleQuery first simulates the no-regret dynamics described above,




by the Data player. Since we only have sampling access to each St , we will approximate S
by the empirical distribution of a set of independent samples drawn from S . As we show
below, the sampling error will be on the same order as the regret as long as we take roughly
log |Q|/↵2 samples.
Lemma 4.4.10. Suppose that S is an ⌘-approximate minimax strategy for the query release game.
Let {x01, . . . ,x0N } be a set of N =
2log(2|Q|/ )
↵20
samples drawn i.i.d. from S , and Ŝ be the empirical
distributions over the drawn samples. Then with probability 1   , Ŝ is an (⌘ +↵0)-approximate
minimax strategy.
Proof. By the definition of an ⌘-approximate minimax strategy, we have
max
q2Q
A(S,q)  V + ⌘ = ⌘.
By applying the Cherno↵ bound, we know that except with probability  / |Q|, the following

















   ↵ as well. Then by taking a union bound over












A(S,q) +↵0  ⌘ +↵0,
which recovers the stated bound.
The details of the algorithm are presented in Algorithm 4. To analyze the algorithm, we
will start with establishing its privacy guarantee, which directly follows from the advanced
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Algorithm 4 Oracle-E cient Synthetic Data Release: OracleQuery
Given: Target privacy parameters ",  2 (0,1), a target failure probability  , a number of
rounds T , accuracy parameters ↵0, 0, a weighted optimization oracle O for the class Qdual,












Input: A dataset S 2 X n.
1: Initialize q0 2 Q to be an arbitrary query
2: Let N↵0 =
2log(8|Q|/ )
↵20
3: for t = 1 . . .T do
4: Let St be a distribution defined by the sampling algorithm
Context-FTPL (Qdual,O, {q0, . . . , q(t 1)}) . Data player’s no-regret algorithm
5: Let qt = PBR("0, 0,↵0, 0,S,O"0, 0 ,St) . Query player’s best response
6: for j = 1, . . . ,N↵0 : do
7: Draw ⌧ from Unif([T ]) and then draw x0j from distribution S
⌧
Output: the dataset Ŝ = {x01, . . . ,x0N↵0 }
composition of Dwork et al. (2010), the fact that each call to PBR by the Query player
satisfies (3"0,2 0)-di↵erential privacy (with "0 and  0 set according to Algorithm 4), and
the fact that the rest of the algorithm can be viewed as a post-processing of these calls.
Lemma 4.4.11 (Privacy of OracleQuery). OracleQuery is oracle equivalent to an (", )-
di↵erentially private algorithm. If O"0, 0 is robustly di↵erentially private, then OracleQuery is
(", )-robustly di↵erentially private.
Now to analyze the accuracy of OracleQuery, we will show that the average distribution S
is part of an approximate minimax equilibrium, and so is its approximation Ŝ .
Lemma 4.4.12 (Accuracy of OracleQuery). Suppose thatO"0, 0 is a weighted ("0, 0)-di↵erentially
private (↵0, 0) minimization oracle over the class Q, where the parameters "0,  0, and  0 are
set according to Algorithm 4. Then OracleQuery is an (↵, )-accurate synthetic data generation


























Proof. First, we will show that the average distribution S from the no-regret dynamics is an






































with probability at least 1   3T 0. Then by Theorem 5.4.9, we know that S is an ⌘-
approximate minimax strategy, with probability at least 1   3 /4. Let us condition on
this event. Lastly, by the setting of N↵0 in Algorithm 4 and Lemma 4.4.10, we know that Ŝ
is a (⌘ +↵0), except with probability  /4. Then the stated bound follows directly from a
union bound.
Finally, we will consider three di↵erent instantiations of O"0, 0 . To optimize the error
guarantee for each instantiation, we set the number of rounds T used in Algorithm 4 so
that the regret of the Data player given by Theorem 4.4.8 is on the same order as the error
of O"0, 0 . We first consider a di↵erentially private oracle that matches the error guarantees
of the generic private learner from Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011).
Corollary 4.4.13. Suppose thatO"0,0 is an ("0,0)-di↵erentially private (↵0, 0)-accurate weighted

































where the Õ hides logarithmic factors in m2,n and log(|X |).
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Next, we will instantiate O"0, 0 with the RSPM algorithm. Note that with this choice,
although OracleQuery is oracle equivalent to a di↵erentially private algorithm, it is not
robustly di↵erentially private.
































where the Õ hides logarithmic factors in m2,n and log(|X |).
Finally, we instantiate the oracle O"0, 0 with the PRSMA algorithm that uses the Laplace
RSPM algorithm with a certifiable heuristic oracle.
Corollary 4.4.15. When O"0, 0 is instantiated with PRSMA algorithm (that internally uses


























































Here, we instantiate our bounds for a particular query class of interest: boolean conjunctions
over the hypercube {0,1}d . Constructing synthetic data for conjunctions (or equivalently
producing a full marginal table for a dataset) has long been a challenge problem in dif-
ferential privacy, subject to a long line of work Barak et al. (2007); Ullman and Vadhan
(2010); Gupta et al. (2013); Kasiviswanathan et al. (2010); Thaler et al. (2012); Hardt et al.
(2012); Feldman and Kothari (2014); Chandrasekaran et al. (2014), and is known to be
computationally hard even for the special case of two-way conjunctions Ullman and Vadhan
(2010). Our results in particular imply the first oracle e cient algorithm for generating
synthetic data for all 2d conjunctions. Other interesting classes satisfy all of the conditions
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needed for our synthetic data generation algorithm to apply, including disjunctions, parities,
and discrete halfspaces — see Appendix A.2.1 for details, and for how to allow negated
variables in the class of conjunctions while preserving seperability.
Definition 4.4.16. Given a subset of variables S ✓ [d], the boolean conjunction defined by S
is the statistical query qS (x) = ^j2Sxj . The set of boolean conjunctions QC defined over the
hypercube X = {0,1}d is:
QC = {qS | S ✓ [d]}
Boolean conjunctions are (d,d) dually-separable (see Appendix A.2.1 for the separator set).
Thus, we can instantiate Theorem 4.4.2 with (e.g.) the Gaussian RSPM algorithm, and
obtain an oracle-e cient algorithm for generating synthetic data for all 2d conjunctions
that outputs a synthetic dataset S 0 that satisfies:
max
q2QC






In this paper, we give oracle-e cient private algorithms for learning and synthetic data
generation for classes of queries Q that exhibit special structure: small universal identifica-
tion sets. Because of information theoretic lower bounds for di↵erentially private learning
Bun et al. (2015); Alon et al. (2018), we know that these results cannot be extended to all
learnable classes of queries Q. But can they be extended to all classes of queries that are
information theoretically learnable subject to di↵erential privacy? Maybe — this is the most
interesting question left open by our work. But here, we present a “barrier” illustrating a
di culty that one would have to overcome in trying to prove this result. Our argument has
three parts:
1. First, we observe a folklore connection between di↵erentially private learning and
online learning: any di↵erentially private empirical risk minimization algorithm A
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for a class Q that always outputs the exact minimizer of a data-independent perturbation
of the empirical risks can also be used as a no-regret learning algorithm, using the
“follow the perturbed leader” analysis of Kalai and Vempala Kalai and Vempala (2005).
The per-round run-time of this algorithm is exactly equal to the run-time of A.
2. Oracle-e cient no-regret learning algorithms are subject to a lower bound of Hazan
and Koren Hazan and Koren (2016), that states that even given access to an oracle
which solves optimization problems over a set of experts Q in unit time, there exist
finite classesQ such that obtaining non-trivial regret guarantees requires total running
time larger than poly(|Q|). This implies a lower bound on the magnitude of the
perturbations that an algorithm of the type described in (1) must use.
3. Finally, we observe for any finite class of hypotheses Q, information theoretically, it
is possible to solve the empirical risk minimization problem on a dataset of size T
up to error O( log |Q|"T ) using the generic learner from Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011).
This implies a separation between the kinds of algorithms described in 1), and the
(non-e ciently) achievable information theoretic bounds consistent with di↵erential
privacy.
We emphasize that oracle e cient algorithms for learning over Q have access to a non-
private oracle which exactly solves the learning problem over Q— not an NP oracle, for
which the situation is di↵erent (see the discussion in Section 4.6).
First we define the class of mechanisms our barrier result applies to:
Definition 4.5.1. We say that an (", )-di↵erentially private learning algorithm A : X n! Q for
Q is a perturbed Empirical Risk Minimizer (pERM) if there is some distribution D",  (defined








We note that many algorithms are pERM algorithms. The most obvious example is report-
noisy-min, in which each Zq ⇠ Lap(1/") independently. The exponential mechanism instan-
tiated with empirical loss as its quality score (i.e. the generic learner of Kasiviswanathan
et al. (2011)) is also a pERM algorithm, in which each Zq is drawn independently from a
Gumbel distribution Dwork and Roth (2014b). But note that the coordinates Zq need not
be drawn independently: The oracle-e cient RSPM algorithm we give in Section 4.3 is also
a pERM algorithm, in which the perturbations Zq are introduced in an implicit (correlated)
way by perturbing the dataset itself. And it is natural to imagine that many algorithms
that employ weighted optimization oracles — which after all solve an exact minimization
problem — will fall into this class. The expected error guarantees of these algorithms are
proven by bounding E[||Z ||1], which is typically a tight bound.
We now briefly recall the online learning setting. Let Q be an arbitrary class of functions
q : X ! [0,1]. In rounds t = 1, . . . ,T , the learner selects a function qt 2 Q, and an (adaptive)
adversary selects an example xt 2 X , as a function of the sequence (q1,x1, . . . , qt 1,xt 1). The
learner incurs a loss of `t = qt(xt). A standard objective is to minimize the expected average
regret:





























where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the learner. A weighted optimization
oracle in the online learning setting is exactly the same thing as it is in our setting: Given a
weighted dataset (S,w), it returns argminq2Q
P
xi2S wi · q(xi ).
A natural way to try to use a private learning algorithm in the online learning setting is just
to run it at each round t on the dataset defined on the set of data points observed so far:
St = {x1, . . . ,xt 1}.
Definition 4.5.2. Follow the Private Leader, instantiated withA, is the online learning algorithm
that at every round t selects qt =A(St).
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The follow the private leader algorithm instantiated with A has a controllable regret bound
whenever A is a di↵erentially private pERM algorithm. The following theorem is folklore,
but follows essentially from the original analysis of “follow the perturbed leader” by Kalai
and Vempala Kalai and Vempala (2005). See e.g. the lecture notes from Roth and Smith
(2017) or Abernethy et al. (2017) for an example of this analysis cast in the language of
di↵erential privacy. We include a proof in Appendix A.2.4 for completeness.
Theorem 4.5.3. Let ",  2 (0,1) and let A be an (", ) di↵erentially private pERM algorithm for
query class Q, with perturbation distribution D(", ). Then Follow the Private Leader instantiated
with A has expected regret bounded by:
R(T ) O
 




Note that the regret is controlled by EZ⇠D",  [kZk1], which also controls the error of A as a
learning algorithm.
We wish to exploit a lower bound on the running time of oracle e cient online learners
over arbitrary sets Q due to Hazan and Koren Hazan and Koren (2016):
Theorem 4.5.4 (Hazan and Koren (2016)). For every algorithm with access to a weighted opti-
mization oracleO, there exists a class of functionsQ such that the algorithm cannot guarantee that





Here, it is assumed that calls to the oracle O can be carried out in unit time, and total time
refers to the cumulative time over all T rounds of interaction. Hence, if A is oracle-e cient
— i.e. it runs in time f (t) = poly(t, log |Q|) when given as input a dataset of size t, the total run
time of follow the private leader instantiated withA is: PTt=1 f (t)  T ·f (T ) = poly(T , log |Q|).
This theorem is almost what we want — except that the order of quantifiers is reversed.
It in principle leaves open the possibility that for every class Q, there is a di↵erent oracle
e cient algorithm (tailored to the class) that can e ciently obtain low regret. After all, our
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RSPM algorithm is non-uniform in this way — for each new class of functions Q, it must be
instantiated with a separator set for that class.
Via a min-max argument together with an equilibrium sparsification technique, we can give
a version of the lower bound of Hazan and Koren (2016) that has the order of quantifiers
we want — see Appendix A.2.4 for the proof.
Theorem 4.5.5. For any d, there is a fixed finite class of statistical queries Q of size |Q| =N = 2d
defined over a data universe of size |X | = O(N5 log2N ) such that for every online learning
algorithm with access to a weighted optimization oracle for Q, it cannot guarantee that its
expected average regret will be o(1) in total time less than ⌦(
p
N/ log3(N )).
Theorem 4.5.5 therefore implies that follow the private leader, when instantiated with any
oracle-e cient di↵erentially private pERM algorithm A cannot obtain diminishing regret
R(T ) = o(1) unless the number of rounds T =⌦(|Q|c) for some c > 0. In combination with
Theorem 4.5.3, this implies our barrier result:
Theorem 4.5.6. Any oracle e cient (i.e. running in time poly(n, log |Q|)) (", )-di↵erentially
private pERM algorithm instantiated with a weighted optimization oracle for the query class
Q defined in Theorem 4.5.5, with perturbation distribution D(", ) must be such that for every
(" +  ) = o(1):
EZ⇠D(", ) [||Z ||1]  ⌦(|Q|
c)
for some constant c > 0.
If the accuracy guarantee of A is proportional to EZ⇠D(", ) [||Z ||1] (as it is for all pERM
algorithms that we know of), this means that there exist finite classes of statistical queries
Q such that no oracle-e cient algorithm can obtain non-trivial error unless the dataset size
n   poly(|Q|). Of course, if n   poly(|Q|), then algorithms such as report-noisy-min and the
exponential mechanism can be run in polynomial time.
This is in contrast with what we can obtain via the generic (ine cient) private learner of










. Similarly, because we show in Theorem 4.5.5 that the hard class Q
can be taken to have universe size X = poly(Q), this means that information theoretically,
it is even possible to privately solve the (harder) problem of ↵-accurate synthetic data







using the (ine cient) synthetic data generation algorithm of





. In contrast, our barrier
result states is that if there exists an oracle-e cient learner A for this class Q that has
polynomially related sample complexity to what is obtainable absent a guarantee of oracle
e ciency, then A must either:
1. Not be a pERM algorithm, or:





Condition 2. seems especially implausible, as for every pERMwe are aware of,EZ⇠D(", ) [||Z ||1]
is a tight bound (up to log factors) on its expected error. In particular, this barrier implies
that there is no oracle e cient algorithm for sampling from the exponential mechanism
distribution used in the generic learner of Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011) for arbitrary query
classes Q.
4.6. Conclusion and Open Questions
In this paper, we have initiated the systematic study of the power of oracle-e cient dif-
ferentially private algorithms, and have made the distinction between oracle-dependent
non-robust di↵erential privacy and robust di↵erential privacy. This is a new direction that
suggests a number of fascinating open questions. In our opinion, the most interesting of
these is:
‘‘Can every learning and synthetic data generation problem that is solvable
subject to di↵erential privacy be solved with an oracle-e cient (robustly) di↵er-
entially private algorithm, with only a polynomial blow-up in sample complex-
ity?”
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It remains an open question whether or not finite Littlestone dimension characterizes
private learnability (it is known that infinite Littlestone dimension precludes private
learnability Alon et al. (2018)) — and so one avenue towards resolving both open questions
in the a rmative simultaneously would be to show that finite Littlestone dimension can be
leveraged to obtain oracle-e cient di↵erentially private learning algorithms.
However, because of our barrier result, we conjecture that the set of query classes that are
privately learnable in an oracle-e cient manner is a strict subset of the set that are privately
learnable. If this is so, can we precisely characterize this set? What is the right structural
property, and is it more general than the su cient condition of having small universal
identification sets that we have discovered?
Even restricting attention to query classes with universal identification sets of size m,
there are interesting quantitative questions. The Gaussian version of our RSPM algorithm
e ciently obtains error that scales as m3/2, but information-theoretically, it is possible
to obtain error scaling only linearly with m. Is this optimal error rate possible to obtain
in an oracle-e cient manner, or is the
p
m error overhead that comes with our approach
necessary for oracle e ciency?
Our PRSMA algorithm shows how to generically reduce from an oracle-dependent guar-
antee of di↵erential privacy to a guarantee of robust di↵erential privacy — but at a cost,
both in terms of running time, and in terms of error. Are these costs necessary? Without
further assumptions on the construction of the oracle, it seems di cult to avoid the O(1/ )-
overhead in running time, but perhaps there are natural assumptions that can be placed on
the failure-mode of the oracle that can avoid this. It is less clear whether the error overhead
that we introduce — by running the original algorithm on an " fraction of the dataset, with
a privacy parameter "0 ⇡ 1/
p
"n — is necessary. Doing this is a key feature of our algorithm
and analysis, because we take advantage of the fact that di↵erentially private algorithms
are actually distributionally private when "0 is set this small — but perhaps it can be avoided
entirely with a di↵erent approach.
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Our barrier result takes advantage of a connection between di↵erentially private learn-
ability and online learnability. Because private pERM algorithms can be used e ciently
as no-regret learning algorithms, they are subject to the lower bounds on oracle-e cient
online learning proven in Hazan and Koren (2016). But perhaps the connection between dif-
ferentially private learnability and online learnability runs deeper. Can every di↵erentially
private learning algorithm be used in a black box manner to e ciently obtain a no-regret
learning algorithm? Note that it is already known that private learnability implies finite
Littlestone dimension, so the open question here concerns whether there is an e cient
blackbox reduction from private ERM algorithms to online learning algorithms. If true, this
would convert our barrier for pERM algorithms into a full lower-bound for oracle-e cient
private learning algorithms generally.
Finally, a more open ended question — that applies both to our work and to work on oracle
e ciency in machine learning more generally — concerns how to refine the model of oracle
e ciency. Ideally, the learning problems fed to the oracle should be “natural” — e.g. a small
perturbation or re-weighting of the original (non-private) learning problem, as is the case
for the algorithms we present in our paper. This is desirable because presumably we believe
that the heuristics which can solve hard learning problems in practice work for “natural”
instances, rather than arbitrary problems. However, the definition for oracle e ciency
that we use in this paper allows for un-natural algorithms. For example, it is possible to
show that the problem of sampling from the exponential mechanism of McSherry and
Talwar (2007) defined by rational valued quality scores that are e ciently computable
lies in BPPNP — in other words, the sampling can be done in polynomial time given
access to an oracle for solving circuit-satisfiability problems4. This implies in particular,
that there exists an oracle e cient algorithm (as we have defined them) for any NP hard
4This construction is due to Jonathan Ullman and Salil Vadhan (personal communication). It starts from the
ability to sample uniformly at random amongst the set of satisfying assignments of an arbitrary polynomially
sized boolean circuit given an NP oracle, using the algorithm of Bellare et al. (2000). For any distribution P
such that there is a polynomially sized circuit C for which the relative probability mass on any discrete input x
can be computed by C(x), we can construct a boolean circuit C0 that computes for bounded bit-length rational
numbers w: C0(x,w) = 1 if C(x)   w. The marginal distribution on elements x when sampling uniformly at
random from the satisfying assignments of this circuit is P .
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learning problem — because the learning oracle can be used as an arbitrary NP oracle via
gadget reductions5. The same logic implies that there are oracle e cient no-regret learning
algorithms for any class of experts for which o✏ine optimization is NP hard — because an
NP oracle can be used to sample from the multiplicative weights distribution. But these
kinds of gadget reductions seem to be an abuse of the model of oracle e ciency, which
currently reduces to all of BPPNP when the given oracle is solving an NP hard problem6.
Ambitiously, might there be a refinement of the model of oracle e ciency that requires one
to prove a utility theorem along the following lines: assuming an oracle which can with high
probability solve learning problems drawn from the actual data distribution, the oracle
e cient algorithm will (with slightly lower probability) solve the private learning problem
when the underlying instance is drawn from the same distribution. Theorems of this sort
would be of great interest, and would (presumably) rule out “unnatural” algorithms relying
on gadget reductions.
5Note that this procedure is not robustly di↵erentially private, since sampling from the correct distribution
occurs only if the oracle does not fail. But it could be fed into our PRSMA algorithm to obtain robust privacy.
It also does not solve synthetic data generation oracle e ciently because the quality score used for synthetic
data generation in Blum et al. (2013) is not computable by a polynomially sized circuit generally.
6This does not contradict the lower bound of Hazan and Koren (2016) for oracle e cient online learning, or
our barrier result/conjectured separation in the case of private learning algorithms. This is because oracles
solving problems that don’t have polynomial time algorithms, but are not NP hard cannot be used to encode the




Auditing and Learning for Subgroup Fairness
5.1. Introduction
The semantics of the statistical notions of fairness discussed in Chapter 1 would be signifi-
cantly stronger if they were defined over a large number of subgroups, thus permitting a
rich middle ground between fairness only for a small number of coarse pre-defined groups,
and the strong assumptions needed for fairness at the individual level. Consider the kind
of fairness gerrymandering that can occur when we only look for unfairness over a small
number of pre-defined groups:
Example 5.1.1. Imagine a setting with two binary features, corresponding to race (say black
and white) and gender (say male and female), both of which are distributed independently and
uniformly at random in a population. Consider a classifier that labels an example positive if
and only if it corresponds to a black man, or a white woman. Then the classifier will appear to
be equitable when one considers either protected attribute alone, in the sense that it labels both
men and women as positive 50% of the time, and labels both black and white individuals as
positive 50% of the time. But if one looks at any conjunction of the two attributes (such as black
women), then it is apparent that the classifier maximally violates the statistical parity fairness
constraint. Similarly, if examples have a binary label that is also distributed uniformly at random,
and independently from the features, the classifier will satisfy equal opportunity fairness with
respect to either protected attribute alone, even though it maximally violates it with respect to
conjunctions of two attributes.
We remark that the issue raised by this toy example is not merely hypothetical. In our
experiments in Section 5.5, we show that similar violations of fairness on subgroups of the
pre-defined groups can result from the application of standard machine learning methods
applied to real datasets. To avoid such problems, we would like to be able to satisfy a
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fairness constraint not just for the small number of protected groups defined by single
protected attributes, but for a combinatorially large or even infinite collection of structured
subgroups definable over protected attributes.
In this chapter, we consider the problem of auditing binary classifiers for equal opportunity
and statistical parity, and the problem of learning classifiers subject to these constraints,
when the number of protected groups is large. There are exponentially many ways of
carving up a population into subgroups, and we cannot necessarily identify a small number
of these a priori as the only ones we need to be concerned about. At the same time, we cannot
insist on any notion of statistical fairness for every subgroup of the population: for example,
any imperfect classifier could be accused of being unfair to the subgroup of individuals
defined ex-post as the set of individuals it misclassified. This simply corresponds to
“overfitting” a fairness constraint. We note that the individual fairness definition of Joseph
et al. (2016) (when restricted to the binary classification setting) can be viewed as asking for
equalized false positive rates across the singleton subgroups, containing just one individual
each1 — but naturally, in order to achieve this strong definition of fairness, Joseph et al.
(2016) have to make structural assumptions about the form of the ground truth. It is,
however, sensible to ask for fairness for large structured subsets of individuals: so long as
these subsets have a bounded VC dimension, the statistical problem of learning and auditing
fair classifiers is easy, so long as the dataset is su ciently large. This can be viewed as an
interpolation between equal opportunity fairness and the individual “weakly meritocratic”
fairness definition from Joseph et al. (2016), that does not require making any assumptions
about the ground truth. Our investigation focuses on the computational challenges, both in
theory and in practice.
5.1.1. Our Results
Briefly, our contributions are:
1It also asks for equalized false negative rates, and that the false positive rate is smaller than the true positive
rate. Here, the randomness in the “rates” is taken entirely over the randomness of the classifier.
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• Formalization of the problem of auditing and learning classifiers for fairness with
respect to rich classes of subgroups G.
• Results proving (under certain assumptions) the computational equivalence of au-
diting G and (weak) agnostic learning of G. While these results imply theoretical
intractability of auditing for some natural classes G, they also suggest that practical
machine learning heuristics can be applied to the auditing problem.
• Provably convergent algorithms for learning classifiers that are fair with respect to
G, based on a formulation as a two-player zero-sum game between a Learner (the
primal player) and an Auditor (the dual player). We provide two di↵erent algorithms,
both of which are based on solving for the equilibrium of this game. The first
provably converges in a polynomial number of steps and is based on simulation of the
game dynamics when the Learner uses Follow the Perturbed Leader and the Auditor
uses best response; the second is only guaranteed to converge asymptotically but is
computationally simpler, and involves both players using Fictitious Play.
• An implementation and empirical evaluation of the Fictitious Play algorithm demon-
strating its e↵ectiveness on a real dataset in which subgroup fairness is a concern.
In more detail, we start by studying the computational challenge of simply checkingwhether
a given classifier satisfies equal opportunity and statistical parity. Doing this in time linear
in the number of protected groups is simple: for each protected group, we need only
estimate a single expectation. However, when there are many di↵erent protected attributes
which can be combined to define the protected groups, their number is combinatorially
large2.
2For example, as discussed in a recent Propublica investigation (Angwin and Grassegger, 2017), Facebook
policy protects groups against hate speech if the group is definable as a conjunction of protected attributes.
Under the Facebook schema, “race” and “gender” are both protected attributes, and so the Facebook policy
protects “black women” as a distinct class, separately from black people and women. When there are d
protected attributes, there are 2d protected groups. As a statistical estimation problem, this is not a large
obstacle — we can estimate 2d expectations to error " so long as our data set has size O(d/"2), but there is now
a computational problem.
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We model the problem by specifying a class of functions G defined over a set of d protected
attributes. G defines a set of protected subgroups. Each function g 2 G corresponds to
the protected subgroup {x : gi(x) = 1}3. The first result of this chapter is that for both
equal opportunity and statistical parity, the computational problem of checking whether a
classifier or decision-making algorithm D violates statistical fairness with respect to the set
of protected groups G is equivalent to the problem of agnostically learning G (Kearns et al.,
1994), in a strong and distribution-specific sense. This equivalence has two implications:
1. First, it allows us to import computational hardness results from the learning theory
literature. Agnostic learning turns out to be computationally hard in the worst case,
even for extremely simple classes of functions G (like boolean conjunctions and linear
threshold functions). As a result, we can conclude that auditing a classifier D for
statistical fairness violations with respect to a class G is also computationally hard.
This means we should not expect to find a polynomial time algorithm that is always
guaranteed to solve the auditing problem.
2. However, in practice, various learning heuristics (like boosting, logistic regression,
SVMs, backpropagation for neural networks, etc.) are commonly used to learn
accurate classifiers which are known to be hard to learn in the worst case. The
equivalence we show between agnostic learning and auditing is distribution specific —
that is, if on a particular data set, a heuristic learning algorithm can solve the agnostic
learning problem (on an appropriately defined subset of the data), it can be used also
to solve the auditing problem on the same data set.
These results appear in Section 5.3.
3For example, in the case of Facebook’s policy, the protected attributes include “race, sex, gender identity,
religious a liation, national origin, ethnicity, sexual orientation and serious disability/disease” (Angwin and
Grassegger, 2017), and G represents the class of boolean conjunctions. In other words, a group defined by
individuals having any subset of values for the protected attributes is protected.
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Next, we consider the problem of learning a classifier that equalizes false positive or negative
rates across all (possibly infinitely many) sub-groups, defined by a class of functions G. As
per the reductions described above, this problem is computationally hard in the worst case.
However, under the assumption that we have an e cient oracles which solves the agnostic
learning problem, we give and analyze algorithms for this problem based on a game-
theoretic formulation. We first prove that the optimal fair classifier can be found as
the equilibrium of a two-player, zero-sum game, in which the (pure) strategy space of
the “Learner” player corresponds to classifiers in H, and the (pure) strategy space of the
“Auditor” player corresponds to subgroups defined by G. The best response problems for
the two players correspond to agnostic learning and auditing, respectively. We show that
both problems can be solved with a single call to a cost sensitive classification oracle, which
is equivalent to an agnostic learning oracle. We then draw on extant theory for learning
in games and no-regret algorithms to derive two di↵erent algorithms based on simulating
game play in this formulation. In the first, the Learner employs the well-studied Follow
the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) algorithm on an appropriate linearization of its best-response
problem, while the Auditor approximately best-responds to the distribution over classifiers
of the Learner at each step. Since FTPL has a no-regret guarantee, we obtain an algorithm
that provably converges in a polynomial number of steps.
While it enjoys strong provable guarantees, this first algorithm is randomized (due to the
noise added by FTPL), and the best-response step for the Auditor is polynomial time but
computationally expensive. We thus propose a second algorithm that is deterministic,
simpler and faster per step, based on both players adopting the Fictitious Play learning
dynamic. This algorithm has weaker theoretical guarantees: it has provable convergence
only asymptotically, and not in a polynomial number of steps — but is more practical and
converges rapidly in practice. The derivation of these algorithms (and their guarantees)
appear in Section 5.4.
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Finally, we implement the Fictitious Play algorithm and demonstrate its practicality by
e ciently learning classifiers that approximately equalize false positive rates across any
group definable by a linear threshold function on 18 protected attributes in the “Com-
munities and Crime” dataset. We use simple, fast regression algorithms as heuristics to
implement agnostic learning oracles, and (via our reduction from agnostic learning to
auditing) auditing oracles. Our results suggest that it is possible in practice to learn fair
classifiers with respect to a large class of subgroups that still achieve non-trivial error. Full
details are contained in Section 5.5, and for a substantially more comprehensive empirical
investigation of our method we direct the interested reader to Kearns et al. (2018).
5.1.2. Further Related Work
Independent of our work, Hébert-Johnson et al. (2017) also consider a related and com-
plementary notion of fairness that they call “multicalibration”. In settings in which one
wishes to train a real-valued predictor, multicalibration can be considered the “calibration”
analogue for the definitions of subgroup fairness that we give for false positive rates, false
negative rates, and classification rates. For a real-valued predictor, calibration informally
requires that for every value v 2 [0,1] predicted by an algorithm, the fraction of individuals
who truly have a positive label in the subset of individuals on which the algorithm predicted
v should be approximately equal to v. Multicalibration asks for approximate calibration on
every set defined implicitly by some circuit in a set G. Hébert-Johnson et al. (2017) give an
algorithmic result that is analogous to the one we give for learning subgroup fair classifiers:
a polynomial time algorithm for learning a multi-calibrated predictor, given an agnostic
learning algorithm for G. In addition to giving a polynomial-time algorithm, we also give a
practical variant of our algorithm (which is however only guaranteed to converge in the
limit) that we use to conduct empirical experiments on real data.
Thematically, the most closely related piece of prior work is Zhang and Neill (2016), who
also aim to audit classification algorithms for discrimination in subgroups that have not
been pre-defined. Our work di↵ers from theirs in a number of important ways. First, we
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audit the algorithm for common measures of statistical unfairness, whereas Zhang and
Neill (2016) design a new measure compatible with their particular algorithmic technique.
Second, we give a formal analysis of our algorithm. Finally, we audit with respect to
subgroups defined by a class of functions G, which we can take to have bounded VC
dimension, which allows us to give formal out-of-sample guarantees. Zhang and Neill
(2016) attempt to audit with respect to all possible sub-groups, which introduces a severe
multiple-hypothesis testing problem, and risks overfitting. Most importantly we give
actionable algorithms for learning subgroup fair classifiers, whereas Zhang and Neill (2016)
restrict attention to auditing.
Technically, the most closely related piece of work (and from which we take inspiration
for our algorithm in Section 5.4) is Agarwal et al. (2017), who show that given access
to an agnostic learning oracle for a class H, there is an e cient algorithm to find the
lowest-error distribution over classifiers in H subject to equalizing false positive rates
across polynomially many subgroups. Their algorithm can be viewed as solving the same
zero-sum game that we solve, but in which the “subgroup” player plays gradient descent
over his pure strategies, one for each sub-group. This ceases to be an e cient or practical
algorithm when the number of subgroups is large, as is our case. Our main insight is that
an agnostic learning oracle is su cient to have the both players play “fictitious play”, and
that there is a transformation of the best response problem such that an agnostic learning
algorithm is enough to e ciently implement follow the perturbed leader.
There is also other work showing computational hardness for fair learning problems.
Most notably, Woodworth et al. (2017) show that finding a linear threshold classifier
that approximately minimizes hinge loss subject to equalizing false positive rates across
populations is computationally hard (assuming that refuting a random k-XOR formula is
hard). In contrast, we show that even checking whether a classifier satisfies a false positive
rate constraint on a particular data set is computationally hard (if the number of subgroups
on which fairness is desired is too large to enumerate).
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5.2. Model and Preliminaries
We model each individual as being described by a tuple ((x,x0), y), where x 2 X denotes a
vector of protected attributes, x0 2 X 0 denotes a vector of unprotected attributes, and y 2 {0,1}
denotes a label. Note that in our formulation, an auditing algorithm not only may not see
the unprotected attributes x0, it may not even be aware of their existence. For example,
x0 may represent proprietary features or consumer data purchased by a credit scoring
company.
We will write X = (x,x0) to denote the joint feature vector. We assume that points (X,y) are
drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution P . Let D be a decision making algorithm, and
let D(X) denote the (possibly randomized) decision induced by D on individual (X,y). We
restrict attention in this paper to the case in which D makes a binary classification decision:
D(X) 2 {0,1}. Thus we alternately refer to D as a classifier. When auditing a fixed classifier
D, it will be helpful to make reference to the distribution over examples (X,y) together with
their induced classification D(X). Let Paudit(D) denote the induced target joint distribution
over the tuple (x,y,D(X)) that results from sampling (x,x0 , y) ⇠ P , and providing x, the true
label y, and the classification D(X) = D(x,x0) but not the unprotected attributes x0. Note
that the randomness here is over both the randomness of P , and the potential randomness
of the classifier D.
We will be concerned with learning and auditing classifiers D satisfying two common
statistical fairness constraints: equality of classification rates (also known as statistical
parity), and equality of false positive rates (also known as equal opportunity). Auditing
for equality of false negative rates is symmetric and so we do not explicitly consider it.
Each fairness constraint is defined with respect to a set of protected groups. We define sets
of protected groups via a family of indicator functions F for those groups, defined over
protected attributes. Each g : X ! {0,1} 2 F has the semantics that g(x) = 1 indicates that
an individual with protected features x is in group g .
94
Definition 5.2.1 (Statistical Parity (SP) Subgroup Fairness). Fix any classifier D, distribution
P , collection of group indicators G, and parameter   2 [0,1]. For each g 2 G, define
↵SP (g,P ) = PrP [g(x) = 1] and,  SP (g,D,P ) = |SP(D)  SP(D,g)| ,
where SP(D) = PrP ,D[D(X) = 1] and SP(D,g) = PrP ,D[D(X) = 1|g(x) = 1] denote the overall
acceptance rate of D and the acceptance rate of D on group g respectively. We say that D satisfies
 -statistical parity (SP) Fairness with respect to P and F if for every g 2 F
↵SP (g,P )  SP (g,D,P )    .
We will sometimes refer to SP(D) as the SP base rate.
Remark 5.2.2. Note that our definition references two approximation parameters, both of which
are important. We are allowed to ignore a group g if it (or its complement) represent only a
small fraction of the total probability mass. The parameter ↵ governs how small a fraction of the
population we are allowed to ignore. Similarly, we do not require that the probability of a positive
classification in every subgroup is exactly equal to the base rate, but instead allow deviations up to
 . Both of these approximation parameters are necessary from a statistical estimation perspective.
We control both of them with a single parameter   .
Definition 5.2.3 (False Positive (FP) Subgroup Fairness). Fix any classifier D, distribution P ,
collection of group indicators F , and parameter   2 [0,1]. For each g 2 G, define
↵FP (g,P ) = PrP [g(x) = 1, y = 0] and,  FP (g,D,P ) = |FP(D) FP(D,g)|
where FP(D) = PrD,P [D(X) = 1 | y = 0] and FP(D,g) = PrD,P [D(X) = 1 | g(x) = 1, y = 0] denote
the overall false-positive rate of D and the false-positive rate of D on group g respectively.
We say D satisfies  -False Positive (FP) Fairness with respect to P and F if for every g 2 G
↵FP (g,P )  FP (g,D,P )    .
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We will sometimes refer to FP(D) FP-base rate.
Remark 5.2.4. This definition is symmetric to the definition of statistical parity fairness, except
that the parameter ↵ is now used to exclude any group g such that negative examples (y = 0)
from g (or its complement) have probability mass less than ↵. This is again necessary from a
statistical estimation perspective.
For either statistical parity and false positive fairness, if the algorithm D fails to satisfy the
 -fairness condition, then we say that D is  -unfair with respect to P and F . We call any
subgroup g which witnesses this unfairness an  -unfair certificate for (D,P ).
An auditing algorithm for a notion of fairness is given sample access to Paudit(D) for some
classifier D. It will either deem D to be fair with respect to P , or will else produce a
certificate of unfairness.
Definition 5.2.5 (Auditing Algorithm). Fix a notion of fairness (either statistical parity or
false positive fairness), a collection of group indicators F over the protected features, and any
 ,  ,  0 2 (0,1) such that   0    . A (  ,  0)-auditing algorithm for F with respect to distribution
P is an algorithm A such that for any classifier D, when given access the distribution Paudit(D),
A runs in time poly(1/  0 , log(1/ )), and with probability 1   , outputs a   0-unfair certificate
for D whenever D is  -unfair with respect to P and F . If D is   0-fair, A will output “fair”.
As we will show, our definition of auditing is closely related to weak agnostic learning.
Throughout the paper we will invoke the definition of cost-sensitive classification oracles
and lemma that follows in Subsection 2.2.
Follow the Perturbed Leader. We will make use of the Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL)
algorithm as a no-regret learner for online linear optimization problems (Kalai and Vempala,
2005). To formalize the algorithm, consider S ⇢ {0,1}d to be a set of “actions” for a learner
in an online decision problem. The learner interacts with an adversary over T rounds,
and in each round t, the learner (randomly) chooses some action at 2 S , and the adversary
chooses a loss vector `t 2 [ M,M]d . The learner incurs a loss of h`t , ati at round t.
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FTPL is a simple algorithm that in each round perturbs the cumulative loss vector over the
previous rounds ` =
P
s<t `
s, and chooses the action that minimizes loss with respect to the
perturbed cumulative loss vector. We present the full algorithm in Algorithm 5, and its
formal guarantee in Theorem 5.2.6.
Algorithm 5 Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) Algorithm
Input: Loss bound M , action set S 2 {0,1}d




, DU be the uniform distribution over [0,1]d , and let a1 2 S
be arbitrary.
For t = 1, . . . ,T :






















where ⇠ t is drawn independently for each t from the distribution DU .
Theorem 5.2.6 (Kalai and Vempala (2005)). For any sequence of loss vectors `1, . . . ,`T , the

























h`t , ai  2d5/4M
p
T
where the randomness is taken over the perturbations ⇠ t across rounds.
5.2.1. Generalization Error
In this section, we observe that the error rate of a classifier D, as well as the degree to which
it violates  -fairness (for both statistical parity and false positive rates) can be accurately
approximated with the empirical estimates for these quantities on a dataset (drawn i.i.d.
from the underlying distribution P ) so long as the dataset is su ciently large. Once we
establish this fact, since our main interest is in the computational problem of auditing and
learning, in the rest of the paper, we assume that we have direct access to the underlying
distribution (or equivalently, that the empirical data defines the distribution of interest),
and do not make further reference to sample complexity or overfitting issues.
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A standard VC dimension bound (see, e.g. Kearns and Vazirani (1994b)) states:
Theorem 5.2.7. Fix a class of functions H. For any distribution P , let S ⇠ Pm be a dataset
consisting of m examples (Xi,yi ) sampled i.i.d. from P . Then for any 0 <   < 1, with probability
1   , for every h 2H, we have:


















where err(h,S) = 1m
Pm
i=1 [h(Xi ) , yi ].
The above theorem implies that so long as m   Õ(VCDIM(H)/"2), then minimizing error
over the empirical sample S su ces to minimize error up to an additive " term on the true
distribution P . Below, we give two analogous statements for fairness constraints:
Theorem 5.2.8 (SP Uniform Convergence). Fix a class of functions H and a class of group
indicators G. For any distribution P , let S ⇠ Pm be a dataset consisting of m examples (Xi,yi)
sampled i.i.d. from P . Then for any 0 <   < 1, with probability 1   , for every h 2H and g 2 G
 
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where PS denotes the empirical distribution over the realized sample S .
Similarly:
Theorem 5.2.9 (FP Uniform Convergence). Fix a class of functions H and a class of group
indicators G. For any distribution P , let S ⇠ Pm be a dataset consisting of m examples (Xi,yi)




























where PS denotes the empirical distribution over the realized sample S .
These theorems together imply that for both SP and FP subgroup fairness, the degree to
which a group g violates the constraint of  -fairness can be estimated up to error ", so long
as m   Õ((VCDIM(H) +VCDIM(G))/"2). The proofs can be found in Appendix A.3.2.
5.3. Equivalence of Auditing and Weak Agnostic Learning
In this section, we give a reduction from the problem of auditing both statistical parity and
false positive rate fairness, to the problem of agnostic learning, and vice versa. This has
two implications. The main implication is that, from a worst-case analysis point of view,
auditing is computationally hard in almost every case (since it inherits this pessimistic
state of a↵airs from agnostic learning). However, worst-case hardness results in learning
theory have not prevented the successful practice of machine learning, and there are many
heuristic algorithms that in real-world cases successfully solve “hard” agnostic learning
problems. Our reductions also imply that these heuristics can be used successfully as
auditing algorithms, and we exploit this in the development of our algorithmic results and
their experimental evaluation.
We make the following mild assumption on the class of group indicators G, to aid in our
reductions. It is satisfied by most natural classes of functions, but is in any case essentially
without loss of generality (since learning negated functions can be simulated by learning
the original function class on a dataset with flipped class labels).
Assumption 5.3.1. We assume the set of group indicators G satisfies closure under negation: for
any g 2 G, we also have ¬g 2 G.
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Recalling that X = (x,x0) and the following notions will be useful for describing our results:
• SP(D) = PrP ,D[D(X) = 1] and FP(D) = PrD,P [D(X) = 1 | y = 0].
• ↵SP (g,P ) = PrP [g(x) = 1] and ↵FP (g,P ) = PrP [g(x) = 1, y = 0].
•  SP (g,D,P ) = |SP(D)  SP(D,g)| and  FP (g,D,P ) = |FP(D) FP(D,g)|.
• PD : the marginal distribution on (x,D(X)).
• PDy=0: the conditional distribution on (x,D(X)), conditioned on y = 0.
We will think about these as the target distributions for a learning problem: i.e. the problem
of learning to predict D(X) from only the protected features x. We will relate the ability
to agnostically learn on these distributions, to the ability to audit D given access to the
original distribution Paudit(D).
5.3.1. Statistical Parity Fairness
We give our reduction first for SP subgroup fairness. The reduction for FP subgroup fairness
will follow as a corollary, since auditing for FP subgroup fairness can be viewed as auditing
for statistical parity fairness on the subset of the data restricted to y = 0.
Theorem 5.3.2. Fix any distribution P , and any set of group indicators G. Then for any   ," > 0,
the following relationships hold:
• If there is a (  /2, (  /2  ")) auditing algorithm for G for all D such that SP(D) = 1/2, then
the class F is (  ,  /2  ")-weakly agnostically learnable under PD .
• If G is (  ,    ")-weakly agnostically learnable under distribution PD for all D such that
SP(D) = 1/2, then there is a (  , (    ")/2) auditing algorithm for G for SP fairness under P .
We will prove Theorem 5.3.2 in two steps. First, we show that any unfair certificate f for D
has non-trivial error for predicting the decision made by D from the sensitive attributes.
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Lemma 5.3.3. Suppose that the base rate SP(D)  1/2 and there exists a function f such that
↵SP (g,P )  SP (g,D,P ) =   .
Then
max{Pr[D(X) = f (x)],Pr[D(X) = ¬f (x)]}   SP(D) +  .
Proof. To simplify notations, let b = SP(D) denote the base rate, ↵ = ↵SP and   =  SP . First,
observe that either Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 1] = b +   or Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 1] = b     holds.
In the first case, we know Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 0] < b, and so Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 0] > 1  b.
It follows that
Pr[D(X) = f (x)] = Pr[D(X) = f (x) = 1] +Pr[D(X) = f (x) = 0]
= Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 1]Pr[f (x) = 1] +Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 0]Pr[f (x) = 0]
> ↵(b +  ) + (1 ↵)(1  b)
= (↵   1)b + (1 ↵)(1  b) + b +↵ 
= (1 ↵)(1  2b) + b +↵ .
In the second case, we have Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 1] = (1 b)+  and Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 0] > b.
We can then bound
Pr[D(X) = f (x)] = Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 0]Pr[f (x) = 0] +Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 1]Pr[f (x) = 1]
> (1 ↵)b +↵(1  b +  ) = ↵(1  2b) + b +↵ .
In both cases, we have (1 2b)   0 by our assumption on the base rate. Since ↵ 2 [0,1], we
know
max{Pr[D(X) = f (x)],Pr[D(X) = ¬f (x)]}   b +↵  = b + 
which recovers our bound.
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In the next step, we show that if there exists any function f that accurately predicts the
decisions made by the algorithmD, then either f or ¬f can serve as an unfairness certificate
for D.
Lemma 5.3.4. Suppose that the base rate SP(D)   1/2 and there exists a function f such that
Pr[D(X) = f (x)]   SP(D)+  for some value   2 (0,1/2). Then there exists a function g such that
↵SP (g,P )  SP (g,D,P )     /2,
where g 2 {f ,¬f }.
Proof. Let b = SP(D). We can expand Pr[D(X) = f (x)] as follows:
Pr[D(X) = f (x)] = Pr[D(X) = f (x) = 1] +Pr[D(X) = f (x) = 0]
= Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 1]Pr[f (x) = 1] +Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 0]Pr[f (x) = 0]
This means
Pr[D(X) = f (x)]  b
=(Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 1]  b)Pr[f (x) = 1] + (Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 0]  b)Pr[f (x) = 0]    
Suppose that (Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 1]  b)Pr[f (x) = 1]     /2, then our claim holds with g = f .
Suppose not, then we must have
(Pr[D(X) = 0 | f (x) = 0]  b)Pr[f (x) = 0] = ((1  b) Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 0])Pr[f (x) = 0]     /2
Note that by our assumption b   (1  b). This means
(b  Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 0])Pr[f (x) = 0]   ((1  b) Pr[D(X) = 1 | f (x) = 0])Pr[f (x) = 0]     /2
which implies that our claim holds with g = ¬f .
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Proof of Theorem 5.3.2. Suppose that the class G satisfies minf 2G err(f ,PD)  1/2   . Then
by Lemma 5.3.4, there exists some g 2 G such that Pr[g(x) = 1]|Pr[D(X) = 1 | g(x) = 1]  
SP(D)|     /2. By the assumption of auditability, we can then use the auditing algorithm to
find a group g 0 2 G that is an (  /2  ")-unfair certificate of D. By Lemma 5.3.3, we know
that either g 0 or ¬g 0 predicts D with an accuracy of at least 1/2+ (  /2  ").
In the reverse direction, consider the auditing problem on the classifier D. We can treat
each pair (x,D(X)) as a labelled example and learn a hypothesis in G that approximates
the decisions made by D. Suppose that D is  -unfair. Then by Lemma 5.3.3, we know
that there exists some g 2 G such that Pr[D(X) = g(x)]   1/2 +   . Therefore, the weak
agnostic learning algorithm from the hypothesis of the theorem will return some g 0 with
Pr[D(X) = g 0(x)]   1/2 + (    "). By Lemma 5.3.4, we know g 0 or ¬g 0 is a (    ")/2-unfair
certificate for D.
5.3.2. False Positive Fairness
A corollary of the above reduction is an analogous equivalence between auditing for FP
subgroup fairness and agnostic learning. This is because a FP fairness constraint can be
viewed as a statistical parity fairness constraint on the subset of the data such that y = 0.
Therefore, Theorem 5.3.2 implies the following:
Corollary 5.3.5. Fix any distribution P , and any set of group indicators G. The following two
relationships hold:
• If there is a (  /2, (  /2  ")) auditing algorithm for F for all D such that FP(D) = 1/2, then
the class G is (  ,  /2  ")-weakly agnostically learnable under PDy=0.
• If G is (  ,    ")–weakly agnostically learnable under distribution PDy=0 for all D such that
FP(D) = 1/2, then there is a (  , (    ")/2) auditing algorithm for FP subgroup fairness for
G under distribution P .
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5.3.3. Worst-Case Intractability of Auditing
While we shall see in subsequent sections that the equivalence given above has positive
algorithmic and experimental consequences, from a purely theoretical perspective the
reduction of agnostic learning to auditing has strong negative worst-case implications.
More precisely, we can import a long sequence of formal intractability results for agnostic
learning to obtain:
Theorem5.3.6. Under standard complexity-theoretic intractability assumptions, for G the classes
of conjunctions of boolean attributes, linear threshold functions, or bounded-degree polynomial
threshold functions, there exist distributions P such that the auditing problem cannot be solved
in polynomial time, for either statistical parity or false positive fairness.
The proof of this theorem follows from Theorem 5.3.2, Corollary 5.3.5, and the following
negative results from the learning theory literature. Feldman et al. (2012a) show a strong
negative result for weak agnostic learning for conjunctions: given a distribution on labeled
examples from the hypercube such that there exists a monomial (or conjunction) consistent
with (1   ")-fraction of the examples, it is NP-hard to find a halfspace that is correct on
(1/2+ ")-fraction of the examples, for arbitrary constant " > 0. Diakonikolas et al. (2011b)
show that under the Unique Games Conjecture, no polynomial-time algorithm can find a
degree-d polynomial threshold function (PTF) that is consistent with (1/2+ ") fraction of a
given set of labeled examples, even if there exists a degree-d PTF that is consistent with a
(1  ") fraction of the examples. Diakonikolas et al. (2011b) also show that it is NP-Hard
to find a degree-2 PTF that is consistent with a (1/2+ ") fraction of a given set of labeled
examples, even if there exists a halfspace (degree-1 PTF) that is consistent with a (1  ")
fraction of the examples.
While Theorem 5.3.6 shows that certain natural subgroup classes G yield intractable au-
diting problems in the worst case, in the rest of the paper we demonstrate that e↵ective
heuristics for this problem on specific (non-worst case) distributions can be used to derive
an e↵ective and practical learning algorithm for subgroup fairness.
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5.4. A Learning Algorithm Subject to Fairness Constraints G
In this section, we present an algorithm for training a (randomized) classifier that satisfies
false-positive subgroup fairness simultaneously for all protected subgroups specified by a
family of group indicator functions G. All of our techniques also apply to a statistical parity
or false negative rate constraint.
Let S denote a set of n labeled examples {zi = (xi ,x0i ), yi )}
n
i=1, and let P denote the empirical
distribution over this set of examples. Let H be a hypothesis class defined over both the
protected and unprotected attributes, and let G be a collection of group indicators over the
protected attributes. We assume that H contains a constant classifier (which implies that
there is at least one fair classifier to be found, for any distribution).
Our goal will be to find the distribution over classifiers fromH that minimizes classification
error subject to the fairness constraint over G. We will design an iterative algorithm that,
when given access to a CSC oracle, computes an optimal randomized classifier in polynomial
time.







such that 8g 2 G ↵FP (g,P )  FP (g,D,P )    . (5.4)
where err(h,P ) = PrP [h(x,x0) , y], and the quantities ↵FP and  FP are defined in Defini-
tion 5.2.3. We will write OPT to denote the objective value at the optimum for the Fair ERM
problem, that is the minimum error achieved by a  -fair distribution over the class H.
Observe that the optimization is feasible for any distribution P : the constant classifiers that
labels all points 1 or 0 satisfy all subgroup fairness constraints. At the moment, the number
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of decision variables and constraints may be infinite (if H and G are infinite hypothesis
classes), but we will address this momentarily.
Assumption 5.4.1 (Cost-Sensitive Classification Oracle). We assume our algorithm has access
to the cost-sensitive classication oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G) over the classes H and G.
Our main theoretical result is an computationally e cient oracle-based algorithm for
solving the Fair ERM problem.
Theorem 5.4.2. Fix any ⌫,  2 (0,1). Then given an input of n data points and accuracy
parameters ⌫,  and access to oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G), there exists an algorithm runs in
polynomial time, and with probability at least 1   , output a randomized classifier D̂ such that
err(D̂,P ) OPT+⌫, and for any g 2 G, the fairness constraint violations satisfies
↵FP (g,P )  FP (g, D̂,P )    +O(⌫).
Overview of our solution. We present our solution in steps:
• Step 1: Fair ERM as LP. First, we rewrite the Fair ERM problem as a linear program
with finitely many decision variables and constraints even when H and G are infinite.
To do this, we take advantage of the fact that Sauer’s Lemma lets us bound the number
of labellings that any hypothesis classH of bounded VC dimension can induce on any
fixed dataset. The LP has one variable for each of these possible labellings, rather than
one variable for each hypothesis. Moreover, again by Sauer’s Lemma, we have one
constraint for each of the finitely many possible subgroups induced by G on the fixed
dataset, rather than one for each of the (possibly infinitely many) subgroups definable
over arbitrary datasets. This step is important — it will guarantee that strong duality
holds.
• Step 2: Formulation as Game. We then derive the partial Lagrangian of the LP, and
note that computing an approximately optimal solution to this LP is equivalent to
finding an approximate minmax solution for a corresponding zero-sum game, in
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which the payo↵ function U is the value of the Lagrangian. The pure strategies of the
primal or “Learner” player correspond to classifiers h 2H, and the pure strategies of
the dual or “Auditor” player correspond to subgroups g 2 G. Intuitively, the Learner is
trying to minimize the sum of the prediction error and a fairness penalty term (given
by the Lagrangian), and the Auditor is trying to penalize the fairness violation of
the Learner by first identifying the subgroup with the greatest fairness violation and
putting all the weight on the dual variable corresponding to this subgroup. In order
to reason about convergence, we restrict the set of dual variables to lie in a bounded
set: C times the probability simplex. C is a parameter that we have to set in the proof
of our theorem to give the best theoretical guarantees — but it is also a parameter
that we will vary in the experimental section.
• Step 3: Best Responses as CSC. We observe that given a mixed strategy for the
Auditor, the best response problem of the Learner corresponds to a CSC problem.
Similarly, given a mixed strategy for the Learner, the best response problem of the
Auditor corresponds to an auditing problem (which can be represented as a CSC
problem). Hence, if we have oracles for solving CSC problems, we can compute
best responses for both players, in response to arbitrary mixed strategies of their
opponents.
• Step 4: FTPL for No-Regret. Finally, we show that the ability to compute best
responses for each player is su cient to implement dynamics known to converge
quickly to equilibrium in zero-sum games. Our algorithm has the Learner play
Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) Kalai and Vempala (2005), which is a no-regret
algorithm, against an Auditor who at every round best responds to the learner’s mixed
strategy. By the seminal result of Freund and Schapire (1996a), the average plays of
both players converge to an approximate equilibrium. In order to implement this in
polynomial time, we need to represent the loss of the learner as a low-dimensional
linear optimization problem. To do so, we first define an appropriately translated CSC
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problem for any mixed strategy   by the Auditor, and cast it as a linear optimization
problem.
5.4.1. Rewriting the Fair ERM Problem
To rewrite the Fair ERM problem, we note that even though both G and H can be infinite
sets, the sets of possible labellings on the data set S induced by these classes are finite.
More formally, we will write G(S) and H(S) to denote the set of all labellings on S that are
induced by G and H respectively, that is
G(S) = {(g(x1), . . . , g(xn)) | g 2 G} and, H(S) = {(h(X1), . . . ,h(Xn)) | h 2H}
We can bound the cardinalities of G(S) and H(S) using Sauer’s Lemma.
Lemma 5.4.3 (Sauer’s Lemma (see e.g. Kearns and Vazirani (1994b))). Let S be a data set of










Given this observation, we can then consider an equivalent optimization problem where
the distribution D is over the set of labellings in H(S), and the set of subgroups are defined
by the labellings in G(S). We will view each g in G(S) as a Boolean function.
To simplify notations, we will define the following “fairness violation” functions for any
g 2 G and any h 2H:
 +(h,g) ⌘ ↵FP (g,P) (FP(h) FP(h,g))   (5.5)
  (h,g) ⌘ ↵FP (g,P ) (FP(h,g) FP(h))   (5.6)
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Claim 5.4.4. For any g 2 G, h 2H, and any ⌫ > 0,
max{ +(D,g),  (D,g)}  ⌫ if and only if ↵FP (g,P )  FP (g,D,P )    + ⌫.






such that for each g 2 G(S) :  +(D,g)  0 (5.8)
  (D,g)  0 (5.9)
For each pair of constraints (5.8) and (5.9), corresponding to a group g 2 G(S), we introduce






















where OPT denotes the optimal objective value in the fair ERM problem. Similarly, the
distribution argminD max L(D, ) corresponds to an optimal feasible solution to the fair
ERM linear program. Thus, finding an optimal solution for the fair ERM problem reduces
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to computing a minmax solution for the Lagrangian. Our algorithms will both compute
such a minmax solution by iteratively optimizing over both the primal variables D and
dual variables  . In order to guarantee convergence in our optimization, we will restrict
the dual space to the following bounded set:
⇤ = {  2 R2|G(S)|+ | k k1  C}.
where C will be a parameter of our algorithm. Since ⇤ is a compact and convex set, the










If we knew an upper bound C on the `1 norm of the optimal dual solution, then this
restriction on the dual solution would not change the minmax solution of the program.
We do not in general know such a bound. However, we can show that even though we
restrict the dual variables to lie in a bounded set, any approximate minmax solution to
Equation (5.10) is also an approximately optimal and approximately feasible solution to
the original fair ERM problem.
Theorem 5.4.5. Let (D̂,  ̂) be a ⌫-approximate minmax solution to the ⇤-bounded Lagrangian
problem in the sense that
L(D̂,  ̂)  min
D2 H(S)
L(D,  ̂) + ⌫ and, L(D̂,  ̂)  max
 2⇤
L(D̂, )  ⌫.
Then err(D̂,P ) OPT+2⌫ and for any g 2 G(S),





5.4.2. Zero-Sum Game Formulation
To compute an approximate minmax solution, we will first view Equation (5.10) as the
following two player zero-sum matrix game. The Learner (or the minimization player) has
pure strategies corresponding to H, and the Auditor (or the maximization player) has pure
strategies corresponding to the set of vertices ⇤pure in ⇤ — more precisely, each vertex or
pure strategy either is the all zero vector or consists of a choice of a g 2 G(S), along with the
sign + or   that the corresponding g-fairness constraint will have in the Lagrangian. More
formally, we write
⇤pure = {  2⇤ with  •g = C | g 2 G(S),• 2 {±}}[ {0}
Even though the number of pure strategies scales linearly with |G(S)|, our algorithm will
never need to actually represent such vectors explicitly. Note that any vector in ⇤ can be
written as a convex combination of the maximization player’s pure strategies, or in other
words: as a mixed strategy for the Auditor. For any pair of actions (h, ) 2H ⇥⇤pure, the
payo↵ is defined as









Claim 5.4.6. Let D 2  H(S) and   2⇤ such that (p, ) is a ⌫-approximate minmax equilibrium
in the zero-sum game defined above. Then (p, ) is also a ⌫-approximate minmax solution for
Equation (5.10).
Our problem reduces to finding an approximate equilibrium for this game. A key step in
our solution is the ability to compute best responses for both players in the game, which we
now show can be solved by the cost-sensitive classication (CSC) oracles.
111
Learner’s best response as CSC. Fix any mixed strategy (dual solution)   2 ⇤ of the












Note that it su ces for the Learner to optimize over deterministic classifiers h 2H, rather
than distributions over classifiers. This is because the Learner is solving a linear optimiza-
tion problem over the simplex, and so always has an optimal solution at a vertex (i.e. a
single classifier h 2H). We can reduce this problem to one that can be solved with a single
call to a CSC oracle. In particular, we can assign costs to each example (Xi,yi ) as follows:














( +g    g ) (Pr[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]  1[g(xi ) = 1]) (5.12)
Given a fixed set of dual variables  , we will write LC( ) 2 Rn to denote the vector of
costs for labelling each datapoint as 1. That is, LC( ) is the vector such that for any i 2 [n],
LC( )i = c1i .
Remark 5.4.7. Note that in defining the costs above, we have translated them from their most
natural values so that the cost of labeling any example with 0 is 0. In doing so, we recall that by
Claim 2.2.2, the solution to a cost-sensitive classification problem is invariant to translation. As
we will see, this will allow us to formulate the learner’s optimization problem as a low-dimensional
linear optimization problem, which will be important for an e cient implementation of follow the
perturbed leader. In particular, if we find a hypothesis that produces the n labels y = (y1, . . . , yn)
for the n points in our dataset, then the cost of this labelling in the CSC problem is by construction
hLC( ), yi.
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Auditor’s best response as CSC. Fix any mixed strategy (primal solution) p 2  H(S) of





















To find the best response, consider the problem of computing (ĝ , •̂) = argmax(g,•) •(D,g).
There are two cases. In the first case, p is a strictly feasible primal solution: that is
 •̂(D, ĝ) < 0. In this case, the solution to (5.13) sets   = 0. Otherwise, if p is not strictly
feasible, then by the following Lemma 5.4.8 the best response is to set  •̂ĝ = C (and all other
coordinates to 0).
Lemma 5.4.8. Fix any D 2  H(S) such that that maxg2G(S){ +(D,g),  (D,g)} > 0. Let  0 2⇤
be vector with one non-zero coordinate ( 0)•
0
g 0 = C, where




Therefore, it su ces to solve for argmax(g,•) •(D,g). We proceed by solving argmaxg +(D,g)
and argmaxg  (D,g) separately: both problems can be reduced to a cost-sensitive classifi-
cation problem. To solve for argmaxg +(D,g) with a CSC oracle, we assign costs to each
example (Xi,yi ) as follows:
• if yi = 1, then c0i = 0 and c
1
i = 0;













To solve for argmaxg   (D,g) with a CSC oracle, we assign the same costs to each example











5.4.3. Solving the Game with No-Regret Dynamics
To compute an approximate equilibrium of the zero-sum game, we will simulate the
following no-regret dynamics between the Learner and the Auditor over rounds: over each
of the T rounds, the Learner plays a distribution over the hypothesis class according to
a no-regret learning algorithm (Follow the Perturbed Leader), and the Auditor plays an
approximate best response against the Learner’s distribution for that round. By the result
of Freund and Schapire (1996a), the average plays of both players over time converge to an
approximate equilibrium of the game, as long as the Learner has low regret.
Theorem 5.4.9 (Freund and Schapire (1996a)). Let D1,D2, . . . ,DT 2  H(S) be a sequence of
distributions played by the Learner, and let  1, 2, . . . , T 2 ⇤pure be the Auditor’s sequence







t be the two players’ empirical distributions over their strategies. Suppose that the































  AT . (5.15)
Then (D, ) is an ( L + A)-approximate minimax equilibrium of the game.
Our Learner will play using the Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL), which gives a no-
regret guarantee. In order to implement FPTL, we will first need to formulate the Learner’s
best response problem as a linear optimization problem over a low dimensional space. For
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s be the vector representing the sum of the actions played by
the auditor over previous rounds, and recall that LC( 
t
) is the cost vector given by our
cost-sensitive classification reduction. Then the Learner’s best response problem against  
t




To run the FTPL algorithm, the Learner will optimize a “perturbed” version of the problem
above. In particular, the Learner will play a distribution Dt over the hypothesis class H(S)
that is implicitely defined by the following sampling operation. To sample a hypothesis h






where ⌘ is a parameter and ⇠ is a noise vector drawn from the uniform distribution over
[0,1]n. Note that while it is intractable to explicitly represent the distribution Dt (which
has support size scaling with |H(S)|), we can sample from Dt e ciently given access to
a cost-sensitive classification oracle for H. By instantiating the standard regret bound of
FTPL for online linear optimization (Theorem 5.2.6), we get the following regret bound for
the Learner.
Lemma 5.4.10. Let T be the time horizon for the no-regret dynamics. Let D1, . . . ,DT be the



















U(h, t)  2n1/4(1 +C)
p
T
Now we consider how the Auditor (approximately) best responds to the distribution Dt .
The main obstacle is that we do not have an explicit representation for Dt . Thus, our first
step is to approximate Dt with an explicitly represented sparse distribution D̂t . We do
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that by drawing m i.i.d. samples from Dt , and taking the empirical distribution D̂t over
the sample. The Auditor will best respond to this empirical distribution D̂t . To show that
any best response to D̂t is also an approximate best response to Dt , we will rely on the
following uniform convergence lemma, which bounds the di↵erence in expected payo↵ for
any strategy of the auditor, when played against Dt as compared to D̂t .
Lemma 5.4.11. Fix any ⇠ ,  2 (0,1) and any distribution D over H(S). Let h1, . . . ,hm be m i.i.d.
draws from p, and D̂ be the empirical distribution over the realized sample. Then with probability



















as long as m   c0 C
2(ln(1/ )+d2 ln(n))
⇠2 for some absolute constant c0 and d2 = VCDIM(G).
Using Lemma 5.4.11, we can derive a regret bound for the Auditor in the no-regret dynam-
ics.
Lemma 5.4.12. Let T be the time horizon for the no-regret dynamics. Let D1, . . . ,DT be the
sequence of distributions maintained by the Learner’s FTPL algorithm. For each Dt , let D̂t be the
empirical distribution over m i.i.d. draws from Dt . Let  1, . . . , T be the Auditor’s best responses



















c0C2(ln(T / ) + d2 ln(n))
m
for some absolute constant c0 and d2 = VCDIM(G).
Finally, let D and   be the average of the strategies played by the two players over the
course of the dynamics. Note that D is an average of many distributions with large support,
and so D itself has support size that is too large to represent explicitely. Thus, we will
again approximate D with a sparse distribution D̂ estimated from a sample drawn from
D. Note that we can e ciently sample from D given access to a CSC oracle. To sample,
we first uniformly randomly select a round t 2 [T ], and then use the CSC oracle to solve
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the sampling problem defined in (5.16), with the noise random variable ⇠ freshly sampled
from its distribution. The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 6 and we present the
proof for Theorem 5.4.2 below.
Algorithm 6 FairNR: Fair No-Regret Dynamics
Input: distribution P over n labelled data points, CSC oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G), dual
bound C, and target accuracy parameter ⌫, 
Initialize: Let C = 1/⌫,  
0













For t = 1, . . . ,T :
Sample from the Learner’s FTPL distribution:
For s = 1, . . .m:
[3]Draw a random vector ⇠s uniformly at random from [0,1]n
Use the oracle CSC(H) to compute h(s,t) = argminh2H(S)hLC( 
(t 1)
),hi+ 1⌘ h⇠s,hi
Let D̂t be the empirical distribution over {hs,t}
Auditor best responds to D̂t :











For s = 1, . . .m:
Draw a random number r 2 [T ] and a random vector ⇠s uniformly at random from [0,1]n
Use the oracle CSC(H) to compute h(r,t) = argminh2H(S)hLC( 
(r 1)
),hi+ 1⌘ h⇠s,hi
Let D̂ be the empirical distribution over {hr,t}
Output: D̂ as a randomized classifier
Proof of Theorem 5.4.2. By Theorem 5.4.5, it su ces to show that with probability at least
1   , (D̂, ) is a ⌫-approximate equilibrium in the zero-sum game. As a first step, we will
rely on Theorem 5.4.9 to show that (D, ) forms an approximate equilibrium.




































By Lemma 5.4.12, with probability 1   /2, we have
 A 
r
c0C2(ln(2T / ) + d2 ln(n))
m
We will condition on this upper-bound event on  A for the rest of this proof, which is the
case except with probability  /2. By Theorem 5.4.9, we know that the average plays (D, )
form an ( L + A)-approximate equilibrium.
Finally, we need to bound the additional error for outputting the sparse approximation
D̂ instead of D. We can directly apply Lemma 5.4.11, which implies that except with
probability  /2, the pair (D̂, ) form a R-approximate equilibrium, with
R   A + L +
p
c0C2(ln(2/ ) + d2 ln(n))p
m









This completes our proof.
5.5. Experimental Evaluation
We now describe an experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithmic framework on
a dataset in which fairness is a concern, due to the preponderance of racial and other
sensitive features. For far more detailed experiments on four real datasets investigating
the convergence properties of our algorithm, evaluating its accuracy vs. fairness tradeo↵s,
and comparing our approach to the recent algorithm of Agarwal et al. (2017), we direct
the reader to Kearns et al. (2018). Python code and an illustrative Jupyter notebook are
provided here (https://github.com/algowatchpenn/GerryFair).
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While the no-regret-based algorithm described in the last section enjoys provably polyno-
mial time convergence, for the experiments we instead implemented a simpler yet e↵ective
algorithm based on Fictitious Play dynamics. We first describe and discuss this modified
algorithm.
5.5.1. Solving the Game with Fictitious Play
Like the algorithm given in the last section, the algorithm we implemented works by
simulating a game dynamic that converges to Nash equilibrium in the zero-sum game
that we derived, corresponding to the Fair ERM problem. Rather than using a no-regret
dynamic, we instead use a simple iterative procedure known as Fictitious Play (Brown,
1949). Fictitious Play dynamics has the benefit of being more practical to implement: at
each round, both players simply need to compute a single best response to the empirical
play of their opponents, and this optimization requires only a single call to a CSC oracle. In
contrast, the FTPL dynamic we gave in the previous section requires making many calls
to a CSC oracle per round — a computationally expensive process — in order to find a
sparse approximation to the Learner’s mixed strategy at that round. Fictitious Play also has
the benefit of being deterministic, unlike the randomized sampling required in the FTPL
no-regret dynamic, thus eliminating a source of experimental variance.
The disadvantage is that Fictitious Play is only known to converge to equilibrium in
the limit Robinson (1951), rather than in a polynomial number of rounds (though it is
conjectured to converge quickly under rather general circumstances; see Daskalakis and
Pan (2014) for a recent discussion). Nevertheless, this is the algorithm that we use in our
experiments — and as we will show, it performs well on real data, despite the fact that
it has weaker theoretical guarantees compared to the algorithm we presented in the last
section.
Fictitious play proceeds in rounds, and in every round each player chooses a best response
to his opponent’s empirical history of play across previous rounds, by treating it as the
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mixed strategy that randomizes uniformly over the empirical history. Pseudocode for the
implemented algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 7 FairFictPlay: Fair Fictitious Play
Input: distribution P over the labelled data points, CSC oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G) for
the classes H(S) and G(S) respectively, dual bound C, and number of rounds T
Initialize: set h0 to be some classifier in H, set  0 to be the zero vector. Let D and   be
the point distributions that put all their mass on h0 and  0 respectively.
For t = 1, . . . ,T :
Compute the empirical play distributions:





t be the auditor’s empirical dual vector
Learner best responds: Use the oracle CSC(H) to compute ht = argminh2H(S)hLC( ),hi
Auditor best responds: Use the oracle CSC(G) to compute  t = argmax Eh⇠D [U(h, )]
Output: the final empirical distribution D over classifiers
5.5.2. Description of Data
The dataset we use for our experimental valuation is known as the “Communities and
Crime” (C&C) dataset, available at the UC Irvine Data Repository4. Each record in this
dataset describes the aggregate demographic properties of a di↵erent U.S. community; the
data combines socio-economic data from the 1990 US Census, law enforcement data from
the 1990 US LEMAS survey, and crime data from the 1995 FBI UCR. The total number of
records is 1994, and the number of features is 122. The variable to be predicted is the rate
of violent crime in the community.
While there are larger and more recent datasets in which subgroup fairness is a potential
concern, there are properties of the C&C dataset that make it particularly appealing for the
initial experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithm. Foremost among these is the
relatively high number of sensitive or protected attributes, and the fact that they are real-
valued (since they represent aggregates in a community rather than specific individuals).
This means there is a very large number of protected sub-groups that can be defined
over them. There are distinct continuous features measuring the percentage or per-capita
4http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Communities+and+Crime
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representation of multiple racial groups (including white, black, Hispanic, and Asian) in
the community, each of which can vary independently of the others. Similarly, there are
continuous features measuring the average per capita incomes of di↵erent racial groups in
the community, as well as features measuring the percentage of each community’s police
force that falls in each of the racial groups. Thus restricting to features capturing race
statistics and a couple of related ones (such as the percentage of residents who do not speak
English well), we obtain an 18-dimensional space of real-valued protected attributes. We
note that the C&C dataset has numerous other features that arguably could or should be
protected as well (such as gender features), which would raise the dimensionality of the
protected subgroups even further. 5
We convert the real-valued rate of violent crime in each community to a binary label
indicating whether the community is in the 70th percentile of that value, indicating that it
is a relatively high-crime community. Thus the strawman baseline that always predicts 0
(lower crime) has error approximately 30% or 0.3 on this classification problem. We chose
the 70th percentile since it seems most natural to predict the highest crime rates.
As in the theoretical sections of the paper, our main interest and emphasis is on the
e↵ectiveness of our proposed algorithm FairFictPlay on a given dataset, including:
• Whether the algorithm in fact converges, and does so in a feasible amount of compu-
tation. Recall that formal convergence is only guaranteed under the assumption of
oracles that do not exist in practice, and even then is only guaranteed asymptotically.
• Whether the classifier learned by the algorithm has nontrivial accuracy, as well as
strong subgroup fairness properties.
• Whether the algorithm and dataset permits nontrivial tuning of the trade-o↵ between
accuracy and subgroup fairness.
5Ongoing experiments on other datasets where fairness is a concern will be reported on in a forthcoming
experimental paper.
121
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, we note that all of these issues can be investigated entirely
in-sample, without concern for generalization performance. Thus for simplicity, despite
the fact that our algorithm enjoys all the usual generalization properties depending on
the VC dimension of the Learner’s hypothesis space and the Auditor’s subgroup space (see
Theorems 5.2.9 and 5.2.8), we report all results here on the full C&C dataset of 1994 points,
treating it as the true distribution of interest.
5.5.3. Algorithm Implementation
The main details in the implementation of FairFictPlay are the identification of the model
classes for Learner and Auditor, the implementation of the cost sensitive classification
oracle and auditing oracle, and the identification of the protected features for Auditor. For
our experiments, at each round Learner chooses a linear threshold function over all 122
features. We implement the cost sensitive classification oracle via a two stage regression
procedure. In particular, the inputs to the cost sensitive classification oracle are cost vectors
c0, c1, where the ith element of ck is the cost of predicting k on datapoint i. We train two
linear regression models r0, r1 to predict c0 and c1 respectively, using all 122 features.
Given a new point x, we predict the cost of classifying x as 0 and 1 using our regression
models: these predictions are r0(x) and r1(x) respectively. Finally we output the prediction
ŷ corresponding to lower predicted cost: ŷ = argmini2{0,1}ri(x).
Auditor’s model class consists of all linear threshold functions over just the 18 aforemen-
tioned protected race-based attributes. As per the algorithm, at each iteration t Auditor
attempts to find a subgroup on which the false positive rate is substantially di↵erent than
the base rate, given the Learner’s randomized classifier so far. We implement the auditing
oracle by treating it as a weighted regression problem in which the goal is find a linear
function (which will be taken to define the subgroup) that on the negative examples, can
predict the Learner’s probabilistic classification on each point. We use the same regression
subroutine as Learner does, except that Auditor only has access to the 18 sensitive features,
rather than all 122.
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Recall that in addition to the choices of protected attributes and model classes for Learner
and Auditor, FairFictPlay has a parameter C, which is a bound on the norm of the dual
variables for Auditor (the dual player). While the theory does not provide an explicit bound
or guide for choosing C, it needs to be large enough to permit the dual player to force the
minmax value of the game. For our experiments we chose C = 10, which despite being a
relatively small value seems to su ce for (approximate) convergence.
The other and more meaningful parameter of the algorithm is the bound   in the Fair ERM
optimization problem implemented by the game, which controls the amount of unfairness
permitted. If on a given round the subgroup disparity found by the Auditor is greater than
  , the Learner must react by adding a fairness penalty for this subgroup to its objective
function; if it is smaller than   , the Learner can ignore it and continue to optimize its
previous objective function. Ideally, and as we shall see, varying   allows us to trace out a
menu of trade-o↵s between accuracy and fairness.
5.5.4. Results
Particularly in light of the gaps between the idealized theory and the actual implementa-
tion, the most basic questions about FairFictPlay are whether it converges at all, and if
so, whether it converges to “interesting” models — that is, models with both nontrivial
classification error (much better than the 30% or 0.3 baserate), and nontrivial subgroup
fairness (much better than ignoring fairness altogether). We shall see that at least for the
C&C dataset, the answers to these questions is strongly a rmative.
We begin by examining the evolution of the error and unfairness of Learner’s model. In
the left panel of Figure 2 we show the error of the model found by Learner vs. iteration for
values of   ranging from 0 to 0.029. Several comments are in order.
First, after an initial period in which there is a fair amount of oscillatory behavior, by 6000
iterations most of the curves have largely flattened out, and by 8,000 iterations it appears
most but not all have reached approximate convergence. Second, while the top-to-bottom
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Figure 2: Evolution of the error and unfairness of Learner’s classifier across iterations, for
varying choices of   . (a) Error "t of Learner’s model vs iteration t. (b) Unfairness  t of
subgroup found by Auditor vs. iteration t, as measured by Definition 5.2.3. See text for
details.
ordering of these error curves is approximately aligned with decreasing   — so larger  
generally results in lower error, as expected — there are many violations of this for small t,
and even a few at large t. Third, and as we will examine more closely shortly, the converged
values at large t do indeed exhibit a range of errors.
In the right panel of Figure 2, we show the corresponding unfairness  t of the subgroup
found by the Auditor at each iteration t for the same runs and values of the parameter  
(indicated by horizontal dashed lines), with the same color-coding as for the left panel.
Now the ordering is generally reversed — larger values of   generally lead to higher  t
curves, since the fairness constraint on the Learner is weaker. We again see a great deal
of early oscillatory behavior, with most  t curves then eventually settling at or near their
corresponding input   value, as Learner and Auditor engage in a back-and-forth struggle
for lower error for Learner and  -subgroup fairness for Auditor.
For any choice of the parameter   , and each iteration t, the two panels of Figure 2 yield
a pair of realized values h"t , ti from the experiment, corresponding to a Learner model
whose error is "t , and for which the worst subgroup the Auditor was able to find had
unfairness  t . The set of all h"t , ti pairs across all runs or   values thus represents the
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Figure 3: (a) Pareto-optimal error-unfairness values, color coded by varying values of the
input parameter   . (b) Aggregate Pareto frontier across all values of   . Here the   values
cover the same range but are sampled more densely to get a smoother frontier. See text for
details.
di↵erent trade-o↵s between error and unfairness found by our algorithm on the data. Most
of these pairs are of course Pareto-dominated by other pairs, so we are primarily interested
in the undominated frontier.
In the left panel of Figure 3, for each value of   we show the Pareto-optimal pairs, color-
coded for the value of   . Each value of   yields a set or cloud of undominated pairs that are
usually fairly close to each other, and as expected, as   is increased, these clouds generally
move leftwards and upwards (lower error and higher unfairness).
We anticipate that the practical use of our algorithm would, as we have done, explore
many values of   and then pick a model corresponding to a point on the aggregated Pareto
frontier across all   , which represents the collection of all undominated models and the
overall error-unfairness trade-o↵. This aggregate frontier is shown in the right panel of
Figure 3, and shows a relatively smooth menu of options, ranging from error about 0.21
and no unfairness at one extreme, to error about 0.12 and unfairness 0.025 at the other,
and an appealing assortment of intermediate trade-o↵s. Of course, in a real application the
selection of a particular point on the frontier should be made in a domain-specific manner






Individual Fairness for algorithmic decision making was originally formulated as the com-
pelling idea that “similar individuals should be treated similarly” by Dwork et al. (2012). In
its original formulation, “similarity” was determined by a task-specific metric on individuals,
which would be provided to the algorithm designer. Since then, the formulation of this
task-specific fairness metric has been the primary obstacle that has stood in the way of
adoption and further development of this conception of individual fairness. This is for two
important reasons:
1. First, although people might have strong intuitions about what kinds of decisions
are unfair, it is di cult for them to distill these intuitions into a concisely defined
quantitative measure.
2. Second, di↵erent people disagree on what constitutes “fairness”. There is no reason to
suspect that even if particular individuals were able to distill their intuitive notions
of fairness into some quantitative measure, that those measures would be consistent
with one another, or even internally consistent.
In this chapter, we propose a practical but rigorous approach aimed at circumventing
this di culty, while staying close to the original idea that “similar individuals should be
treated similarly”. We are motivated by the following idea: Even if people cannot distill
their conception of fairness as a quantitative metric, they can still be asked to express their
opinion about whether particular pairs of individuals should be treated similarly or not.
Thus, one could choose a panel of “judges”, or even a particular person, and elicit opinions
from them about whether certain pairs of decisions were fair or not. There is no reason to
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suspect that these pairwise opinions will be consistent in any sense, or that they will form
a metric. Nevertheless, once such a set of pairwise fairness constraints has been elicited,
and once a data distribution and hypothesis class are fixed, there is a well-defined learning
problem: minimize classification error subject to the constraint that the violation of the
specified pairs is held below some fixed threshold. By varying this threshold, we can in
principle define a Pareto frontier of classifiers, optimally trading o↵ error with the elicited
conception of individual fairness — without ever having to commit to a restricted class of
fairness notions. We would like to find the classifiers that realize this Pareto frontier. In
this paper, we solve the computational, statistical, and conceptual issues necessary to do
this, and demonstrate the e↵ectiveness of our approach via a behavioral study.
6.1.1. Results
Our Model We model individuals as having features in X and binary labels, drawn from
some distribution P . A committee of judges1 u 2 U has preferences that certain individuals
should be treated the same way by a classifier — i.e. that the probability that they are given
a positive label should be the same. We represent these preferences abstractly as a set of
pairs Cu ✓ X ⇥X for each judge u, where (x,x0) 2 Cu represents that judge u would view it
as unfair if individuals x and x0 were treated substantially di↵erently (i.e. given a positive
classification with a substantially di↵erent probability). We impose no structure on how
judges form their views, or the relationship between the views of di↵erent judges — i.e.
the sets {Cu}u2U are allowed to be arbitrary (for example, they need not satisfy a triangle
inequality), and need not be mutually consistent. We write C = [uCu .
We then formulate a constrained optimization problem, that has two di↵erent “knobs”
with which we can quantitatively relax our fairness constraint. Suppose that we say that
a  -fairness violation corresponds to classifying a pair of individuals (x,x0) 2 C such that
their probabilities of receiving a positive label di↵er by more than   (our first knob):
1Though we develop our formalism as a committee of judges, note that it permits the special case of a single
subjective judge, which we make use of in our behavioral study.
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|E [h(x)  h(x0)]|    . In this expression, the expectation is taken only over the randomness
of the classifier h. We might ask that for no pair of individuals do we have a  -fairness
violation: max(x,x0)2C |E [h(x)  h(x0)]|    . On the other hand, we could ask for the weaker
constraint that over a random draw of a pair of individuals, the expected fairness violation is at
most ⌘ (our second knob): E(x,x0)⇠P 2 [|h(x)  h(x0)| · [(x,x0) 2 C]]  ⌘. We can also combine
both relaxations to ask that the in expectation over random pairs, the “excess” fairness
violation, on top of an allowed budget of   , is at most ⌘. Subject to these constraints, we
would like to find the distribution over classifiers that minimizes classification error: given
a setting of the parameters   and ⌘, this defines a benchmark with which we would like to
compete.
Our Theoretical Results Even absent fairness constraints, learning to minimize 0/1 loss
(even over linear classifiers) is computationally hard in the worst case (see e.g. Feldman et al.
(2012b), Feldman et al. (2009b)). Despite this, learning seems to be empirically tractable in
most cases. To capture the additional hardness of learning subject to fairness constraints, we
follow several recent papers Agarwal et al. (2017); Kearns et al. (2018) in aiming to develop
oracle e cient learning algorithms. Oracle e cient algorithms are assumed to have access
to an oracle (realized in experiments using a heuristic — see the next section) that can solve
weighted classification problems. Given access to such an oracle, oracle e cient algorithms
must run in polynomial time. We show that our fairness constrained learning problem is
computationally no harder than unconstrained learning by giving such an oracle e cient
algorithm (or reduction), and show moreover that its guarantees generalize from in-sample
to out-of-sample in the usual way — with respect to both accuracy and the frequency and
magnitude of fairness violations. Our algorithm is simple and amenable to implementation,
and we use it in our experimental results.
Our Experimental Results Finally, we implement our algorithm and run a set of experi-
ments on the COMPAS recidivism prediction dataset, using fairness constraints elicited
from 43 human subjects. We establish that our algorithm converges quickly (even when
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implemented with fast learning heuristics, rather than “oracles”). We also explore the
Pareto curves trading o↵ error and fairness violations for di↵erent human judges, and
find empirically that there is a great deal of variability across subjects in terms of their
conception of fairness, and in terms of the degree to which their expressed preferences are
in conflict with accurate prediction. Finally we find that most of the di culty in balancing
accuracy with the elicited fairness constraints can be attributed to a small fraction of the
reported constraints.
6.1.2. Related work
Dwork et al. (2012) first proposed the notion of individual metric-fairness that we take
inspiration from, imagining fairness as a Lipschitz constraint on a randomized algorithm,
with respect to some “task-specific metric” to be provided to the algorithm designer. Since
the original proposal, the question of where the fairness metric should come from has been
one of the primary obstacles to its adoption, and the focus of subsequent work. Zemel et al.
(2013) attempt to automatically learn a representation for the data (and hence, implicitly,
a similarity metric) that causes a classifier to label an equal proportion of two protected
groups as positive. They provide a heuristic approach and an experimental evaluation.
Kim et al. (2018) consider a group-fairness like relaxation of individual metric-fairness,
asking that on average, individuals in pre-specified groups are classified with probabilities
proportional to the average distance between individuals in those groups. They show how
to learn such classifiers given access to an oracle which can evaluate the distance between
two individuals according to the metric. Compared to our work, they assume the existence
of an exact fairness metric which can be accessed using a quantitative oracle, and they use
this metric to define a statistical rather than individual notion of fairness. Most related to
our work, Gillen et al. (2018) assumes access to an oracle which simply identifies fairness
violations across pairs of individuals. Under the assumption that the oracle is exactly
consistent with a metric in a simple linear class, Gillen et al. (2018) gives a polynomial
time algorithm to compete with the best fair policy in an online linear contextual bandits
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problem. In contrast to the unrealistic assumptions that Gillen et al. (2018) is forced to
make in order to derive a polynomial time algorithm (consistency with a simple class
of metrics), we make essentially no assumptions at all on the structure of the “fairness”
constraints. Ilvento (2019) studies the problem of metric learning with the goal of using
only a small number of numeric valued queries, which are hard for human beings to answer,
relying more on comparison queries. Finally, Rothblum and Yona (2018) prove similar
generalization guarantees to ours in the context of individual-metric fairness. In the setting
that they consider, the metric fairness constraint is given.
6.2. Problem formulation
Let S denote a set of labeled examples {zi = (xi ,yi )}ni=1, where xi 2 X is a feature vector and
yi 2 Y is a label. We will also write SX = {xi}ni=1 and SY = {yi}
n
i=1. Throughout the paper,
we will restrict attention to binary labels, so let Y = {0,1}. Let P denote the unknown
distribution over X ⇥Y . Let H denote a hypothesis class containing binary classifiers h :
X ! Y . We assume thatH contains a constant classifier (which will imply that the “fairness
constrained” ERM problem that we define is always feasible). We’ll denote classification
error of hypothesis h by err(h,P ) := Pr(x,y)⇠P (h(x) , y) and its empirical classification error
by err(h,S) := 1n
Pn
i=1 (h(xi ) , yi ).
We assume there is a set of one or more judges U , such that each judge u 2 U is identified
with a set of pairs of individuals Cu ✓ X 2 that she thinks should be “treated similarly” i.e.
ideally that for the learned classifier h, h(x) = h(x0) (we will ask that this hold in expectation
if the classifier is randomized, and will relax it in various ways). For each pair (x,x0), let
wx,x0 be the fraction of judges who would like individual x and x0 to be treated similarly –
that is wx,x0 =
|{u|(x,x0)2Cu }|
|U | . Note that wx,x0 = wx0 ,x.
In practice, we will not have direct access to the sets of pairs Cu corresponding to the judges
u, but we may ask them whether particular pairs are in this set (see Section 6.5 for details
about how we actually query human subjects). We model this by imagining that we present
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each judge with a random set of pairs A ✓ [n]22, and for each pair (xi ,xj ), ask if the pair
should be treated similarly or not; we learn the set of pairs in A\Cu for each u. Define the
empirical constraint set Ĉu = {(xi ,xj ) 2 Cu}8(i,j)2A and ŵxixj =
|{u|(x,x0)2Ĉu }|
|U | , if (i, j) 2 A and 0
otherwise. For simplicity, we will sometimes write wij instead of wxi ,xj . Note that ŵij = wij
for every (i, j) 2 A.
Our goal will be to find the distribution over classifiers fromH that minimizes classification
error, while satisfying the judges’ fairness requirement C. To do so, we’ll try to find D, a
probability distribution over H, that minimizes the training error and satisfy the judges’
empirical fairness constraints, Ĉ. For convenience, we denote D’s expected classification
error as err(D,P ) := Eh⇠D[err(h,P )] and likewise its expected empirical classification error
as err(D,S) := Eh⇠D[err(h,S)]. We say that any distribution D over classifiers satisfies (  ,⌘)-
approximate subjective fairness if it is a feasible solution to the following constrained




such that 8(i, j) 2 [n]2 : Eh⇠D
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i




|A|  ⌘. (6.3)
This “Fair ERM” problem, whose feasible region we denote by ⌦(S,ŵ,  ,⌘), has decision
variables D and {↵ij }, representing the distribution over classifiers and the “fairness vio-
lation” terms for each pair of training points, respectively. The parameters   and ⌘ are
constants which represent the two di↵erent “knobs” we have at our disposal to quantita-
tively relax the fairness constraint, in an `1 and `1 sense respectively. To understand each
of them, it helps to consider them in isolation. First, imagine that we set ⌘ = 0.   controls
2We will always assume that this pair set is closed under symmetry
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the worst-case disparity between the probability that any pair (xi ,xj ) 2 Ĉ is classified as
positive. (Note that although we have constraints for every pair xi ,xj , not just those in
Ĉ, because ŵi,j = 0 if (xi ,xj ) < Ĉ, a solution to the above program is free to set the slack
parameter ↵i,j = 1 for any such pair. When ⌘ = 0, the slack parameter ↵i,j is constrained to
be 0 whenever ŵi,j > 0 — i.e. whenever (xi ,xj ) 2 Ĉ.) Next imagine that   = 0. The parameter
⌘ controls the expected di↵erence in probability that a randomly selected pair (xi ,xj ) 2 A is
classified positively, weighted by the number of judges u who feel they should be classified
the same way — i.e. the expected degree of dissatisfaction of the panel of judges U , over
the random choice of a pair of individuals and the randomness of their classification3.
6.2.1. Fairness loss
Our goal is to develop an algorithm that will minimize its empirical error err(D,S), while
satisfying the empirical fairness constraints Ĉ. The standard VC dimension argument states
that empirical classification error will concentrate around the true classification error, and
we hope to show the same kind of generalization for fairness as well. To do so, we first
define fairness loss here.
For some fixed randomized hypothesis D 2  H and w, define  -fairness loss between a pair
as



















This is the expected degree to which the di↵erence in classification probability for a
randomly selected pair exceeds the allowable budget   , weighted by the fraction of judges
3To see this, recall that (xi ,xj ) 2 C ) (xj ,xi ) 2 C, and so constraint 6.2 can be rewritten as |Eh⇠D[h(xi )  
h(xj )]|  ↵ij +   , and ŵi,j = 0 if (i, j) < A, and so the sum in constraint 6.3 can equivalently be taken over A
rather than [n]2.
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who think that the pair should be treated similarly. By construction, the empirical fairness




|A|  ⌘), and we show in Section 6.4,
the empirical fairness should concentrate around the true fairness loss:





In our algorithm, we will make use of a cost-sensitive classification (CSC) oracle. An




i=1 and a hypothesis
class, H. c0i and c
1
i correspond to the cost of labeling xi as 0 and 1 respectively. Invoking a
















We say that an algorithm is oracle-e cient if it runs in polynomial time assuming access to a
CSC oracle.
6.3. Empirical risk minimization
In this section, we give an oracle-e cient algorithm for approximately solving our (in-
sample) constrained empirical risk minimization problem.
6.3.1. Outline of the solution
We frame the problem of solving our constrained ERM problem as finding an approxi-
mate equilibrium of a zero-sum game between a primal player and a dual player, trying
to minimize and maximize respectively the Lagrangian of the constrained optimization
problem.
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The Lagrangian for our optimization problem is




































For the constraint in equation (6.2), corresponding to each pair of individuals (xi ,xj ), we
introduce a dual variable  ij . For the constraint (6.3), we introduce a dual variable ⌧. The
primal player’s action space is (D,↵) 2 ( H, [0,1]n2), and the dual player’s action space is
( ,⌧) 2 (Rn2 ,R).



















By a classic result of Freund and Schapire (1996b), one can compute an approximate
equilibrium by simulating “no-regret” dynamics between the primal and dual player. Our
algorithm can be viewed as simulating the following no-regret dynamics between the primal
and the dual players over T rounds. Over each of the rounds, the dual player updates dual
variables { ,⌧} according to no-regret learning algorithms (exponentiated gradient descent
(Kivinen and Warmuth, 1997) and online gradient descent (Zinkevich, 2003) respectively).
At every round, the primal player then best responds with a pair {D,↵} using a CSC oracle.
The time-averaged play of both players converges to an approximate equilibrium of the
zero-sum game, where the approximation is controlled by the regret of the dual player.
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6.3.2. Primal player’s best response




, the primal player needs



















Eh⇠D [ (yi , 0)] and c1i =
1
n











i=1) (we note that the best response is always a deterministic




ij  0 and 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 8 Best Response, BEST⇢( ,⌧), for the primal player
Input: training examples S = {xi ,yi}ni=1,   2⇤, ⌧ 2 T, CSC oracle CSC
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
if yi = 0 then

























|A|   ij  0
0 : ⌧
wij
|A|   ij > 0.
Output: D,↵


















































Proof. First, note that ↵ is not dependent on D and vice versa. Thus, we may separate the














































































































































Note that for any pair (i, j) 2 [n]2, the term ↵ij 2 [0,1]. Thus, when the constant ⌧
wij
|A|   ij  0,
we assign ↵ij as the maximum bound, 1, in order to minimize L⇢2 . Otherwise, when
⌧
wij
|A|   ij > 0, we assign ↵ij as the minimum bound, 0.




































































































Note that the cost depends on whether yi = 0 or 1. For example, take yi = 1 and h(xi) = 0.
The cost

























6.3.3. Dual player’s no regret updates
In order to reason about convergence we need to restrict the dual player’s action space to lie
within a bounded `1 ball, defined by the parameters C⌧ and C  that appear in our theorem
— and serve to trade o↵ running time with approximation quality:
⇤ =
n
  2Rn2+ : k k1  C 
o
,T = {⌧ 2R+ : k⌧k1  C⌧} .
The dual player will use exponentiated gradient descent (Kivinen and Warmuth, 1997) to
update   and online gradient descent (Zinkevich, 2003) to update ⌧, where the reward


























(i,j)2[n]2 wij↵ij   ⌘
⌘
.
Lemma 6.3.4. Running online gradient descent for ⌧t , i.e.
⌧t = proj[0,C⌧]
⇣





with step size µt = C⌧p
T


















Algorithm 9 No-Regret Dynamics
Input: training examples {xi ,yi}ni=1, bounds C  and C⌧ , time horizon T , step sizes µ 
and {µt⌧}t=1T ,
Set ✓01 = 0 2 Rn
2
Set ⌧0 = 0
for t = 1,2, . . . ,T do







for all pairs (i, j) 2 [n]2











Dt,↵t  BEST⇢( t ,⌧t)




































































From Zinkevich (2003), we find that the regret of this online gradient descent (translated






















































































. To prove the above



















Since wij ,↵ij ,⌘ 2 [0,1] for all pairs (i, j), the Lagrangian 1|A|
P
ij wij↵ij   ⌘ =
P
ij wij↵ij
|A|   ⌘  1.































Note that if we define µt⌧ =
C⌧p
T






















































Proof. In each round, the dual player gets to charge either some (i, j) constraint or no
constraint at all. In other words, he is presented with n2 + 1 options. Therefore, to account
for the option of not charging any constraint, we define vector  0 = ( ,0), where the last
coordinate, which will always be 0, corresponds to the option of not charging any constraint.














Hence, the reward function is
































because for any t, each respective component of the gradient, Eh⇠Dt
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i
 ↵tij    ,
is bounded by 1.

















































If we take µ = 1C 
q
logn


















Now, we appeal to Freund and Schapire (1996b) to show that our no-regret dynamics
converge to an approximate minmax equilibrium of L. Then, we show that an approximate
minmax equilibrium corresponds to an approximately optimal solution to our original
constrained optimization problem.
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Theorem 6.3.6 (Freund and Schapire (1996b)). Let (D1,↵1), . . . , (DT ,↵T ) be the primal player’s





t , ↵ = 1T
PT
t=1↵
t ,   = 1T
PT
t=1 
t , and ⌧ = 1T
PT
t=1 ⌧



















 ⇠ T ,









is an ⇠ -approximate solution





























D̂, ↵̂,  ̂, ⌧̂
⌘

























Then, err(D̂,S)  OPT + 2v. And as for the constraints, Eh⇠D̂
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i
 ↵̂ij +   +
1+2v
C 
,8(i, j) 2 [n]2 and 1|A|
P
(i,j)2[n]2 ŵij ↵̂ij  ⌘ + 1+2vC⌧ .





































Note that for any D and ↵, max 2⇤,⌧2T penaltyS,ŵ(D,↵, ,⌧)   0 because one can always set





























 err (D⇤,S) + 2v
The first inequality and the third inequality are from the definition of v-approximate saddle
point, and the second to last equality comes from the fact that D⇤, a⇤ is a feasible solution.


















h(xi )  h(xj )
i

















































Now, we show that even when (D̂, ↵̂) is not a feasible solution, the constraints are
violated only by so much.
max
 2⇤,⌧2T
L(D̂, ↵̂, ,⌧) = err(D̂,S) + max
 2⇤,⌧2T
penaltyS,ŵ(D̂, ↵̂, ,⌧)  err(D⇤,S) + 2v
max
 2⇤,⌧2T
penaltyS,ŵ(D̂, ↵̂,  ̂, ⌧̂)  err(D⇤,S)  err(D̂,S) + 2v
max
 2⇤,⌧2T
penaltyS,ŵ(D̂, ↵̂,  ̂, ⌧̂)  1+2v




, which minimizes the function as shown in Lemma A.4.2


































Say (i⇤, j⇤) = argmax(i,j)2[n2]Eh⇠D
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i





↵i⇤j⇤     > 0, then  ⇤i⇤j⇤ = C⌧ and 0 for the other coordinates and else, it’s just a zero
vector. Also, ⌧ = C⌧ if
P


















































Theorem 6.3.9. Fix parameters ⌫,C⌧ ,C  that serve to trade o↵ running time with approximation







outputs a solution (D̂, ↵̂) with the following




And the constraints are approximately satisfied: Eh⇠D̂
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i




(i,j)2[n]2 ŵij ↵̂ij  ⌘ + 1+2⌫C⌧ .
Proof. Observe that
L(D,↵, ,⌧) = err(D,S) +L 1D,↵( ) +L
 2
D,↵(⌧)
By how we constructed L 1D,↵ and L
 2
























































t , ↵ = 1T
PT
t=1↵
t ,   = 1T
PT
t=1 
t , and ⌧ = 1T
PT
t=1 ⌧












And as for the constraints,
Eh⇠D̂
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i
 ↵̂ij +  +
1+2⌫
C 











In this section, we show that fairness loss generalizes out-of-sample. Error generalization
follows from the standard VC-dimension bound, which— because it is a uniform convergece
statement is una↵ected by the addition of fairness constraints.
Theorem 6.4.1 (Kearns and Vazirani (1994c)). Fix some hypothesis class H and distribution
P . Let S ⇠ Pn be a dataset consisting of n examples {xi ,yi}ni=1 sampled i.i.d. from P . Then, for
any 0 <   < 1, with probability 1   , for every h 2H, we have






















Proving that the fairness loss generalizes doesn’t follow immediately from a standard
VC-dimension argument for several reasons: it is not linearly separable, but defined as
an average over non-disjoint pairs of individuals in the sample. The di↵erence between
empirical fairness loss and true fairness loss of a randomized hypothesis D 2  H is also
a non-convex function of the supporting hypotheses h, and so it is not su cient to prove
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a uniform convergence bound merely for the base hypotheses in our hypothesis class H.
We circumvent these di culties by making use of an "-net argument, together with an
application of a concentration inequality, and an application of Sauer’s lemma. Briefly, we
show that with respect to fairness loss, the continuous set of distributions over classifiers
have an "-net of sparse distributions. Using the two-sample trick and Sauer’s lemma, we
can bound the number of such sparse distributions.
6.4.1. Fairness Loss
At a high level, our argument proceeds as follows: using McDiarmid’s inequality, for
any fixed hypothesis, its empirical fairness loss concentrates around its expectation. This
argument extends to an infinite family of hypotheses with bounded VC-dimension via the
standard two-sample trick, together with Sauer’s lemma: the only catch is that we need
to use a variant of McDiarmid’s inequality that applies to sampling without replacement.
However, proving that the fairness loss for each fixed hypothesis h concentrates around
its expectation is not su cient to obtain the same result for arbitrary distributions over
hypotheses, because the di↵erence between a randomized classifier’s fairness loss and its
expectation is a non-convex function of the mixture weights. To circumvent this issue, we
show that with respect to fairness loss, there is an "-net consisting of sparse distributions
over hypotheses. Once we apply Sauer’s lemma and the two-sample trick, there are only
finitely many such distributions, and we can union bound over them.
We begin by stating the standard version of McDiarmid’s inequality:
Theorem 6.4.2 (McDiarmid’s Inequality). Suppose X1, . . . ,Xn are independent and f satisfies
sup
x1,...,xn,x̂i
|f (x1, . . . ,xn)  f (x1, . . . ,xi 1, x̂i ,xi+1, . . . ,xn)|  ci .







































⇧D,w,  (S ⇥ S) ES
h












Proof. Define a slightly modified fairness loss function that depends on each instance
instead of pairs.










Note that ⇧0D,w,  (x1, . . . ,xn) =⇧D,w,  (S ⇥ S). The sensitivity of ⇧0D,w,  (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is 1n , so
applying McDiarmid’s inequality yields the above concentration.
Now, following the argument described above, we show that the di↵erence between empir-
ical fairness loss over S ⇥ S and true fairness loss converges uniformly over D 2  H with
high probability.





























where d is the VC-dimension of H, and k = ln(2n
2)
8"2 + 1.





















"; if such hypothesis does not exist, let it be some fixed hypothesis in H.
Pr


















 ⇧D⇤S ,w,  (S ⇥ S) ⇧D⇤S ,w,  (S






























































































































































We used Lemma 6.4.3 for the second to last inequality, and the last inequality follows from
the theorem’s condition (i.e. n   2ln(2)"2 ) and how we defined D
⇤
S .
Now, imagine sampling S = 2n points from P , and uniformly choosing n points without
replacement to be S and the remaining n points to be S 0. This process is equivalent to











































Now, we show that the continuous set of distributions over classifiers  H can be approx-
imated by an "0-net of sparse distributions. By sparse distribution, we mean uniform
distributions over supports of at most k, for some fixed value k: D̂ = 1k (h1, . . . ,hk) where
hi 2H for i 2 [k]. Because by Sauer’s lemma, the set of hypotheses H induces at most O(nd )
distinct labellings of a dataset of sizse n, we need to union bound over at most O(ndk)
distinct sparse distributions.
Lemma 6.4.5. For some fixed data sample S of size n, any D 2  H can be approximated by
some uniform mixture over k := 2ln(2n
2)
"02 + 1 hypotheses D̂ =
1
k {h1, . . . ,hk} such that for every










   "0 .
Proof. Fix some (x,x0) 2 S⇥S . Randomly sample k hypotheses fromD: {hi}ki=1 ⇠Dk . Because
for each randomly drawn hypothesis hi ⇠D, the di↵erence in its prediction for x and x0 is
























































However, there are n2 fixed pairs in S ⇥ S , and if we distribute the failure property between












































































 "0 ,8(x,x0) 2 S ⇥ S,




< 1 or k >
2ln(2n2)
"02 .
Corollary 6.4.6. For some fixed data sample S , any D 2  H can be approximated by a uniform
mixture of k := 2ln(2n
2)
"02 + 1 hypotheses D̂ =
1



















is 1-Lipschitz in terms of Eh⇠D
h
h(xi )  h(xj )
i
.
Using Corollary 6.4.6 and Sauer’s lemma that bounds the total number of possible labelings
by H over 2n points by ( e·2nd )







































































































Now, for any D̂, we will try to bound the probability that the di↵erence in fairness loss
between S and S 0 is big. We do so by union bounding over cases where both of them deviate
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⇧D̂,w,  (S ⇥ S) ES |S
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⇧D̂,w,  (S ⇥ S) ES |S
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Here, we can’t appeal to McDiarmid’s because S is sampled without replacement from
S . However, we use the stochastic covering property to show concentration for sampling
without replacement (Pemantle and Peres, 2014) (a similar technique was used by Neel
et al. (2018))
Definition 6.4.7 (Pemantle and Peres (2014)). Z1, . . . ,Zn satisfy the stochastic covering prop-
erty, if for any I ⇢ [n] and a   a0 2 {0,1}I coordinate-wise such that ||a0   a||1 = 1, there is
a coupling ⌫ of the distributions µ,µ0 of (Zj : j 2 [n] \ I ) conditioned on ZI = a or ZI = a0,
respectively, such that ⌫(x,y) = 0 unless x  y coordinate-wise and ||x   y||1  1.
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Theorem 6.4.8 (Pemantle and Peres (2014)). Let (Z1, . . . ,Zn) 2 {0,1} be random variables such
that Pr(
Pn
i=1Zi = k) = 1 and the stochastic covering property is satisfied. Let f : {0,1}n!R be
an c-Lipschitz function. Then, for any " > 0,





Lemma 6.4.9 (Neel et al. (2018)). Given a set S of n points, sample k  n elements without
replacement. Let Zi = {0,1} indicate whether ith element has been chosen. Then, (Z1, . . . ,Zn)
satisfy the stochastic covering property.
Let S = {x1, . . . ,x2n}. If we slightly change the definition of the fairness loss so that it depends
on the indicator variables Z1, . . . ,Z2n,
⇧00
D̂,w,  ,S





ZiZj⇧D̂,w,  (xi ,xj ) =⇧D̂,w,  (S ⇥ S).
We see that ⇧00
D̂,w,  ,S
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For convenience, we set "0 = "2 .
However, in our case, instead of finding the average over all pairs in S , we calculate the
fairness loss only over m randomly chosen pairs. Fixing S , if m is su ciently large, our
empirical fairness loss should concentrate around the fairness loss over all the pairs for S .





















=⇧D,w,  (S ⇥ S),8a 2 [|M |].












Once again, using "-net sparsification of  H, we show the above concentration converges
uniformly over D 2  H
























































































where k = 2ln(2m)4"02 + 1. The last inequality is from Corollary 6.4.6 and Lemma 6.4.10. For
convenience, we just set "0 = "/2.
Combining theorem 6.4.4 and lemma 6.4.11 yields the following theorem for fairness loss
generalization.
Theorem 6.4.12. Let S consists of n i.i.d points drawn from P and let M represent a set of m



































where k0 = 2ln(2m)"2 + 1, k =
ln(2n2)
8"2 + 1, and d is the VC-dimension of H.
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To interpret this theorem, note that the right hand side (the probability of a failure of
generalization) begins decreasing exponentially fast in the data and fairness constraint
sample parameters n andm as soon as n  ⌦(d log(n) log(n/d)) andm  ⌦(d log(m) log(n/d)).























where k0 = 2ln(2m)"2 + 1 and k =
ln(2n2)


























































6.5. A Behavioral Study of Subjective Fairness: Preliminary Findings
The framework and algorithm we have provided can be viewed as a potentially powerful
tool for empirically studying subjective individual fairness as a behavioral phenomenon. In
this section we describe preliminary results from a human-subject study we performed in
which subjective fairness was elicited and then enforced by our algorithm.
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Figure 4: Screenshot of sample subjective fairness elicitation question posed to human
subjects.
Our study used the COMPAS recidivism data gathered by ProPublica 4 in their celebrated
analysis of Northepointe’s risk assessment algorithmAngwin et al. (2016). This data consists
of defendants from Broward County in Florida between 2013 to 2014. For each defendant
the data consists of sex (male, female), age (18-96), race (African-American, Caucasian,
Hispanic, Asian, Native American), juvenile felony count, juvenile misdemeanor count,
number of other juvenile o↵enses, number of prior adult criminal o↵enses, the severity of
the crime for which they were incarcerated (felony or misdemeanor), as well as the outcome
of whether or not they did in fact recidivate. Recidivism is defined as a new arrest within 2
years, not counting tra c violations and municipal ordinance violations.
We implemented our fairness framework via a web app that elicited subjective fairness
notions from 43 undergraduates at a major research university. After reading a document
describing the data and recidivism prediction task, each subject was presented with 50
randomly chosen pairs of records from the COMPAS data set, as illustrated in Figure 4,
and asked whether in their opinion the two individuals should treated (predicted) equally
or not. Importantly, the subjects were shown only the features for the individuals, and
not their actual recidivism outcomes, since we sought to elicit subjects’ fairness notions
regarding the predictions of those outcomes. While absolutely no guidance was given
to subjects regarding fairness, the elicitation framework allows for rich possibilities. For
example, subjects could choose to ignore demographic factors or criminal histories entirely
4 The data can be accessed on ProPublica’s Github page here. We cleaned the data as in the ProPublica study,
removing any records with missing data. This left 5829 records, where the base rate of two-year recidivism was
46%.
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if they liked, or a subject who believes that minorities are more vulnerable to overpolicing
could discount their criminal histories relative to Caucasians in their pairwise elicitations.
For each subject, the pairs they identified to be treated equally were taken as constraints on
error minimization with respect to the actual recidivism outcomes over the entire COMPAS
dataset, and our algorithm was applied to solve this constrained optimization problem,
using a linear threhsold heuristic as the underlying learning oracle (Kearns et al. (2018)).
We ran our algorithm with ⌘ = 0 and variable   in Equations (6.1) through (6.3), which
represents the strongest enforcement of subjective fairness — the di↵erence in predicted
values must be at most   on every pair selected by a subject. Because the issues we are
most interested in here (convergence, tradeo↵s with accuracy, and heterogeneity of fairness
preferences) are orthogonal to generalization — and because we prove VC-dimension based
generalization theorems — for simplicity, the results we report are in-sample.
6.5.1. Results
Figure 5: (a) Sample algorithm trajectory for a particular subject at various   . (b) Sample
subjective fairness Pareto curves for a sample of subjects. (c) Scatterplot of number of
constraints specified and number of opposing constraints vs. error at   = 0.3. (d) Scatterplot
of number of constraints where the true labels are di↵erent vs. error at   = 0.3. (e)
Correlation between false positive rate di↵erence and   for racial groups.
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Since our algorithm relies on a learning heuristic for which worst-case guarantees are not
possible, the first empirical question is whether the algorithm converges rapidly on the
behavioral data. We found that it did so consistently; a typical example is Figure 5(a), where
we show the trajectory of model error vs. fairness violation for a particular subject’s data in
which the allowed violation was   = 0.3 (horizontal line). At 2000 iterations the algorithm
has saturated the allowed violation with the constrained error-optimal model.
Perhaps the most basic behavioral questions we might ask involve the extent and nature of
subject variability. For example, do some subjects identify constraint pairs that are much
harder to satifsy than other subjects? And if so, what factors seem to account for such
variation?
Figure 5(b) shows that there is indeed considerable variation in subject di culty. For a
representative subset of the 43 subjects, we have plotted the error vs. fairness violation
Pareto curves obtained by varying   from 0 (pairs selected by subjects must have identical
probabilistic predictions of recidivism) to 1.0 (no fairness enforced whatsoever). Since
our model space is closed under probabilistic mixtures, the worst-case Pareto curve is
linear, obtained by all mixtures of the error-optimal model and random predictions. Easier
constaint sets are more convex. We see in the figure that both extremes are exhibited
behaviorally — some subjects yield linear or near-linear curves, while others permit huge
reductions in unfairness for only slight increases in error, and virtually all the possibilities
in between are realized as well. 5
Since each subject was presented with 50 random pairs and was free to constrain as many
or as few as they wished, it is natural to wonder if the variation in di culty is explained
simply by the number of constraints chosen. In Figure 5(c) we show a scatterplot of the the
number of constraints selected by a subject (x axis) versus the error obtained (y axis) for
  = 0.3 (an intermediate value that exhibits considerable variation in subject error rates) for
all 43 subjects. While we see there is indeed strong correlation (approximately 0.69), it is
5The slight deviations from true convexity are due to only approximate convergence.
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far from the case that the number of constraints explains all the variability. For example,
amongst subjects who selected approximately 16 constraints, the resulting error varies
over a range of nearly 8%, which is over 40% of the range from the optimal error (0.32)
to the worst fairness-constrained error (0.5). More surprisingly, when we consider only
the ‘opposing’ constraints, pairs of points with di↵erent true labels, the correlation (0.489)
seems to be weaker. Enforcing a classifier to predict similarly on a pair of points with
di↵erent true labels should increase the error, and yet, it is less correlated with error than
the raw number of constraints.
It is also interesting to consider the collective force of the 1432 constraints selected by all
43 subjects together, which we can view as a “fairness panel” of sorts. Given that there
are already individual subjects whose constraints yield the worst-case Pareto curve, it is
unsurprising that the collective constraints do as well. But we can exploit the flexibility of
our optimization framework in Equations (6.1) through constraint (6.3), and let   = 0.0 and
vary only ⌘, thus giving the learner discretion in which subjects’ constraints to discount
or discard at a given budget ⌘. In doing so we find that the unconstrained optimal error
can be obtained while having the average (exact) pairwise constraint be violated by only
roughly 25%, meaning roughly that only 25% of the collective constraints account for all
the di culty.
Finally, it is interesting to see if there’s any relationship between subjective fairness and
other standard fairness notions, such as false positive rate di↵erence. For each subject
and a pair of racial groups, we take the absolute di↵erence in false positive rates of the
classifier at   2 {0.0,0.1, . . . ,1.0} and calculate the correlation coe cient between   ’s and the
false positive rate di↵erences. Figure 5(e) shows the average correlation coe cient across
subjects for each pair of racial groups. Subjective fairness’ correlation with false positive
rate di↵erence seems to be the strongest for Caucasian and African-American.
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We leave the fuller investigation of our behavioral study for future work, including the
detailed nature of subject variability and the comparison of behavioral subjective fairness
to more standard algorithmic fairness notions.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Details from Chapter 3
A.1.1. AboveThreshold
Proof of 3.2.4. Let D,D0 be two neighboring databases. We will instead analyze the algo-
rithm that outputs the entire prefix f1, . . . , ft when stopping at time t. Because IAT is a
post-processing of this algorithm, and privacy can only be improved under post-processing,
this su ces to prove the theorem. We wish to show for all outcomes o = (t, f1, . . . , ft):
Pr[IAT(D) = (t, f1, f2, . . . , ft)]  e"A+"t Pr
⇥
IAT(D0) = (t, f1, f2, . . . , ft)
⇤
We have directly from the privacy guarantee of AboveThreshold that for every fixed sequence
of queries f1, . . . , ft :
Pr[IAT(D) = t | f1, . . . , ft]  e"A Pr
⇥
IAT(D0) = t | f1, . . . , ft
⇤
(A.1)
because the guarantee of AboveThreshold is quantified over all data-independent sequences
of queries f1, . . . , fT , and by definition of the algorithm, the probability of stopping at time t
is independent of the identity of any query f 0t for t
0 > t.
Now we can write:
Pr[IAT(D) = t, f1, . . . ft] = Pr[IAT(D) = t | f1, . . . ft]Pr[M(D) = f1, . . . ft]
By assumption, M is prefix-private, in particular, for fixed t and any f1, . . . , ft :
Pr[M(D) = f1, . . . ft]  e"t Pr
⇥




Pr[IAT(D) = t, f1, . . . ft]
Pr[IAT(D0) = t, f1, . . . ft]
=
Pr[IAT(D) = t | f1, . . . ft]
Pr[IAT(D0) = t|f1, . . . , ft]
Pr[M(D) = f1, . . . ft]
Pr[M(D0) = f1, . . . ft]
 e"A · e"t = e"A+"t ,
as desired.
We also include the following utility theorem. We say that an instantiation of AboveThresh-
old is (↵, ) accurate with respect to a threshold W and stream of queries f1, . . . fT if except
with probability at most   , the algorithm outputs a query ft only if ft(D)  W  ↵.
Theorem A.1.1. For any sequence of 1-sensitive queries f1, . . . , fT such AboveThreshold is (↵, )-
accurate for
↵ =




We now describe the DoublingMethod described in Section 3.1 and Section 6.3, and give a
formal ex-post privacy analysis. Let ✓⇤ = argmin✓2Rp L(✓). DoublingMethod accepts a list
of privacy levels "1 < "2 < . . . < "T , where "i = 2"i 1. We show in A.1.12 that 2 is the optimal
factor to scale " by. It also takes in a failure probability   , and a black-box private ERM
mechanism M that has the following guarantee: Fixing a dataset D, M takes as input D
and a privacy level "i , and generates an "i-di↵erentially private hypothesis ✓i , such that the
query f i(D) = L(D,✓⇤) L(D,✓i ) has `1 sensitivity at most  .
Theorem A.1.2. For k  T , define privacy loss function E(k,✓k) =
2k  log(T / )
↵ + (2
k   1)"1,"(T +
1,✓⇤) =1. Then DoublingMethod is E-ex-post di↵erentially private, and is 1   accurate.
Proof. Since if the algorithm reaches step T + 1 it outputs the true minimizer which has
error 0 < ↵, it could only fail to output a hypothesis with error less than ↵ if it stops
at i  T . DoublingMethod only stops early if the noisy query is greater than  ↵/2; or
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Algorithm 10 Doubling Method: DoublingMethod(D, {"1, . . . ,"T },M,↵, )
Input: private dataset D, an accuracy ↵, failure probability   , mechanism M
for each t = 1, . . . ,T do
Generate ✓t  M(D)t
Let f t(D) = L(D,✓⇤) L(D,✓t)





if f t(D) +wt    ↵/2: then Output (t, f t); Halt.
Output T +1,✓⇤.
f i(D) +wi    ↵/2. But f i(D)   ↵, which forces wi   ↵/2. By properties of the Laplace




↵ ) =   /T . Hence by union bound over T the
total failure probability is at most   .
By the assumption, generating the kth private hypothesis incurs privacy loss "1 ⇤ 2k 1. By
the Laplace mechanism, evaluating the error of the sensitivity   query f i is 2  log(T / )↵ -
di↵erentially private. Theorem 3.6 in Rogers et al. (2016) then says that the ex-post privacy






Remark A.1.3. In practice, the private empirical risk minimization mechanism M may not
always output a hypothesis that leads to queries with uniformly bounded `1 sensitivity. In this
case a projection that scales down the hypothesis norm can be applied prior to evaluating the
private query error. For a discussion of scaling the norm down refer to the experiments section of
the appendix.
A.1.3. Ridge Regression
In this subsection, we let `(✓, (Xi,yi )) = 12(yi   h✓,Xii)2, and the empirical loss over the data








where X denotes the (n ⇥ p) matrix with row vectors X1, . . . ,Xn and y = (y1, . . . , yn). We
assume that for each i, kXik1  1 and |yi |  1. For simplicity, we will sometimes write L(✓)
for L(D,✓).
First, we could show that the unconstrained optimal solution in ridge regression has
bounded norm.
Lemma A.1.4. Let ✓⇤ = argmin✓2Rd L(✓). Then ||✓⇤||2  1p  .
Proof. For any ✓ 2 Rp,L(✓⇤)  L(✓). In particular for ✓ = 0,















2  12 ,
and so ||✓⇤||2  1p  as desired.
The following claim provides a bound on the sensitivity for the excess risk, which are the
queries we send to AboveThreshold.
Claim A.1.5. Let C be a bounded convex set in Rp with kCk2 M . Let D and D0 be a pair of
adjacent datasets, and let ✓⇤ = argmin✓2C L(✓,D) and ✓
• = argmin✓2C L(✓,D
0). Then for any
✓ 2 C,




The following lemma provides a bound on the `1 sensitivity for the matrix X|X and vector
X|y.
Lemma A.1.6. Fix any i 2 [n]. Let X and Z be two n ⇥ p matrices such that for all rows j , i,
Xj = Zj . Let y,y0 2 Rn such that yj = y0j for all j , i. Then
kX|X  Z|Zk1  2 and kX|y  Z|y0k1  2,
as long as kXik,kZik, |yi |, |y0i |  1.
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Proof. We can write











= kX|i Xi  Z
|
i Zk1
 kX|i Xik1 + kZ
|
i Zik1
= kXik21 + kZik21  2.
Similarly,







= kyiXi   y0iZik1
= kyiXik1 + ky0iZik1
= kXik1 + kZik1  2.
This completes the proof.
Before we proceed to give a formal proof for 3.3.1, we will also give the following basic fact
about Laplace random vectors.
Claim A.1.7. Let ⌫ = (⌫1, . . . ,⌫k) 2 Rk such that each ⌫i is an independent random variable
drawn from the Laplace distribution Lap (r). Then E [k⌫k2] 
p
2kr.
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality,











































































Therefore, we have E [k⌫k2] 
p
2kr.
Proof of 3.3.1. In the algorithm, we compute Z = X|X + B and z = X|y + b, where the
entries of B and b are drawn i.i.d. from Lap(4/"). Note that the output ✓p is simply a
post-processing of the noisy matrix Z and vector z. Furthermore, by A.1.6, the joint vector
(Z,z) is has a sensitivity bounded by 4 with respect to `1 norm. Therefore, the mechanism
satisfies "-di↵erential privacy by the privacy guarantee of the Laplace mechanism.
LetM =
p






2 . Observe that ✓p = argmin✓2C Lp(✓).
Our goal is to bound L(✓p) L(✓⇤), which can be written as follows













Moreover, hb,✓pi  kbk2k✓pk2 Mkbk2 and













































































By A.1.7, we also have E [kBkF]  4
p







































which recovers our stated bound.
A.1.4. Logistic Regression
In this subsection, the input data D consists of n labelled examples (X1, y1), . . . , (Xn,yn), such
that for each i, xi 2 Rp, kxik1  1, and yi 2 { 1,1}.
We consider the logistic loss function: `(✓, (Xi,yi )) = log(1+exp( yi✓|Xi )), and our empirical











In output perturbation, the noise needs to scale with the `1-sensitivity of the optimal
solution, which is given by the following lemma.
Lemma A.1.8. Let D and D0 be a pair of neighboring datasets. Let ✓ = argminw2Rp L(w,D) and
✓0 = argminw02Rp L(w









By the fact that kak1 
p
pkak2 for any a 2 Rp, we recover the stated result.









Proof. Note that the weight vector ✓ = ~0 has loss log2. Therefore, L(✓⇤)  log2. Since the








We will focus on generating hypotheses ✓ within the set C = {a 2 Rp | kak2 
p
2log2/ }.
Then we can bound the `1 sensitivity of the excess risk using the following result.









The following fact is useful for our utility analysis for the output perturbation method.
Claim A.1.11. Fix any data point (x,y) such that kxk1  1 and y 2 { 1,1}. The logistic loss
function `(✓, (x,y)) is a 1-Lipschitz function in ✓.
Proof of 3.3.3. The privacy guarantee follows directly from the use of Laplace mechanism
and the `1-sensitivity bound in A.1.8. Since the logistic loss function is 1-Lipschitz. For any
(x,y) in our domain,
|`(✓⇤, (x,y))  `(✓p, (x,y))|  k✓⇤  ✓pk2 = kbk2.
Furthermore,
k✓pk22   k✓⇤k22 = k✓⇤ + bk22   k✓⇤k22 = 2hb,✓⇤i+ kbk22
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which recovers the stated bound.
We include the full details of OutputNR in 11.
Algorithm 11 Output Perturbation with Noise-Reduction: OutputNR(D, {"1, . . . ,"T },↵, )
Input: private data set D = (X,y), accuracy parameter ↵, privacy levels "1 < "2 < . . . < "T ,





A = (D,"0,↵/2,2log(1 + exp(M))/(1 + exp( M))/(n), ·)
with "0 = 16 (log(2T / ))/↵ and   = 2log(1 + exp(M))/(1 + exp( M))/(n)
Let C = {a 2 Rp | kak2 
p
1/ } and ✓⇤ = argmin✓2Rp L(✓)
Generate hypotheses: {✓t} =NR(✓⇤, 2
p
p
n  , {"1, . . . ,"T })
for t = 1, . . . ,T : do
if k✓tk2 M then Set ✓t =M(✓t/k✓tk2) . Rescale the norm for bounded sensitivity
Let f t(D) = L(D,✓⇤) L(D,✓t)
Query A with f t




For simplicity and to avoid over-fitting, we fixed the following parameters for both experi-
ments:
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• n =100,000 (number of data points)
•   = 0.005 (regularization parameter)
•   = 0.10 (requested failure probability)
• "1 = 4E, where E is the inversion of the theory guarantee for the underlying algorithm.
For example in the logistic regression setting where the algorithm is Output Perturba-
tion, E is the value such that setting " = E guarantees expected excess risk of at most
↵.
• "T = 1.0/n.
• ↵ = 0.005,0.010,0.015, . . . ,0.200 (requested excess error bound).
For NoiseReduction, we choose T = 1000 (maximum number of iterations) and set "t = "1rt






For the Doubling method, T is equal to the number of doubling steps until "t exceeds "T ,
i.e. T = dlog2("1/"T )e.
Features, labels, and transformations. The Twitter dataset has p = 77 features (dimen-
sion of each x), relating to measurements of activity relating to a posting; the label y is a
measurement of the “buzz” or success of the posting. Because general experience suggests
that such numbers likely follow a heavy-tailed distribution, we transformed the labels by
y 7! log(1 + y) and set the taks of predicting the transformed label.
The KDD-99 Cup dataset has p = 38 features relating to attributes of a network connection
such as duration of connection, number of bytes sent in each direction, binary attributes,
etc. The goal is to classify connections as innocent or malicious, with malicious connections
broken down into further subcategories. We transformed three attributes containing likely
heavy-tailed data (the first three mentioned above) by xi 7! log(1 + xi), dropped three
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columns containing textual categorical data, and transformed the labels into 1 for any kind
of malicious connection and 0 for an innocent one. (The feature length p = 38 is after
dropping the text columns.)
For both datasets, we transformed the data by renormalizing to maximum L1-norm 1. That
is, we computedM =maxi kxik1, and transformed each xi 7! xi/M . In the case of the Twitter
dataset, we did the same (separately) for the y labels. This is not a private operation (unlike
the previous ones) on the data, as it depends precisely on the maximum norm. We do not
consider the problem of privately ensuring bounded-norm data, as it is orthogonal to the
questions we study.
The code for the experiments is implemented in python3 using the numpy and scikit-learn
libraries.
Additional results
Figure 6 plots the empirical accuracies of the output hypotheses, to ensure that the algo-
rithms are achieving their theoretical guarantees. In fact, they do significantly better, which
is reasonable considering the private testing methodology: set a threshold significantly
below the goal ↵, add independent noise to each query, and accept only if the query plus
noise is smaller than the threshold. Combined with the requirement to use tail bounds, the
accuracies tend to be significantly smaller than ↵ and with significantly higher probability
than 1    . (Recall: this is not necessarily a good thing, as it probably costs a significant
amount of extra privacy.)
Figure 7 shows the breakdown in privacy losses between the “privacy test” and the “hy-
pothesis generator”. In the case of NoiseReduction, these are AboveThreshold’s "A and
the "t of the private method, Covariance Perturbation or Output Perturbation. In the
case of Doubling, these are the accrued " due to tests at each step and due to Covariance
Perturbation or Output Perturbation for outputting the hypotheses.
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This shows the majority of the privacy loss is due to testing for privacy levels. One reason
why might be that the cost of privacy tests depends heavily on certain constants, such as
the norm of the hypothesis being tested. This norm is upper-bounded by a theoretical
maximum which is used, but a smaller maximum would allow for significantly higher
computed privacy levels for the same algorithm. In other words, the analysis might be
loose compared to an analysis that knows the norms of the hypotheses, although this is a
private quantity. Figure 8 supports the conclusion that generally, the theoretical maximum
was very pessimistic in our cases. Note that a tenfold reduction in norm gives a tenfold
reduction in privacy level for logistic regression, where sensitivity is linear in maximum
norm; and a hundred-fold reduction for ridge regression.
Supporting theory
Claim A.1.12. For the “doubling method”, the factor 2 increase in " at each time step gives the
optimal worst case ex post privacy loss guarantee.
Proof. In a given setting, suppose "⇤ is the “final” level of privacy at which the algorithm
would halt. With a factor 1/r increase for r < 1, the final loss may be as large as "⇤/r. The
total loss is the sum of that loss and all previous losses, i.e. if t steps were taken:














The final inequality implies that setting r = 0.5 and (1/r) = 2 is optimal. The asymptotic
! is justified by noting that the starting "1 may be chosen arbitrarily small, so there exist
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(a) Linear (ridge) regression. (b) Regularized logistic regression.
(c) Linear (ridge) regression. (d) Regularized logistic regression.
Figure 6: Empirical accuracies. The dashed line shows the requested accuracy level,
while the others plot the actual accuracy achieved. Due most likely due to a pessimistic
analysis and the need to set a small testing threshold, accuracies are significantly better
than requested for both methods.
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(a) Linear (ridge) regression. (b) Regularized logistic regression.
Figure 7: Privacy breakdowns. Shows the amount of empirical privacy loss due to the
AboveThreshold versus the losses due to computing the hypotheses.
(a) Linear (ridge) regression. (b) Regularized logistic regression.
Figure 8: L2 norms of final hypotheses. Shows the average L2 norm of the output ✓̂
for each method, versus the theoretical maximum of 1/
p
  in the case of
ridge regression and
p
2log(2)/  in the case of regularized logistic regression.
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parameters that exceed the value of that summation for any finite t; and the summation
limits to 11 r as t!1.
A.2. Details from Chapter 4
A.2.1. Examples of Separator Sets
Separator Sets for Empirical Loss Queries.
In this section we show how to construct a separator set for a family of empirical loss queries
defined over a hypothesis class, given a separator set for the corresponding hypothesis
class. Formally, let us consider the data domain X to be the set of labelled examples
XA ⇥ {0,1}, where XA is the domain of attribute vectors. Let H be a hypothesis class, with
each hypothesis h : Xa ! {0,1} mapping attribute vectors to binary labels. Let UH be a
separator set for H such that for any pair of distinct hypotheses h,h0 2H, there is a u 2UH
such that h(u) , h0(u).
For every h 2H, let qh : X ! {0,1} be the loss query corresponding to h such that qh((x,y)) =
[h(x) , y]. Define the query class QH to be {qh | h 2H}, and let U = {(u,0) | u 2UH}. Solving
the learning problem over H corresponds to solving the minimization problem over QH.
Claim A.2.1. The set U is a separator set for the query class QH.
Proof. Let qh,qh0 2 QH be a pair of distinct queries. Since UH is a separator set for H, there
exists an element u 2UH such that h(u) , h(u0). As a result,
qh((u,0)) = h(u) , h(u0) = qh0 ((u,0)).
Therefore, U is a separator set for QH.
Thus, if a hypothesis class H has a separator set of size m, so does the set of queries QH
representing the empirical loss of the hypotheses h 2H.
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Separator Sets for Common Hypothesis Classes.
In this section we provide some examples of hypothesis classes with small separator sets.
We say that a class of queries Q is self-dual of Q = Qdual.
Conjunctions, Disjunctions, and Parities.
We begin with some easy but important cases that can be verified by inspection:
Fact A.2.2. Let XA = {0,1}d . For every j 2 [d], let ej 2 XA be a boolean vector that has 1 in the
j-th coordinate and 0 in all others, and let ej 2 XA be the vector that has 0 in the j-th coordinate
and 1 in all others. Let U = {ej | j 2 [d]} and U = {ej | j 2 [d]}. Then for the following hypothesis
classes:
• U is a separator set for conjunctions over XA: {^j2Sxj | S ✓ [d]};
• U is a separator set for disjunctions over XA: {_j2Sxj | S ✓ [d]};
• U is a separator set for parities over XA: { j2Sxj | S ✓ [d]}.
Hence, each of these classes has a separator set of size d, equal to the data dimension. Moreover,
each of these classes is self-dual.
Remark A.2.3. Note here we have definedmonotone conjunctions, disjunctions, and parities
— i.e. in which the literals cannot appear negated. Up to a factor of 2 in the dimension, this
is without loss of generality, since we can add d extra coordinates to each example which by
convention will encode the negation of each of the values in the first d coordinates. This allows us
to handle non-monotone conjunctions, disjunctions, and parities as well.
Discrete Halfspaces.
Discrete halfspaces are a richer set of hypotheses that generalize both conjunctions and
disjunctions. Let XA = Bd for some set B ✓ [ 1,1]. For example we could allow real valued
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features by letting B = [ 1,1], or we could take some discretization. We will assume that
0 2 B. Halfspaces themselves will be defined with respect to vectors of weights w that are
discretized to lie in some finite set w 2 V d , for V ✓ [ 1,1]. Here we could take |V | = 2 by
requiring that the weights be defined over the hypercube (V = { 1,1}), or we could allow
finer discretization. It is important that V be finite.
Definition A.2.4 (Halfspace Query). Given a weight vector w 2 V d , the halfspace query
parameterized by w is defined to be qw(x) = 1{w · x   1}. Let QV = {qw : w 2 V d}.
The value of “1” used as the intercept is arbitrary, and can is set without loss of generality at the
cost of 1 extra data dimension.
Lemma A.2.5. QV has a separator set of size (|V |  1)d. In particular, if weights are defined over
the hypercube (V = { 1,1}), then the separator set is of size d.
Proof. Suppose the elements of V are x1 < x2 < . . . < x|V |, which without loss of generality
are distinct. We construct a separator set of size (|V |   1)d as follows. Let c1, . . . c|V | 1 be
a sequence such that cv lies in [ 1xv+1 ,
1
xv
). Define the vector sjv 2 X to take value cv in
coordinate j , and 0 elsewhere. We claim that U = {sjv}j=1,...d,v=1...|V | 1 is a separator set for
QV . Let qw1 , qw2 2 QV . Since w1 , w2 they must di↵er in some coordinate, call it k. Let
w1,k = xl ,q2,k = xm, and without loss of generality assume xm > xl . Then by construction of
{cv} there exists cv such that cv   1xm , but cv <
1
xl
. We therefore have that w1 · skv = xl · cv < 1,
whereas w2 · skv = xm · cv   1, and hence qw1(skv) = 0 , 1 = qw2(skv).
Finally, we note that the dual of QV is QB — and so if B = V , the set of halfspace queries QV
is self-dual.
Decision Lists.
For simplicity, in this section we discuss monotone decision lists, in which variables cannot
be negated — but as we have already remarked, this is without loss of generality up to a
factor of 2 in the dimension. Here we define the general class of k-decision lists: 1-decision
lists (often just referred to as decision lists) are a restricted class of binary decision tree in
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which one child of every internal vertex must be a leaf. k-decision lists are a generalization
in which each branching decision can depend on a conjunction of k variables.
Definition A.2.6. A monotone k-decision list over XA = {0,1}d is defined by an ordered sequence
L = (c1, b1), . . . , (cl ,bl ) and a bit b, in which each ci is a monotone conjunction of at most k literals,
and each bi 2 {0,1}. Given a pair (L,b), the decision list qL,b(x) computes as follows: it outputs
qL,b(x) = bj where j is the minimum index in L satisfying cj (a) = 1. If cj is the first conjunction
that x satisfies in the definition of qL,b(x) we say that x binds at cj . If no such index exists then
qL,b(x) = b, and we say qL,b(x) does not bind. k-decision lists are strict generalizations of k-DNF
and k-CNF formulae.





1-decision lists have a separator set of size O(d2).
Proof. Let MCk denote the set of monotone conjunctions of  k literals over XA. For any
two s, l in MCk , let esl denote the element a 2 XA such that all literals appearing in either
s or l are set to 1, and all others are set to 0. Define U = {esl : s, l 2MCk}. Since each esl








Now let (L1, b1) , (L2, b2) be two distinct k-decision lists. Since the two decision lists are
distinct there must exist x 2 XA such that q(L1,b1)(x) , q(L2,b2)(x). Let c1, c2 be the conjunctions
on which (L1, b1), (L2, b2) bind on x respectively. (If Li does not bind on x, set ci to be the
empty conjunction). Define ec1,c2 2 U as above. We claim that q(L1,b1)(ec1,c2) = q(L1,b1)(x) ,
q(L2,b2)(x) = q(L2,b2)(ec1,c2), and hence ec1,c2 2 U distinguishes (L1, b1) from (L2, b2), which
proves the claim. The key fact that q(Li ,bi )(ec1,c2) = q(Li ,bi )(x) follows from the fact that (Li ,bi )
still binds at ci (or does not bind at all) on input x, and it can’t bind earlier since any
monotone conjunction satisfied by ec1,c2 is satisfied by x.
Other Classes of Functions.
In this section, we have exhibited simple constructions of small universal identification
sets for conjunctions, disjunctions, parities, discrete halfspaces, and k-decision lists. This is
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not an exhaustive enumeration of such classes — we give these as examples of the most
frequently studied classes of boolean functions in the PAC learning literature. However,
short universal identification sets for other classes of functions are known. For example:
Theorem A.2.8 (Goldman et al. (1993)). There exist polynomially sized universal identification
sets for the following two classes of circuits:
1. Logarithmic depth read-once majority formulas, and
2. Logarithmic depth read-once positive NAND formulas.
A.2.2. RSPM with Gaussian Perturbations
We now present a Gaussian variant of the RSPM algorithm.
Gaussian RSPM
Given: A separator set U = {e1, . . . , em} for a class of statistical queries Q and a weighted




Input: A dataset S 2 X n of size n.
Output: A statistical query q 2 Q.
Sample independently ⌘i ⇠N (0, 2) for i 2 {1, . . . ,m}
Construct a weighted dataset WD of size n+m as follows:
WD(S,⌘) = {(xi ,1) : xi 2 S}[ {(ei ,⌘i ) : ei 2U }
Output q = O(WD(S,⌘)).



















Proof. Note that for each noise variable ⌘i , we have the following tail bound:













Then the proof follows from the same reasoning in the proof for Theorem 4.3.2.
Theorem A.2.10 (Privacy). If O⇤ is a weighted optimization oracle for Q, then the Gaussian
Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is (", )-di↵erentially private.
Proof. In the following, we will inherit the notation from Section 4.3. We will denote the
output by the algorithm on input dataset S under realizations of the perturbations ⌘ as
Q(S,⌘) = O⇤(WD(S,⌘)). For any q 2 Q, let E(q,S) = {⌘ : Q(S,⌘) = q}. We will use the same
mapping fq(⌘) : Rm ! Rm as defined in Section 4.3. We will write PG to denote the pdf
of the distribution N (0, 2). We will also again define the set B as the set of ⌘ for which
there are multiple minimizers q̂. For every ⌘ 2 Rm \B, let q̂⌘ be the unique minimizer. Note
that Lemmas 4.3.5 and 4.3.7 both hold in our setting, and in particular, Lemma 4.3.7 holds
because of the continuity of the Gaussian distribution.
Similar to the standard analysis for the Gaussian mechanism Dwork and Roth (2014b), we
will leverage the fact that the distribution N (0, 2I ) is independent of the orthonormal
basis from which its constituent normals are drawn, so we have the freedom to choose the
underlying basis without changing the distribution. For any r 2 Rm and any q 2 Q, fix such
a basis b1, . . . , bm such that b1 is parallel to ⌫ = fq(r)  r. A random draw ⌘ from N (0, 2I )
can be realized by the following process: first draw signed lengths  i ⇠N (0, 2), for i 2 [m],
then define ⌘[i] =  ibi , and finally let ⌘ =
Pm
i=1⌘
[i]. For each i 2 [m], let r[i] be the projection


































kr + ⌫k22   krk22
⌘
◆
Now we can write


























which completes the proof.
To finish up the privacy analysis, note that by Lemma A.2.11, the ratio PG(⌘)/PG(fq(⌘)) is




m/2. Now we will bound the probability
that the random vector ⌘[1] has norm exceeding this bound. First, observe that k⌘[1]k2 = | 1|,
where  1 is a random draw from the distributionN (0, 2). Since  21 is a  2 random variable
with degree of freedom 1, we can apply the following tail bound Laurent and Massart













In other words, for any   2 (0,1/e), with probability at least 1   , we have
k⌘[1]k2 <  (
p
2ln(1/ ) + 1) ⌘⇤




m/2, as long as   = c
p
m ln(1/ )
" for any c   3.5. We will use
this value of   for the remainder of the analysis. Now let L = {⌘ 2 Rm | k⌘[1]k2 >⇤}, then we






































































































































fq̂(⌘) 2 E(q̂,S 0)
⌘








fq̂(⌘) 2 E(q̂,S 0)
⌘




































































This completes the proof.
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A.2.3. Proofs and Details for Theorem 4.3.9
Lemma 2.2.6. Let AO be a certifiable-oracle dependent algorithm that is oracle equivalent to A.
Then for any fixed input dataset S , there exists a coupling between A(S) and AO(S) such that
Pr[AO(S) = a|AO(S) ,?] = Pr[A(S) = a|AO(S) ,?].
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that AO and A draw all their randomness
up front in the form of a random seed ⌘, and are then a deterministic function of the
random seed and the input dataset. By definition, during the run of AO , the algorithm
generates a (possibly randomized, and possibly adaptively chosen) sequence of inputs to
the optimization oracle O, {wd1, . . .wdm}, where each wdi is a weighted dataset. We denote
the output of the ith optimization problem by oi . After the mth optimization problem, AO
outputs a deterministic outcome a = h(o1, o2, . . . om). Given access to a perfect optimization
oracle O⇤, AO⇤ is simply A – this is the definition of oracle equivalence. We construct
a coupling between an algorithmM and AO , and then argue runningM is the same as
running A:
Input: A dataset S , random seed ⌘, heuristic oracle O, perfect oracle O⇤.
Output: values M(S,⌘),A(S,⌘)
Run AO(⌘,S) - generating the first optimization problem wd1.
for i = 1 . . .m do
Compute oi = O(wdi )
if oi =? then
Output AO(S,w) =?
Set oi = O⇤(wdi )
Generate wdi+1 adaptively as a function of previous outputs (oi ,oi 1, . . . o1)
Output M(S,⌘) = h(o1, . . . om) = a
if AO(S,⌘) =? has not been output then
Output AO(S,w) = a
The procedure starts by generating a random seed ⌘ and initializing a run of AO(⌘,S)
- generating the first optimization problem wd1. If the oracle O fails on input wd1,AO
outputs ?. In this case the next optimization input wd2 is generated as a function of the
output of the perfect oracle O⇤(wd1). If it succeeds, we simply generate the next output
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as a function of O(wd1) (which is the same as O⇤(wd1) by definition of certifiability). This
process continues until we solve themth optimization problem, and outputM(⌘,S),AO(⌘,S)
as described above. Now it is clear that if the oracle doesn’t fail, we generate the same
output a for AO andM. No matter whether or not O fails,M has output that corresponds
to perfectly solving the optimization problems generated with input S,⌘, and so it is
equivalent to running A. Moreover, whenever the oracle does not fail, A andM have the
same output, by construction. This completes the proof.
Definition A.2.12 (PEMANTLE and PERES (2014)). Let (X1, . . . ,Xn) ⇢ {0,1}n be an ensemble
of n {0,1}-valued random variables. We say that (X1, . . .Xn) satisfy the stochastic covering
property, if for any I ⇢ [n], J = [n]\I , and a   a0 2 {0,1}|I |, where   denotes coordinate-wise
dominance, such that ||a0   a||1 = 1, there is a coupling v of the distributions µ,µ0 on (Xk)k2J
conditioned on (Xk)k2I = a or (Xk)k2I = a0 respectively, such that v(x,y) = 0 unless x  y and
||x   y||1  1.
Lemma A.2.13. Given a set |S | = n, subsample k  n elements without replacement. Let
Xi 2 {0,1} be 1 if element xi 2 S is subsampled, else 0. Then (X1, . . .Xn) satisfy the stochastic
covering property.
Proof. For a 2 {0,1}|I | let |a| be the number of 1’s in a. Then the distribution of x = XJ |a
corresponds to subsampling k   |a| elements from (xk)k2J , and the distribution of y = XJ |a0
corresponds to subsampling k   |a| + 1 elements from (xk)k2J without replacement. To
establish the stochastic covering property, we exhibit a coupling v of x,y:
To generate y subsample k   |a|+ 1 elements from (xk)k2J without replacement. Let x be
the first k   |a| such elements subsampled. Both x,y constructed as such have the correct
marginal distributions, and by construction x  y, ||x   y||1 = 1 always.
Definition A.2.14. (X1, . . . ,Xn) ⇢ {0,1}n are k-homogenous if Pr[
Pn
i=1Xi = k] = 1.
Theorem A.2.15 (Theorem 3.1 in PEMANTLE and PERES (2014)). Let (X1, . . .Xn) 2 {0,1} be
k-homogenous random variables satisfying the stochastic covering property. Let f : {0,1}n! R
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be an " Lipschitz function, and let µ = E [f (X1, . . .Xn)]. Then for any t > 0:
Pr[|f (X1, . . .Xn) µ|   t]  2e
 t2
8"2k
Lemma 4.3.10. Let P (S) ⇠ P Ssplit . Let A : X l !M be an ("0 ,0) di↵erentially private algorithm,
where: "0 = 1p
8 nK log(2K/ )
. Fix ⌦ ⇢M , and let q⌦(Si) = logPr[A(Si) 2 ⌦]. Define Q to be the
event
Q = {P (S) : max
i,j21...K
|q⌦(Si )  q⌦(Sj )|  2}.
Then over the random draw of P (S) ⇠ P Ssplit , Pr[Q]   1   .
Proof. Fix any index k of the partition. Let {Xi}ni=1 be the indicator random random variables
indicating that element i in S , is included in Sk . Since Sk is entirely determined by {Xi},
we can write q⌦(Sk) as a function of {Xi}, e.g. q⌦(X1, . . .Xn). Moreover, by definition of
"-di↵erential privacy, q⌦ is "-Lipschitz, i.e. for any Xi,X 0i :
|q⌦(X1, . . .Xi , . . .Xn)  q⌦(X1, . . .X 0i , . . .Xn)|  "
By Lemma A.2.13 proven in the Appendix, (X1, . . .Xn) satisfy what is called the stochastic
covering property, a type of negative dependence. Since |Sk | = n/K , (X1, . . .Xn) are n/K-










So by a union bound this holds for all k = 1 . . .K with probability at least 1   . Since for




, by the triangle inequality for all i, j, |q⌦(Si)  
q⌦(Sj )|  2 with probability 1   , as desired.
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Lemma 4.3.11.
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦]




Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] + 4 
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
Proof. Conditioning on L and using Pr[L]   1  2  we have:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = a]




AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|L
i
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
Expanding Pr
h
AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|L
i
by conditioning on F ,P (S) and using the law of total prob-
ability we have:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = a|L]




Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
= (A.2)
Separating the summation in the numerator over P (S) into SQ,ScQ we have:
X
P (S),o2F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] =
X
P (S)2SQ,o2F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] +
X
P (S)2ScQ,o2F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] (A.3)
Rewriting the second term,
X
P (S)2ScQ,o2F










Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),L])Pr[P(S)|L] 
X
P (S)2ScQ
Pr[P(S)|L] = Pr[Qc |L]
The first equality follows from the fact that Pr[o,P (S)|L] = Pr[o|P (S),L]Pr[P (S)|L], and the
second equality follows from the law of total probability. Since Pr[Qc]   , and Pr[L]   1 2 ,
Pr[Qc |L]   /(1  2 )  2 , for    1/4. Thus
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = a|L]




Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] + 2 
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]










Lemma 4.3.12. Fix any o, any P (S) 2 SQ, and index j 2 Iopass, i.e. oj ,?. Then:







Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,?] +
 e2
(1   )
Proof of Lemma 4.3.12. By Equation 4.3, we know:





Pr[AO(Si ) = a|AO(Si ) ,?]
We also know that since we’ve conditioned on L (and hence on E), for each i 2 Iopass on the
RHS of the above equation, Pr[AO(Si ) =?]   . By Lemma 2.2.6, we know that there exists
a coupling between AO(Si) and A(Si) such that Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) , ?] = Pr[A(Si) =
a|AO(Si ) ,?].
By the law of total probability Pr[A(Si ) = a] =
Pr[A(Si ) = a|AO(Si ) ,?]Pr[AO(Si ) ,?] + Pr[A(Si ) = a|AO(Si ) =?]Pr[AO(Si ) =?]
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Then Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) , ?]Pr[AO(Si) , ?]  Pr[A(Si) = a] =) Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,
?]  11   Pr[A(Si ) = a], and similarly Pr[A(Si ) = a|AO(Si ) ,?]   Pr[A(Si ) = a]   .
Since we’ve shown that each of the conditional probabilities Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) , ?] is
close to Pr[AO(Si) = a], since we assume P (S) 2 SQ, we know they are close to each other.
Using the inequalities above:
Pr[A(Sj ) = a|oj ,?] 
1
1    Pr[A(Sj ) = a] 
e2
1    Pr[A(Si ) = a] 
e2
1    (
Pr[A(Si ) = a|oi ,?]
1    +  ), (A.4)
where the middle inequality follows from the definition of SQ. Summing both sides over




Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] 
(1 +
e2





























Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) , ?]
⌘
Pr[o|P(S)], by (?). By







(1   )|o| + (1+
e2










Pulling out the  e
2








(1   ) · "Pr[o|P(S)] =
" e2






(1   ) Pr[P(S)] 
" e2
(1   ) .









(1   )2(1"   1)
) · 1|o| ·
X
i2Iopass ,i,1







Applying this upper bound on (?) gives:
X
P (S)2SQ,o2F
















































End of proof of Theorem 4.3.9.

















Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,?]Pr[o1 =?,o 1|P(S)] +
1
|o 1 + 1|










Pr[AO(Si ) 2⌦|AO(Si ) ,?]Pr[o 1|P(S)]
⌘
,
where we’ve used the fact that Pr[o1 = ?,o 1|P(S)] + Pr[o1 , ?,o 1|P(S)] = Pr[o 1|P(S)].




























Pr[AO(S 0i ) 2⌦|AO(S 0i ) ,?]Pr[o 1|P(S 0)]
⌘











































Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
(A.10)
Since Si = S 0i for all i , 1, this reduces to:
(1 +
e2


















Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
(A.11)
since |o 1|   1" by definition.
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Following the chain of inequalities back to their genesis, we finally obtain:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
 (1 + e
2






Pr[AprsmO (S 0) 2⌦]
,
which substituting into Lemma 4.3.11 gives:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) 2⌦]  (1 +
e2






0) 2⌦] + 4  + " e
2
1   
For ",   1/2, (1 + e2
(1  )2( 1"  1)
) 11 "  e8e
2"+"+"2 , which establishes that PRSMA is (8e2" + " +
"2,4  + " e
2
1   ) di↵erentially private. Setting " = "
⇤,  =  ⇤ completes the proof.
A.2.4. Proofs from Section 4.5
Theorem 4.5.3. Let ",  2 (0,1) and let A be an (", ) di↵erentially private pERM algorithm for
query class Q, with perturbation distribution D(", ). Then Follow the Private Leader instantiated
with A has expected regret bounded by:
R(T ) O
 




Proof. This theorem is folklore, and this proof is adapted from the lecture notes of Roth
and Smith (2017). We introduce some notation. First, write `t 2 R|Q| to denote the “loss
vector” faced by the algorithm at round t, with value qi(xt) in coordinate i. Write `1:t to
denote the summed vector `1:t =
Pt
j=1 `
j . Write M : Rd ! Rd to denote the function such
that M(v)i⇤ = 1 where i⇤ = argmini vi and M(v)i = 0 otherwise. In this notation, at each
round t, “Follow the Leader” obtains loss M(`1:t 1) · `t and “Follow the Private Leader”
obtains loss M(`1:t 1 +Zt) · `t . At the end of play, at time T , the best query q in hindsight
obtains cumulative loss M(`1:T ) · `1:T .
The proof of this theorem will go through a thought experiment. Consider an imaginary
algorithm called “be the leader”, which at round t plays according to M(`1:t). We will first
193
show that this imaginary algorithm obtains loss that is only lower than that of the best
action in hindsight.




M(`1:t) · `t M(`1:T ) · `1:T
Proof. This follows by a simple induction on T . For T = 1, it holds with equality. Now




M(`1:t) · `t M(`1:T ) · `1:T +M(`1:T+1) · `T+1 
M(`1:T+1) · `1:T +M(`1:T+1) · `T+1 =M(`1:T+1) · `1:T+1 (A.12)
Recall that private pERM algorithms operate by sampling a perturbation vector Zt ⇠D",  at
each round. Next, we show that “be the private leader”, which at round t plays according
to M(`1:t +Zt), doesn’t do much worse.
Lemma A.2.17 (Kalai and Vempala (2005)). For any set of loss vectors `1, . . . ,`T and any set of










Proof. Define ˆ̀t = `t +Zt  Zt 1. Note that ˆ̀1:t = `1:t +Zt , since the sum telescopes. Thus,




M(`1:t +Zt) · (`t +Zt  Zt 1)  M(`1:T +ZT ) · (`1:T +ZT )
 M(`1:T ) · (`1:T +ZT )




M(`1:T ) · (Zt  Zt 1)








(M(`1:T ) M(`1:t +Zt)) · (Zt  Zt 1) 





We will use this lemma and a trick to compute the expected regret of “be the private leader”.









E[M(`1:t +Zt) · `t]
Hence, the expectation remains unchanged in the thought experiment under which the
perturbation is not resampled at every step, and instead Z1 = . . . = Zt ⇠ D", . Applying





M(`1:t +Zt) · `t] M(`1:T ) · `1:T +2E[||Z1||1]
Finally, we use the fact that the algorithm is (", )-di↵erentially private, and the di↵erence
between “follow the private leader” and “be the private leader” amounts to running a
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di↵erentially private algorithm on one of two datasets. For any (", ) di↵erentially private
algorithm A : X ⇤ ! R, for any function f : R ! [0,T ], and for any pair of neighboring
datasets S,S 0 we have that:
E[f (A(S))]  e"E[f (A(S 0))] +  T .
We can therefore conclude that for each t:
E[M(`1:t 1 +Zt) · `t]  e"E[M(`1:t +Zt) · `t] +  t
















M(`1:T ) · `1:T +2E[||Z1||1]
⌘
+  T M(`1:T ) · `1:T + (2+4")E[||Z1||1] + 2"T +  T
Dividing by T yields the theorem.
Theorem 4.5.5. For any d, there is a fixed finite class of statistical queries Q of size |Q| =N = 2d
defined over a data universe of size |X | = O(N5 log2N ) such that for every online learning
algorithm with access to a weighted optimization oracle for Q, it cannot guarantee that its
expected average regret will be o(1) in total time less than ⌦(
p
N/ log3(N )).
Proof. We start by quoting the main ingredient proven in Hazan and Koren (2016) that
goes into their lower bound:
Theorem A.2.18 (Hazan and Koren (2016) Theorem 4). For every N = 2d , and for every
randomized algorithm for the players in the game with access to a best-response oracle, there is an
N ⇥N game with payo↵s taking values in {0,1/4,3/4,1} such that with probability 2/3 the players
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We start by using the Yao min-max principle to reverse the order of quantifiers: Theorem
A.2.18 also implies that there is a fixed distribution over N ⇥ N games that is hard in
expectation for every algorithm. However, because we will be interested in the support size
of this distribution, we go into a bit more detail in how we apply the min-max principle.
Consider a “meta game” defined by an (infinite) matrix M , with rows i indexed by the
L = 4N
2
N ⇥N zero-sum games Gi taking values in {0,1/4,3/4,1}, and columns indexed by
algorithms Aj instantiated with best-response oracles designed to play zero-sum games.
M(i, j) will encode the expected running time before algorithm Aj when used to play game
Gi converges to a value that is within 1/4 of the equilibrium value of game Gi . Let the
row player (the “lower bound” player) be the maximization player in the zero sum game
defined by M , and let the column player (the “algorithm player”) be the minimization
player. As stated, the entries in M can take unboundedly large values — but observe that
there is a simple modification to the game that allows us to upper bound the entries in
M by O(N logN ). This is because there exists an algorithm A (the multiplicative weights
algorithm — see e.g. Arora et al. (2012)) that can be used to play any N ⇥N game and
converge to a 1/4-approximate equilibrium after time at most O(N logN ) (running in time
O(N ) per iteration for O(logN ) iterations). It is also possible to check whether a pair of
distributions form a 1/4 approximate equilibrium with two calls to a best response oracle.
Hence, we can take any algorithm Ai and modify it so that it converges to a 1/4-approximate
equilibrium after at most O(N logN ) time. We simply halt the algorithm after O(N logN )
time if it has not yet converged, and run the multiplicative weights algorithm A. Theorem
A.2.18 implies that the value of this modified game M is at least ⌦(
p
N/ log3(N )).
We now observe that the “meta-game” M has an O(1)-approximate max-min strategy for
the lower bound player that has support size at most O(N4 log2N ). To see this, consider
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the following constructive approach to computing an approximate equilibrium: simulate
play of the game in rounds. Let the lower bound player sample a game Gt at each round
t using the multiplicative weights distribution over her L actions, and let the algorithm
player best respond at each round to the lower bound player’s distribution. By construction,
the algorithm player has 0 regret, whereas the lower bound player has regret O(
p
logL/T ·
N logN ) after T rounds (since the entries of M are bounded between 0 and O(N logN ))
This corresponds to O(1) regret after T =O(logL ·N2 log2N ) =O(N4 log2N ) many rounds.
By Theorem 5.4.9, the empirical distribution over these O(N4 log2N ) many games Gt forms
an O(1)-approximate max-min strategy. Thus we have proven:
Corollary A.2.19. For every N = 2d , there is a fixed set H ✓ {0,1/4,3/4,1}N⇥N of N ⇥N games,
of size |H | =O(N4 log2N ) such that for every randomized algorithm A for players in a game with
access to a best response oracle, there is a game G 2H such that with probability 2/3, the players




Now consider the N ⇥O(N5 log2N ) matrix R that results from stacking the matrices in H .
Identify the N rows with a query class Q of size N , indexed by functions q 2 Q. Identify the
columns with a data universe X of size |X | =O(N5 log2N ) indexed by x 2 X , and define the
queries such that q(x) = R(q,x) for each q 2 Q,x 2 X . Observe that any no-regret algorithm
with action set Q that can obtain o(1) regret against an adversary who is constrained to play
loss vectors in X can be used to compute an o(1) approximate equilibrium strategy for any
game in H (together with a single call to a best-response oracle per round by his oppoinent,
by Theorem 5.4.9). Thus we can conclude that no algorithm can guarantee to get o(1) regret
over Q until at least ⌦(
p
N/ log3(N )) time.
Theorem 4.5.6. Any oracle e cient (i.e. running in time poly(n, log |Q|)) (", )-di↵erentially
private pERM algorithm instantiated with a weighted optimization oracle for the query class
Q defined in Theorem 4.5.5, with perturbation distribution D(", ) must be such that for every
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(" +  ) = o(1):
EZ⇠D(", ) [||Z ||1]  ⌦(|Q|
c)
for some constant c > 0.
Proof. For any such pERM algorithm A, Let B = EZ⇠D(", ) [||Z ||1]. We know from Theorem
4.5.3 that follow the private leader instantiated with A obtains regret o(1) whenever T =
!(B), for any "+  = o(1). SinceA is oracle e cient (i.e. runs in time poly(t, log |Q|)), the total
running time needed to obtain diminishing regret is
PT
t=1poly(t, log |Q|) = poly(B, log |Q|).
We know from Theorem 4.5.5 that to guarantee diminishing regret over Q, the total running
time must be at least ⌦(
p
|Q|/ log3(|Q|)). Thus we must have that B = poly(|Q|) — i.e.
B =⌦(|Q|c) for some c > 0.
A.3. Details from Chapter 5
A.3.1. Cherno↵-Hoe↵ding Bound
We use the following concentration inequality.
Theorem A.3.1 (Real-vaued Additive Cherno↵-Hoe↵ding Bound). Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xm be i.i.d.

























Proof of Theorems 5.2.8 and 5.2.9. We give a proof of Theorem 5.2.8. The proof of Theorem
5.2.9 is identical, as false positive rates are just positive classification rates on the subset of
the data for which y = 0.
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Given a set of classifiers H and protected groups G, define the following function class:
FH,G = {fh,g (x) ⌘ h(x)^ g(x) : h 2H, g 2 G}
We can relate the VC-dimension of FH,G to the VC-dimension of H and G:
Claim A.3.2.
VCDIM(FH,G)  Õ(VCDIM(H) +VCDIM(G))
Proof. Let S be a set of size m shattered by FH,G. Let ⇡FH,G (S) be the number of labelings of
S realized by elements of FH,G. By the definition of shattering, ⇡FH,G (S) = 2m. Now for each
labeling of S by an element in FH,G, it is realized as (f ^ g)(S) for some f 2 F , g 2 G. But
(f ^ g)(S) = f (S)^ g(S), and so it can be realized as the conjunction of a labeling of S by an
element of F and an element of G. But since there are ⇡F (S)⇡G(S) such pairs of labelings,
this immediately implies that ⇡FH,G (S)  ⇡F (S)⇡G(S). Now by the Sauer-Shelah Lemma
(see e.g. Kearns and Vazirani (1994b)), ⇡F (S) =O(mVCDIM(H)),⇡G(S) =O(mVCDIM(G)). Thus
⇡FH,G (S) = 2
m O(mVCDIM(H)+VCDIM(G)), which implies thatm = Õ(VCDIM(H)+VCDIM(G)),
as desired.
This bound, together with a standard VC-Dimension based uniform convergence theorem


































[h(X) = 1|g(x) = 1] · Pr
(X,y)⇠P
[g(x) = 1]  Pr
(X,y)⇠PS










This completes our proof.
A.3.3. Missing Proofs in Section 5.4
Theorem 5.4.5. Let (D̂,  ̂) be a ⌫-approximate minmax solution to the ⇤-bounded Lagrangian
problem in the sense that
L(D̂,  ̂)  min
D2 H(S)
L(D,  ̂) + ⌫ and, L(D̂,  ̂)  max
 2⇤
L(D̂, )  ⌫.
Then err(D̂,P ) OPT+2⌫ and for any g 2 G(S),




Proof of Theorem 5.4.5. Let D⇤ be the optimal feasible solution for our constrained opti-
mization problem. Since D⇤ is feasible, we know that L(D⇤,  ̂)  err(D⇤,P ).




Let (ĝ , •̂) 2 argmax(g,•) •(D̂,g) and let  0 2 ⇤ be a vector with ( 0)•̂ĝ = C and all other
coordinates zero. By Lemma 5.4.8, we know that  0 2 argmax 2⇤L(D̂, ). By the definition
of a ⌫-approximate minmax solution, we know that L(D̂,  ̂)   L(D̂, 0) ⌫. This implies that
L(D̂,  ̂)   err(D̂,P ) +C •̂(D̂, ĝ)  ⌫ (A.14)
Note that L(D⇤,  ̂)  err(D⇤,P ), and so
L(D̂,  ̂)  min
D2 H(S)
L(D,  ̂) + ⌫  L(D⇤,  ̂) + ⌫ (A.15)
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Combining Equations (A.14) and (A.15), we get
err(D̂,P ) +C •̂(D̂, ĝ)  L(D̂,  ̂) + ⌫  L(D⇤,  ̂) + 2⌫  err(D⇤,P ) + 2⌫
Note that C •̂(D̂, ĝ)   0, so we must have err(D̂,P )  err(D⇤,P ) + 2⌫ = OPT+2⌫. Further-
more, since err(D̂,P ), err(D⇤,P ) 2 [0,1], we know
C •̂(D̂, ĝ)  1+2⌫,
which implies that maximum constraint violation satisfies •̂(D̂, ĝ)  (1+2⌫)/C. By applying
Claim 5.4.4, we get




Now let us consider the case in which D̂ is a feasible solution for the optimization problem.
Then it follows that there is no constraint violation by D̂ and max L(D̂, ) = err(D̂,P ), and
so
err(D̂,P ) = max
 
L(D̂, )  L(D̂,  ̂) + ⌫ min
D
L(D,  ̂) + 2⌫  L(D⇤,  ̂) + 2⌫  err(D⇤,P ) + 2⌫
Therefore, the stated bounds hold for both cases.
Lemma 5.4.8. Fix any D 2  H(S) such that that maxg2G(S){ +(D,g),  (D,g)} > 0. Let  0 2⇤
be vector with one non-zero coordinate ( 0)•
0
g 0 = C, where





























Note that this is a linear optimization problem over the non-negative orthant of a scaling of
the `1 ball, and so has a solution at a vertex, which corresponds to a single group g 2 G(S).
Thus, there is always a best response  0 that puts all the weight C on the coordinate ( 0)•g
that maximizes  •(D,g).
Lemma 5.4.10. Let T be the time horizon for the no-regret dynamics. Let D1, . . . ,DT be the



















U(h, t)  2n1/4(1 +C)
p
T
Proof of Lemma 5.4.10. To instantiate the regret bound in Theorem 5.2.6, we just need to
provide a bound on the maximum absoluate value over the coordinates of the loss vector
(the quantity M in Theorem 5.2.6). For any   2⇤, the absolute value of the i-th coordinate






























































































Also note that the dimension of the optimization is the size of the dataset n. This means if








Lemma 5.4.11. Fix any ⇠ ,  2 (0,1) and any distribution D over H(S). Let h1, . . . ,hm be m i.i.d.
draws from p, and D̂ be the empirical distribution over the realized sample. Then with probability



















as long as m   c0 C
2(ln(1/ )+d2 ln(n))
⇠2 for some absolute constant c0 and d2 = VCDIM(G).
Proof of Lemma 5.4.11. Recall that for any distribution D0 over H(S) the expected payo↵



























































By the triangle inequality, it su ces to show that with probability (1  ),A = |Eh⇠D [err(h,P )] 





































































The first part follows directly from a simple application of the Cherno↵-Hoe↵ding bound
(Theorem A.3.1): with probability (1   /2), A  ⇠/2, as long as m   2ln(4/ )/⇠2.
To bound the second part, we first note that by Hölder’s inequality, we have




Since for all   2 ⇤ we have k k1  C, it su ces to show that with probability 1    /2,




















[Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0, g(x) = 1]]  E
h⇠D̂







































[Pr[h(X) = 1 | y = 0]]  E
h⇠D̂
[Pr[h(X) = 1 | y = 0]]
!

















[Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0]]  E
h⇠D̂








where the last inequality follows from Pr[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]  1.





j (X) = 1, y = 0, g(x) = 1], which is
an average of m i.i.d. random variables with expectation Eh⇠D [Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0, g(x) = 1]].










[Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0]]  E
h⇠D̂































[Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0, g(x) = 1]]  E
h⇠D̂












By taking the union bound over (A.16) and (A.17) over all choices of g 2 G(S), we have with








[Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0]]  E
h⇠D̂


















[Pr[h(X) = 1, y = 0, g(x) = 1]]  E
h⇠D̂








for all g 2 G(S).
(A.19)




. Thus, there exists an absolute
constant c0 such that m   c0 C
2(ln(1/ )+d2 ln(n))
⇠2 implies that failure probability above  0(1 +
|G(S)|)   /2. We will assume m satisifies such a bound, and so the events of (A.18) and
(A.19) hold with probaility at least (1   /2). Then by the triangle inequality we have for all
(g,•) 2 G(S)⇥ {±}, | •(D,g)  •(D̂,g)|  ⇠/(2C), which implies that B  ⇠/2. This completes
the proof.






































Lemma 5.4.12. Let T be the time horizon for the no-regret dynamics. Let D1, . . . ,DT be the
sequence of distributions maintained by the Learner’s FTPL algorithm. For each Dt , let D̂t be the
empirical distribution over m i.i.d. draws from Dt . Let  1, . . . , T be the Auditor’s best responses



















c0C2(ln(T / ) + d2 ln(n))
m
for some absolute constant c0 and d2 = VCDIM(G).
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By instantiating Lemma 5.4.11 and applying union bound across all T steps, we know with
probability at least 1   , the following holds for all t 2 [T ]:
  tA 
r
c0C2(ln(T / ) + d2 ln(n))
m
where c0 is the absolute constant in Lemma 5.4.11 and d2 = VCDIM(G).
Note that by Claim A.3.3, the Auditor is performing a   tA-approximate best response at






















































It follows that with probability 1   , we have
 A 
r
c0C2(ln(T / ) + d2 ln(n))
m
which completes the proof.
A.4. Details from Chapter 6




































































































































Algorithm 12 Best Response, BEST (D,↵), for the dual player
Input: training examples S = {xi ,yi}ni=1, D 2  (H), ↵ 2 [0,1]n
2
  = 0 2 Rn2
(i⇤, j⇤) = argmax(i,j)2[n]2 Eh⇠D
h



















(i,j)2[n]2 wij↵ij   ⌘  0
C⌧ o.w.
Output:  ,⌧
Lemma A.4.2. For fixed D and ↵, the output   from BEST (D,↵) minimizes L
 1
D,↵
Proof. Because L 1D,↵ is linear in terms of   and the feasible region is the non-negative
orthant bounded by 1-norm, the optimal solution must include putting all the weight to
the pair (i, j) where Eh⇠D
h




Lemma A.4.3. For fixed D and ↵, the output ⌧ from BEST (D,↵) minimizes L
 2
D,↵
Proof. Because L 2D,↵ is linear in terms of ⌧, the optimal solution is trivially to set ⌧ at either
C⌧ or 0 depending on the sign.
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